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glossAry
Auditee One subjected to an audit (e.g. management of an organi-
zation, entity).
bad news messages Unwelcome but valuable and constructive risk warning 
messages issued by the internal auditors to the message 
recipients (e.g. (project) management) about risks that 
threaten the organization (e.g. projects and their status).
Escalating Is-project Information Systems projects that receive a stable or even 
increasing amount of resources from decision makers even 
when strong signals are available that goal attainment of 
the project is no longer viable.
Internal auditor The risk warning messenger who meets the professional 
standards of the Institute of Internal Auditing (IIA, 2004).
Internal Auditing An independent, objective assurance and consulting activ-
ity designed to add value and improve an organization’s op-
erations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives 
by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate 
and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control 
and governance processes (Institute of Internal Auditors 
(IIA) definition).
Internal audit function The department within an organization in which internal 
auditors perform their roles and responsibilities according 
to the definition of internal auditing provided by the IIA.
nudging Small cues in a message that could unconsciously be of 
influence on people’s behaviour.
social norm The term ‘social norm’ can refer to 1. what is commonly 
done, what is normal (descriptive norms) and 2. what is 
commonly approved and disapproved, what ought to be 
done (injunctive norms).
timing The precise moment for doing something for optimum ef-
fect. 
PrEfAcE
My PhD journey started some months before I took on the responsibility for the Audit 
Professional Practices department within a large Dutch Bank in January, 2014. This was a 
perfect timing to start studying the IA effectiveness because of three reasons. 
Firstly, in my new role I was responsible amongst others, for delivering input to our 
performance reporting to senior management that includes various indicators of the 
effectiveness of our internal audit department. This provided me with more knowledge 
of and an insight in the indicators of the IA effectiveness giving me a great opportunity 
to think about additional indicators to improve IA effectiveness. 
Secondly, in these times, senior management of the Bank was faced with important 
strategic decisions that had to be made quickly and in the right direction, making the 
effective internal auditor’s risk warnings messages to become more necessary than ever. 
Thirdly, the CEO read almost every audit report and showed a great support to our 
internal audit function by personally paying great attention to resolving serious audit 
issues. This triggered me to go after the effect of this support of senior management for 
the effectiveness of the IA function.
Being for almost 25 years in the audit profession, having done many audits, I had 
the wish to give something back to the internal audit profession, give my knowledge 
contribution to the new generations of internal auditors who will work in practice and 
academic research.
All the above played pivotal role in my motivation to start a research on IA effective-
ness in such crucial times for the company. This thesis consists of four individual studies 
on indicators of IA effectiveness, which I realised in four years’ time in parallel to my full 
time job. 
I hope the results of my studies will help to improve practices and fill the knowledge 
gap in academic literature about IA effectiveness.

1
Introduction
The effectiveness of Internal Audit (IA) takes a prominent place in the Institute of 
Internal Auditing’s (IIA’s) definition but it is also frequently debated and challenged in 
practice. Evaluating and improving the effectiveness of risk management, control, and 
governance processes is the key statement of IA (IIARF, 2015).
Many incidents related to large corporate bankruptcies in the beginning of this cen-
tury, caused some tension between the value that IA believes to provide and the value 
perceived by its customers. While the IIA sees IA as a pillar of corporate governance, 
some of its key stakeholders nowadays doubt its effectiveness and hence its value for the 
organization. In practice there are many occasions when audit issues addressed by the 
internal auditor are not always accepted by management and even though audit issues 
are accepted by management and corrective actions have been agreed, management 
turns a deaf ear to the internal auditor’s risk warning and is continuing the ‘wrongdoing’. 
As an illustration, we often hear about organizations experiencing large projects that are 
not successful but not stopped by management despite the risk warnings reported by 
the internal auditor asking for change of course in the project direction.
In academic literature the reluctance to hear ‘bad news’ is a phenomenon that has 
been typified as a ‘deaf effect’ (Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar et al, 2006; Keil and Robey, 2001). 
The deaf effect could unfavourably influence the effectiveness of the internal auditor. In 
their recent studies Nuijten (2012) and Nuijten et al, (2016) suggested that deaf effect 
events on strategic topics such as continuation of a ‘troubled’ IT-project could be con-
sidered as a deficiency in the IA’s effectiveness. While the question arises whether IA acts 
effectively in deaf effect situations, in circumstances of disastrous business failures, this 
could be followed by the inevitable question ‘where was the auditor again?’. This could 
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further raise the question if the IA was effective in providing its services to management, 
which may further have unfavourable effects for the IA function within the organization 
as well as for the internal auditing as a profession in general. Therefore, internal audi-
tors, as risk warnings messengers, need better ways of gaining the attention of message 
recipients to overcome the deaf effect and thus contribute to the effectiveness of the IA. 
IA effectiveness definitions
One of the older and most used definitions of the effectiveness of the IA function is the 
definition of Dittenhofer (2001). In general, Dittenhofer (2001) relates the effectiveness 
of something with the achievement of a desired condition and points out that the in-
ternal auditing process is effective when it functions in such a way as to accomplish the 
task described by the internal auditing objective. In line with this definition, Mihret and 
Yismaw (2007) stated that internal audit is effective if it meets the intended outcome it 
is supposed to bring about. According to these definitions, effectiveness is synonymous 
with the achievement of goals. 
In the literature there are other definitions of IA effectiveness that are related to 
acceptance of the internal auditors recommendations for improvement. For example, 
Sawyer (1995) stated that the auditor’s job is not done until defects are corrected and 
remain corrected. Sawyer (1995) stated that management’s commitment to use audit 
recommendations and its support in strengthening internal audit is vital to audit effec-
tiveness (Sawyer, 1995). One decade later, the IIARF (2015) defines the internal auditing 
as an independent activity that helps organizations to improve their operations (IIARF, 
2015). In this regard, the IA function can be considered effective when organizations 
follow their internal auditors’ (independent) advice for improvement (Lenz, 2013). Fur-
thermore, Lenz and Sarens (2012) consider that the IA report as an output cannot be 
effective per se, but all what matters is the intended change triggered by this output as 
well as the specific outcome of it and possibly lasting impact that achieves the wanted 
improvement.
In line with these definitions, in this thesis we look at the IA effectiveness from the 
perspective of deaf effect i.e. willingness of management to listen or not to listen to the 
internal auditor’s risk warning messages.
Deaf effect and IA effectiveness
The reluctance to hear bad news is a phenomenon that has been labelled in the literature 
as a ‘deaf effect’. In this thesis we use the deaf effect phenomenon (Cuellar, 2009; Cuellar 
et al, 2006) to define the effectiveness of IA. Based on the Whistle-Blowing Theory, Cuel-
lar (2009) defined deaf effect as a phenomenon ‘when a decision maker doesn’t hear, 
ignores, overrules a report of bad news to continue a failing course of action’. Keil and 
Robey (2001) defined the ‘deaf effect’ as a reluctance of project management to hear bad 
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news (i.e. unwelcome but yet valuable messages) about their projects and confirmed 
that deaf effect does occur. Recently, Nuijten (2012) and Nuijten et al, (2016) investigated 
some of the causal factors that influence the deaf effect and suggested that deaf effect 
can be considered as a deficiency in the IA’s effectiveness, which could even be followed 
later by the inevitable ‘where was the auditor’ question in disastrous business failures. In 
his study, Nuijten (2012) explained comprehensively the two different roles of internal 
auditors, how they are related to corporate governance and how they are reflected in the 
relationship with managers. In explaining this, reference is made to the formalized role 
of the internal auditor as part of organizations’ corporate governance frameworks, re-
lated to providing risk information to decision makers when the organization takes risks 
that might no longer be justifiable and consistent with the organization’s interests. This 
corporate governance framework could be dominated by principles and assumptions 
of the Agency Theory (incongruent goals and information asymmetry) or Stewardship 
Theory (congruent goals and information sharing). This determines whether the internal 
auditors - as exponent of this corporate governance framework - are supposed to a) 
monitor management risk-taking and expose management failures and decisions that 
are not consistent with organization’ interests, or b) contribute to management perfor-
mance by challenging and improving decision-making. In the first condition (based on 
Agency Theory principles) the internal auditor will act as an opponent to management. 
In the second condition (based on Stewardship Theory), the internal auditor will act as a 
collaborative partner to management. According to the Stewardship Theory, managers 
would appear to be more receptive to (even negative results from) objective assess-
ments performed by the internal auditors when they consider them to be collaborative 
partners instead of opponents or ‘policemen’. 
Focussing on the relationship between the messenger and the recipient at an inter-
personal level: with the internal auditor in the role of the provider of a risk warning and 
with the project owner’s relationship with the messenger (as a collaborative partner or 
as an opponent), based on empirical research, Nuijten (2012) and later Nuijten et al, 
(2016) provided evidence that managers (project owners) are more likely to listen to 
the risk warnings from an internal auditor who is seen as a collaborative partner, regard-
less of the objectivity and credibility of the internal auditor to make true assertions on 
risks. The managers are less motivated intrinsically to listen to the risk warning, when 
the messenger is seen as an opponent – such an internal auditor is often labelled as a 
‘policeman’.
We base our studies on the principles of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory and 
the relationships according to these theories.
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Identifi ed knowledge gap in prior academic research
Prior research on factors infl uencing IA eff ectiveness has tended to focus predominantly 
on factors such as the acceptance and implementation of the audit recommendations, 
the size of the audit department, compliance with the auditing standards, the position-
ing of the Internal Audit department in the organization and relation with the Audit 
Committee, and interaction with line managers (Arena and Azzone, 2009), top manage-
ment support (Cohen and Sayag, 2010; Van Peursem, 2005; Mihret and Yismaw 2007), 
staff  expertise, executing the audit plan, audit communication (Mihret and Yismaw, 
2007), organizational support’ (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; 2006b). 
Based on a literature review, Lenz and Sarens (2012) and Lenz et al, (2014) derived 
four key dimensions or categorical building blocks of eff ectiveness of the IA function: 
organization, IA resources, IA processes and IA relationships (see Figure 1-1 below).
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Figure 1-1. Building blocks of IAF characteristics according to Lenz and Sarens (2012), 
Lenz et al, (2014)
figure 1-1. Building blocks of IAF characteristics according to Lenz and Sarens (2012), Lenz et al, (2014)
An overview of these dimensions (Lenz et al, 2014) follows below: 
•	 Interpersonal	 relations:	 the	 IA	 relationships	with	other	governance	actors,	namely	
senior management (SM) and the board/AC.
•	 Organizational	 factors:	fi	rm	size,	 the	overall	governance	context,	and	whether	 the	
organization has a legal requirement to establish an IA function, are considered as 
diff erentiators that can aff ect IA eff ectiveness, IA role and mandate.
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•	 Personality	factors:	characteristics	of	the	IA	function	as	a	whole	and	the	character-
istics of the individual auditor, communication skills and personal authority, stature 
and presence, strategic audit focus, the ability to exercise sound judgment, and the 
capacity to communicate clearly on audit issues.
•	 IA	 processes:	 compliance	with	 the	 audit	 plan	 (i.e.,	 the	 number	 of	 audits	 planned	
versus the number executed); compliance with a budget; degree of satisfaction with 
the IA as seen by auditees; audit time management (planning, fieldwork, closing); 
and reporting time management (i.e. planned versus actual reporting time).
From the above, we could establish that the IA effectiveness from the perspective of 
deaf effect i.e. willingness of management to listen or not to listen to the internal auditor 
risk warning messages is not addressed in one of these building blocks. We think this 
willingness of management to listen or not to listen to the internal auditor risk warning 
messages belongs to the interpersonal relationship block. This is one of the knowledge 
gaps we want to address with our thesis.
In the existing literature on IA effectiveness we identified some more knowledge gaps 
that we aim to fill in with our study. For this purpose we use the paper of Lenz and 
Hahn (2015) who performed a comprehensive review on the available literature on ef-
fectiveness of IA. By generally considering publications from 1999 onward, their paper 
provided a brief summary of what academic literature says about IA effectiveness. When 
providing a review of the existing empirical literature on IA effectiveness, Lenz and Hahn 
(2015) distinguished two different streams, the ‘supply-side’ perspective, i.e. empirical 
studies based on self-assessments of internal auditors, and the demand-side’ perspec-
tive, i.e. empirical studies based on other stakeholders’ perspectives. Stream 1 addresses 
the ‘supply-side’ perspective, empirical literature where internal auditors, mostly heads 
of IA (CAE), describe how they assess their effectiveness. The role of the CAE and the skills 
and competencies of internal auditors, organizational specifics, its politics and culture, 
support from senior management and the impact of the board, directly or through the 
audit committee (AC), are regarded as important factors (Lenz and Hahn, 2015). Stream 
2 addresses the ‘demand-side’ perspective (i.e. meeting expectation of auditees) as it 
sheds light on empirical literature that discusses and analyses how clients, the custom-
ers and beneficiaries of the services rendered by the IA function perceive its value. 
Lenz and Hahn (2015) consider IA effectiveness as a largely unaddressed area in 
academic research and based on their research suggested factors that influence IA 
effectiveness thereby focussing predominantly on the stakeholders (‘demand-side’) 
perspective. This gap in the literature was earlier reported by Soh and Martinov Ben-
nie (2011) who posited that in practice, the most commonly employed measures of IA 
effectiveness are still related to delivery of the annual IA plan and the acceptance and 
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adoption of audit recommendations, hence focussing on the ‘supply-side’ perspective 
of the IA effectiveness. 
By investigating other factors that may influence the effectiveness of IA we address 
this knowledge gap in the literature, thereby focussing on the ‘demand-side’ perspective 
and its link with the ‘supply-side’ perspective. 
Another knowledge gap in the area of IA effectiveness we aim to address in our study 
relates to the relevance of nudging and timing for the IA effectiveness. While we could 
find many studies in the behavioural literature that address nudging (refer to Chapter 
3 of this thesis), to our knowledge nudging concepts are not yet applied in academic 
research of IA effectiveness. Similarly, the influence of timing in general is relatively little 
examined in the organizational literature but in the IA effectiveness literature not yet 
addressed (refer to Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis).
One final remark we want to make here is about the knowledge gaps in the litera-
ture related to Stewardship Theory. Davis et al, (1997) recommended to researchers to 
further examine the stewardship mechanisms, their relative performance, their interac-
tions with psychological conditions and the situational contingencies impacting them. 
Furthermore, Davis et al, (1997) advised researchers to investigate the choice between 
Agency and Stewardship relationships over time, including interaction effects between 
the relationship and other organizational or psychological factors. With our study we 
hope to address some of these recommendations and to further advance the under-
standing of the Stewardship Theory. Hernandez (2012; p. 173) noted “to date scholars of 
Stewardship Theory have focused on distinguishing it from Agency Theory rather than 
advancing an understanding of the stewardship construct”.
To summarize, with this study thesis we aim to contribute to fill the abovementioned 
knowledge gaps in the existing academic literature about IA effectiveness. Additionally, 
with this study we also aim to contribute to the literature by further extending previ-
ous examination on the deaf effect in the field of escalating IS-projects. Finally, we aim 
to gather knowledge that will further advance the understanding of the Stewardship 
Theory.
research objective and scope
The objective of this study is as follows:
1. Identifying and recommending additional approaches and factors from the ‘demand-
side’ perspective of IA effectiveness for reducing deaf effect and hence improving IA 
effectiveness; 
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2. Examining the main causal effects of additional contingency factors such as orga-
nization power of the internal auditor operationalized in top management support 
and nudging concepts including descriptive social norms and their interaction 
effects from the collaborative partner vs opponent perspective. Additionally, we 
examined what constitutes the right ‘timing’ for communicating the risk warnings by 
the internal auditor as a new contingency factor for IA effectiveness;
3. Combining both the ‘supply’ and the ‘demand’ side perspective of the IA effective-
ness for finding better ways for meeting customer expectations.
We include here the collaborative partner vs opponent relationship between the in-
ternal auditor (messenger of risk warnings (bad news)) and the auditee (management 
– decision makers). The meaning of the collaborative partner vs opponent construct will 
be further explained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis based on the Stewardship 
Theory and Agency Theory. The top management support construct is explained in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis based on the Whistleblowing Theory and literature on IA ef-
fectiveness. The nudging construct is detailed in Chapter 3 of this thesis and is based on 
the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct and Nudging concepts. Exploring the timing 
factors on the basis of the so called ‘supply vs demand’ side of the IA effectiveness will 
be explained in Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
The scope of this study included the IA function being our unit of analysis and the 
internal auditor being the unit of observation. For the purpose of our study we defined 
IA effectiveness as the extent to which the internal auditor’s message recipients (audi-
tees) are willing to listen or not to listen to the internal auditors’ risk warning message 
(so called ‘deaf effect’). 
Focussing on the deaf effect as an indicator for IA effectiveness, in our studies de-
scribed in Chapter 2 and 3 we made the assumption that a manager acts in the role of 
project owner who is not willing to listen to the risk warning message that an Information 
System project should be redirected or discontinued. In Chapter 4 and 5 a manager acts 
in the role of an auditee (management) who is not willing to listen to the risk warning 
messages related to risks involved in management’s decision making in the organization 
in general. The messenger providing the risk warnings is our study is the internal auditor 
who is a credible source that makes true assertions based on thorough investigation in 
conformity with the internal auditing standards and requirements (Nuijten et al, 2016). 
As our main research objective is related to investigating several different factors 
influencing the deaf effect as an indicator of IA effectiveness, we position our study in 
the field of academic research of IA effectiveness as well as deaf effect.
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research questions
In table 1-1 we present the Research Questions that are based on our scope and as-
sumptions and that will form the starting point for the research design of our studies 
elaborated in Chapter 2 - 5 of this thesis.
table 1-1. Research Questions
research Question type of 
Question
chapter
1 Could the organization power of the internal auditor (through high or low 
top management support) be of influence on the deaf effect?
Why 2
1.1 Could the messenger-recipient relationship (MRR) be of influence on 
the deaf effect?
Why 2
1.2 Is the influence of MRR on the deaf effect moderated by the 
organization power of the internal auditor through top management 
support?
How 2
2 Are recipients less likely to exhibit the deaf effect when they are nudged by 
the messenger (i.e., internal auditor) with a descriptive social norm?
Why 3
2.1 Does the messenger-recipient relationship (i.e., whether the 
messenger is seen as a collaborative partner or as an opponent) 
influence the effectiveness of nudging?
How 3
3 Which timing factors are proposed to be of influence on the Auditee’s 
willingness to listen or not to listen to the Auditor’s risk warning message?
Why 4
3.1 How do the timing factors influence (in general) the auditee’s 
decision to listen (or not to listen) to the risk warning message? 
How 4
4 Which timing factors determine when is the right moment (thus, not too 
early and not too late) for the internal auditor to communicate the risk-
warning message that makes the auditee listen to the internal auditor?
What 5
framework research Design
In table 1-2 we present the main characteristics of the conceptual and the technical 
research design that we use in our studies. 
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table 1-2. Framework empirical research design
conceptual 
research Design
chapter 2 chapter 3 chapter 4 chapter 5
research 
Question
Explanatory Explanatory Explorative Explorative
Effects Main
Moderation
Main
Moderation
Main Main
Dependent 
Variable
Continue Continue Deaf Effect
(indicator of IA 
effectiveness) 
Deaf Effect (indicator 
of IA effectiveness)
Independent 
Variable
Collaborative
Top Management 
Support
Collaborative
Nuding with 
Descriptive Social 
Norm
Timing factors
 
Timing factors
theories Stewardship Theory
Whistleblowing 
Theory
Stewardship Theory
Focus theory of 
Normative Conduct
Nudging concepts
- -
technical 
research Design
chapter 2 chapter 3 chapter 4 chapter 5
research strategy Laboratory 
Experiment
Laboratory 
Experiment
Focus Group 
interviews
Q Methodological 
study
research Design Between Group Between Group Mixed Design
(qualitative data 
and content 
analysis)
Mixed Design
(qualitative data and 
content analysis)
Participants 93 Students 171 Students 15 Internal auditors
15 Managers
26 Internal auditors
26 Managers
Data Analysis Moderated 
Regression Analysis
Partial Least Squared Iterative Coding Q method factor 
analysis
Data Validity MANOVA, Cronbach 
Alpha, AVE, 
Exploratory & 
Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis
MANOVA, 
Cronbach Alpha, 
AVE, Exploratory & 
Confirmatory Factor 
analysis
Protocol
Exploratory analysis
Statement set
database
tool SPSS rel 21 smartPLS rel 2.0 Atlas.ti software PQ method 
(version 2.35).
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structure of this thesis
Figure 1-2 shows an overview of the structure of this thesis. Chapter 2 is an experiment 
with students and investigates the influence of organization power of the internal audi-
tor through top management support on effectiveness of IA, based on Whistle Blow-
ing Theory. Similarly, Chapter 3 is an experiment with students and investigates how 
nudging with descriptive social norm influences effectiveness of IA, based on nudging 
concepts. Chapter 4 is an exploratory study on timing factors and examined which tim-
ing factors have influence on the IA effectiveness and hence influences decision makers 
to listen or not to listen to the risk warning messages of the internal auditor. Chapter 5 is 
a Q methodology research on the importance of timing for effectiveness of IA focussing 
on the understanding of the timing factors that might be of influence on the IA ef-
fectiveness and the importance thereof for the internal auditors and management (the 
auditees). In Chapter 6 we include our discussion about the most important findings and 
conclusions resulting of our studies in this thesis, theoretical and practical implications, 
the limitations and suggestions for further research and we end with a brief reflection 
about this thesis.
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Structure of this Thesis
Figure 1-2. Structure of this thesis
 
 
 
 
 
 
figure 1-2. Structure of this thesis
This study offers is a multi-method approach of studying IA effectiveness. All four stud-
ies have been accepted by and presented at the European Conference on Internal Audit 
and Corporate Governance in April 2014 throughout April 2017. One study has been 
submitted to international journal and is in reviewing procedure. Two out of four studies 
are in preparation to be submitted to international journals in due course. In the below 
table 1-3 the results and the status of our studies in this thesis are described in more 
detail. 
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2
Does the Organization Power 
through Top Management Support 
help Internal Auditors to Reduce the 
Deaf Effect for Risk Warnings?
chAPtEr oVErVIEw
Ignoring risk warnings, a phenomenon known as the deaf effect, can contribute to the 
problem of project escalation. Internal auditors, who issue risk warnings when a project 
is going away from the expected course, need to look for improved ways that could help 
message recipients to listen more to the risk warnings. In this paper, we investigate whether 
internal auditors could use their organization power through top management support 
to influence the deaf effect. Our scenario-based experiment showed no significant main 
effect of top management support on the deaf effect. Our study shed more light on this 
counter-intuitive result, since we found that top management support interacted with the 
messenger-recipient relationship. Top management support is helpful in reducing the deaf 
effect when the messenger is seen as an opponent and may be contra-productive when the 
messenger is seen as a collaborative partner.
key words: deaf effect, internal audit effectiveness, organization power, top manage-
ment support, internal auditor 
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2.1 IntroDuctIon
Project escalation (i.e., continued commitment to a failing project) is a common and 
costly problem that occurs in the context of information systems (IS) projects, often in 
spite of risk warnings issued by internal auditors. Internal auditors frequently notice that 
management turns a deaf ear to such warnings, a phenomenon known as the deaf effect 
(Keil and Robey, 1999, 2001). Internal auditors cannot be effective in stopping escalation 
if they cannot influence the deaf effect in such a way that managers (i.e. decision mak-
ers) heed their warnings. In this paper, we investigate whether internal auditors could 
use their organization power through top management support to help overcome the 
deaf effect.
While there have been a few studies of the deaf effect (Keil and Robey, 1999, 2001; 
Cuellar, 2009; Lee et al, 2014; Nuijten et al, 2016), they have tended to focus on charac-
teristics of the messenger and the messenger’s relationship with the recipient that tend 
to be stable and not easily changed. The management literature offers little evidence for 
the key role of top management support in the success of the organization processes 
and programs and in particular the internal audit function. Aside from one study by 
Sarens and De Beelde (2006b) that investigated the effect of ‘organizational support’ in 
internal audit practices, we know of no studies that have examined how auditors can use 
support from top management to contextualize their message so as to more strongly 
influence message recipients. With this study we aim to obtain a better understanding 
of the concept ‘top management support’ for internal audit and its influence on the 
internal audit effectiveness. Based on previous research (Keil and Robey, 2001; Cuellar, 
2009; Lee et al, 2014; Nuijten et al, 2016), in this study we tested hypotheses about 
factors involved in causing the deaf effect and aim to contribute to an improved under-
standing of the deaf effect in escalating IT-projects that could further help the empirical 
research on the effectiveness of internal audit. Our aim is to examine the main causal 
and interaction effects regarding to how organization power through top management 
support influences the deaf effect for risk warnings by the internal auditor who is seen 
as a collaborative partner or opponent. Additionally, following Nuijten et al, (2016), we 
further examine whether decision makers are more likely to listen to the risk warnings 
from an internal auditor who is seen as a collaborative partner. We also examine whether 
decision makers will be less motivated to listen to the risk warning, when the messenger 
is seen as an opponent – such an internal auditor is often labelled as a ‘policeman’. 
The paper is organized as follows. We start with an overview of deaf effect literature 
and further describe our research model and hypotheses. Next, we describe our research 
methodology, followed by the results we obtained. We conclude the paper with discus-
sion and implications for research as well as practice. 
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2.2 lItErAturE rEVIEw AnD thEory bAsE
Keil and Robey (1999) were first to introduce the term ‘deaf effect’ and defined it as a 
situation in which actors in organizations “turn a deaf ear to signs of trouble.” In their 
articles Keil and Robey (1999; 2001) present specific examples of the deaf effect in IT 
projects based on interviews with both internal and external auditors who expressed 
their frustration in blowing the whistle on a troubled project only to find that their risk 
warnings were ignored (or even worse, being fired from their job). Following these first 
field-based observations of the deaf effect, other researchers including Cuellar (2009) 
started scenario-based laboratory experiments to investigate the factors that influence 
the deaf effect. For example, Cuellar et al, (2006) found that a significant predictor of the 
deaf effect was the messenger credibility. In addition to the messenger credibility, Lee 
et al, (2014) found that role prescription of the messenger was an important factor of 
the deaf effect.
In their recent paper Nuijten et al, (2016) suggest that the messenger-recipient rela-
tionship (MRR) is a key factor that influences the deaf effect. More specifically, Nuijten et 
al, (2016) draw on stewardship theory and show that when an auditor is seen as a col-
laborative partner, message recipients will be more likely to listen to the risk warnings 
reported by the internal auditor. Inspired on stewardship theory they suggested that 
decision makers are more likely to be responsive to risk warnings when the messenger 
aims at contributing to management performance instead of exposing management 
failures. In our research, we leverage the work of Nuijten et al, (2016) by examining how 
the organization power of the internal auditor through top management support can 
be used in a way that message recipients will be willing to turn less deaf ear to the risk 
warnings of the messenger.
Our study draws further on the whistle-blowing effectiveness theory (Near and Miceli, 
1995). Near and Miceli (1995) argue that the effectiveness of whistle-blowing is based 
on the personal characteristics (credibility and power) of the whistle-blower and the 
compliant recipient, moderated by the support for the whistle-blower and the wrong-
doer as well as situational and organizational characteristics of the wrong-doing. In their 
model (Near and Miceli, 1995), the relative credibility and power of those actors was 
central referring to internal auditors who have – in certain situations – role prescribed 
power and authority (so one would expect them to be effective whistle-blowers, accord-
ing to Near and Miceli’s model). In their model, the Whistle-Blower’s power variable is 
measured by several operational measures and support from superiors is one of these 
operational measures. Similarly, in our study we use the top management support to 
internal auditors in the organization as an operational measure of organization power 
of the internal auditor.
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While prior research has advanced our understanding of the deaf effect, the effect of 
organization power through top management support, to our knowledge has not been 
examined in this context. This gap in our understanding is an important one to explore 
because there are good theoretical reasons to believe that top management support 
could reduce the deaf effect.
2.3 rEsEArch moDEl AnD hyPothEsEs
We based our model and hypotheses on stewardship theory (Davis et al, 1997) and 
whistle-blowing theory (Near and Miceli, 1995). Following Nuijten et al, (2016) in our 
study we focused on the relationship between the messenger and the recipient at an 
inter-personal level: with the internal auditor in the role of the provider of a risk warning 
and the decision maker in the role of recipient of the risk warning. Within the messenger-
recipient relationship, the internal auditor can be seen as a collaborative partner or as 
an opponent.
We have defined the following research questions: 1) could the organization power 
of the internal auditor (through high or low top management support) be of influence 
on the deaf effect?, 2) could the messenger-recipient relationship (MRR) be of influence 
on the deaf effect and (3) is the influence of MRR on the deaf effect moderated by the 
organization power of the internal auditor through top management support?
Consistent with previous studies on the deaf effect, the variable that we aim to explain 
in our study is whether or not decision makers are likely to continue a troubled IT-project 
after the internal auditor provides a risk warning that the project should be stopped or 
redirected and not continued as planned. In figure 2-1 we present our research model.
Organization Power is operationalized through top management support and acts as 
a quasi-moderator in our research model. Following Nuijten et al, (2016), our research 
model contains the messenger-recipient relationship (MRR) as an independent vari-
able. Furthermore, consistent with previous studies, we included the decision makers’ 
individual risk propensity, gender and years of work experience in our model. Our study 
differs from Nuijten et al, (2016), since we did not include the relevance that individuals 
assigned to the message and the perceived risks in our model, for the reason that we did 
not want to overcomplicate our model and that those variables did not contribute to the 
underlying logic of our model. This was confirmed by the results of our measurements 
of those two variables, so for those reasons we decided to keep them out of the research 
model that we present in figure 2-1 and that we will further elaborate throughout this 
section.
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hypotheses
Main Effect of high vs. low organization power on continuation of a course of action
According to Near and Miceli (1995), whistle-blowers with power may be less likely to ex-
perience retaliation. In their research Near and Miceli (1995) found that whistle-blowers 
who lacked support from either top management or their immediate super supervisors, 
were much more likely to suffer reprisal, confirming in another study that federal whistle-
blowers who suffered retaliation were less likely to be effective than those who did not 
(Miceli and Near, 2002). The study on the predictors of external whistleblowing by Sims 
and Keenan (1998), showed that the whistleblowing reporting will be encouraged if the 
immediate supervisor of a potential whistle-blower is perceived as supporting. 
In the area of internal audit effectiveness, several recent studies have also demonstrat-
ed that support for internal auditing by top management is an important determinant 
of its effectiveness. Mihret and Yismaw (2007) performed a case study on the internal 
audit effectiveness within the Ethiopian public sector and found that management sup-
port to the internal auditor is one of the two most important factors (the other being 
internal audit quality) influencing internal audit effectiveness. Management support 
in their study was defined as the management commitment to implement the audit 
recommendations and maintain a strong internal audit department. Cohen and Sayag 
(2010) performed an empirical examination of the effectiveness of internal auditing in 
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Israeli organizations. Their correlation and regression analysis showed support from top 
management to be the main determinant of internal audit effectiveness. Similarly, Van 
Peursem (2005) links the internal audit effectiveness with management support and 
found indications that acting alone and without broad management support, can be 
truly ineffective for internal audit.
Based on existing theories in other research areas, like applied psychology (Eisen-
berger and Huntington, 1986), Sarens and De Beelde (2006b) measured organizational 
support towards a focus on the internal auditing function as a whole within six Belgian 
companies and found evidence that the opinions and recommendations of an internal 
audit activity that receives more support by top management and more accepted and 
appreciated by the people in the organization. In their further research, Sarens and De 
Beelde (2006a) found that the overall acceptance and appreciation of the internal audit 
within a company is strongly dependent upon the support they receive from senior 
management. Similarly, other studies found that support from senior management 
is fundamental for internal audit effectiveness (Sawyer, 1973; Cohen and Sayag 2010; 
Mihret and Yismaw 2007; Sarens and De Beelde 2006a; 2006b).
So, in our study we posit that the higher the messenger’s organization power (through 
high top management support) the less likely the manager will continue the course of 
action. This represents a negative causal relationship between organization power and 
deaf effect. This results in the following hypothesis:.
h1. Decision makers are more likely to continue a course of action (respond deaf to a 
risk warning) when the messenger has low organization power.
Main Effect of the messenger-recipient relationship on continuation of a course of action
In deaf effect situations within our domain of interest, the internal auditor plays the 
role of the messenger who delivers a risk warning to a recipient (and decision maker) 
who must decide whether or not to take corrective action or not to listen to the risk 
warning and continue the project as planned. Nuijten et al, (2016) differentiate between 
a messenger-recipient relationship (MRR) in which the internal auditor is seen as a 
collaborative partner and one in which the internal auditor is seen as an opponent. In 
their study, Nuijten et al, (2016) found that decision makers are more likely to heed the 
auditor’s risk warning and discontinue the course of action when the messenger is seen 
as a collaborative partner instead of an opponent. In our study, we re-test the effects 
of the MRR on the deaf effect through replication. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
h2. Decision makers are less likely to exhibit the deaf effect and continue a failing 
course of action when the messenger issuing risk warnings and advocating project 
redirection is seen as a collaborative partner. 
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Moderating Effect of high vs. low organization power on continuation of a course of 
action
Besides on the main effect of Organization Power on the continuation decision by the 
message recipient, our interest in this research concerns the interaction effect of the 
organization power through top management support can have with the messenger-
recipient relationship (MRR). As we theorized earlier, Near and Miceli (1995) argue that 
the effectiveness of whistle-blowing is based on the personal characteristics (credibility 
and power) of the whistle-blower and the compliant recipient, moderated by the sup-
port for the whistle-blower and the wrongdoer as well as situational and organizational 
characteristics of the wrong-doing. Based on that, we theorize that the organization 
power of the messenger through top management support moderates the influence 
of MRR on the deaf effect. We expect that managers are more reluctant to listen to a 
risk warning when the messenger is seen as an opponent as opposed to a collaborative 
partner. However, when this opponent messenger has high organization power through 
top management support, managers will be more likely to listen to the warning even 
though it comes from an opponent. 
So, in the high organization power conditions, the influence of MRR on the decision to 
continue is weaker. We expect that in the high organization power conditions decision 
makers are more likely to follow any advice, regardless whether the message comes from 
a collaborative partner or an opponent. In the situation when the messenger will have 
low organization power through low top management support, the decision maker will 
become more reluctant to listen to an opponent messenger, while the decision maker 
is still likely to listen to the messenger who is seen as a collaborative partner. For this 
reason, we expect that the influence of the MRR on the deaf effect will be stronger 
under the condition of low organization power of the messenger and weaker under the 
condition of high organization power. This results in the following hypothesis for the 
moderating effect:
h3. The messenger’s organization power moderates the influence of MRR on the deaf 
effect. Specifically, the influence of MRR on the deaf effect is strengthened when the mes-
senger has low organization power. 
2.3 mEthoD
To test our hypotheses, we conducted one scenario-based laboratory experiment. We 
created the setting for the investigation of the phenomenon and we had control over 
the independent variable(s) and the random assignment of the participants to the treat-
ment and non-treatment conditions (Boudreau et al, 2001). We manipulated messenger-
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recipient relationship (MRR) and organization power through top management support 
in 2x2 factorial design. 
Participants
For our experiment we used a group of 93 post-graduate students of accounting at a 
Belgian University. The students were in average 22.6 years old (s.d. 2.4) and had an aver-
age work experience of 0.24 years (s.d. 0.75). 87 percent of the students had a European 
nationality dominated by Belgian citizens. 56 percent were male and 44 percent were 
female. None of the participants were involved in pilot-testing of our scenario for the 
purpose of this study. 
The students participated in the experiment on a voluntary basis in the last 20 minutes 
of their courses. We told the participants that this was an experiment study about busi-
ness decision making in a strategic information system project situation and that their 
answers would remain anonymous. We randomly assigned each participant to one of 
the experimental scenarios. From the 93 returned envelops there were 15 forms that we 
could not use for analysis since the main question (decision) and some other questions 
were not answered in an unambiguous way (missing, scratched or multiple answers).
In our study we used student subjects as surrogates for managers. Previous studies on 
the deaf effect has employed student subjects (Cuellar et al, 2006; Lee et al, 2014). While 
the appropriateness of student subjects has been debated, Keil et al, (2007) argue that 
data from student subjects in studies focusing on experiments and theory application 
such as ours, are acceptable (Keil et al, 2007). Harrison and Harrrell (1993) and Sitkin and 
Weingart (1995) suggest that the use of student subjects is often appropriate when the 
experiment involves human decision making. According to Ashton and Kramer (1980), 
p. 3 “real-world decision makers possess information-processing characteristics and 
biases that are extremely similar to their student counterparts”. This is also supported 
by Nuijten et al, (2016) who tested a core model of the deaf effect including the MRR 
construct with both students and practitioners and found that results of the experiment 
were consistent regardless of the type of subject used. Finally, Cook and Campbell 
(1979) stated that, in practice, external validity is often sacrificed to achieve internal 
and construct validity and for the greater statistical power that comes through having 
isolated and controlled settings (e.g. classroom), standardized procedures and homog-
enous respondent populations. For these types of validity, homogenous samples, such 
as student subjects, and laboratory experiments are more important than the degree 
to which they function as exact surrogates for practitioners. For theory testing, after 
internal validity is achieved, external validity is addressed by testing across multiple 
contexts with different types of participants. 
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scenario and treatments
In our scenario the participants were asked to consider themselves to be the project 
owner of an information technology project within an insurance company. The scenario 
used in this experiment was based on one used by Nuijten et al, (2016) and describes a 
situation in which the project owner is informed that Mr. Johnson from the internal audit 
department has recently found serious issues with the project and recommends that the 
project should be redirected (i.e., not continue as planned).
Consistent with Nuijten et al, (2016), we independently manipulated the messenger-
recipient relationship (MRR) to be either collaborative or not. The treatment of the 
relationship between the messenger and the decision maker was phrased as follows for 
the low stewardship relation (low collaborative partnership):
Mr. Johnson has a long history of working AGAINST IS project teams with the goal of 
exposing project failings, thus embarrassing project owners. He is seen as policeman 
who does not add any value to the development process. Thus, Mr. Johnson is treated as 
an OPPONENT WHO IS NOT TO BE TRUSTED.
The high stewardship relation treatment contained elements of being seen as a ‘col-
laborative partner’ and was phrased as follows:
Mr. Johnson has a long history of working COLLABORATIVELY with IS project teams with 
the goal of helping to identify and manage project risks, thus enabling project owners to 
be successful. He is seen by the project management as adding value to the process. Thus, 
Mr. Johnson is treated as a TRUSTED PARTNER to management. 
We rephrased this scenario with the typical element – organization power – that we 
developed for this study.
The HIGH- organization power was phrased as follows:
Within the company, internal auditors receive an enormous support by the executive 
board. Strong top management support is shown by the fact that executive board pays 
great attention on implementing audit recommendations by project owners and even 
follows up personally on that. As a consequence, Mr. Johnson in his role as an internal 
auditor has a very STRONG ORGANIZATION POWER within the company.
The LOW- organization power was phrased as follows:
Within the company, internal auditors receive a very poor support by the executive 
board. Poor top management support is shown by the fact that executive board does 
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NOT pay attention to implementing audit recommendations by project owners and does 
NOT follow up on that in any fashion. As a consequence, Mr. Johnson in his role as an 
internal auditor has a very LOW ORGANIZATION POWER within the company.
constructs and measures
Our independent variables were manipulated and treated as dichotomous variables. 
The high vs low level of organizational power of the internal auditor through top man-
agement support was recorded in the variable OrgPower (1=high organization power; 
0=low organization power. Messenger recipient relationship was recorded in the vari-
able MRR (1=collaborative partner; 0=opponent). 
In our experiment we use the decision to continue a troubled information systems 
project (Continue) despite the auditor’s risk warning and recommendation to redirect 
the project as the dependent variable. Consistent with Nuijten et al, (2016) we assessed 
this construct by applying two measurement items (Continue1 and Continue2). 
Consistent with prior studies (Keil et al, 2000; Cuellar et al, 2006), risk propensity (Risk-
Prop) was measured using four items adapted from Sitkin and Weingart (1995). In the 
Appendix all of the construct measures that were employed are shown.
2.4 rEsults
Table 2-1 presents the construct reliability cronbach’s alpha scores measuring the inter-
nal consistency with a given construct’s items (weighting them all equally). Hair et al, 
(1998) note that a cronbach’s alpha score slightly lower than 0.7 might still be acceptable 
for exploratory research and Nunnally (1967) recommends a threshold value of only 
0.6 for exploratory research. In the table 1a we present the cronbach’s alpha scores we 
obtained. We conclude that the reliability of our measurements of the constructs meet 
the thresholds.
table 2-1. Reliability of Measurements
Contruct Items Cronbach alpha
Continue 2 0.900
MRRmc 3 0.785
OrgPowermc 4 0.922
RiskProp 4 0.846
convergent and Discriminant Validity
We performed a Principal Components Analysis, which is an exploratory factor analysis 
of clustering measurements into factors. We assessed whether or not our measurement-
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variables, that are supposed to tap into the same construct, indeed stick together and 
are not sticking too much to measurements that were supposed to tap into other con-
structs. We used Varimax rotation and a fixed number of factors that was equal to the 
number of variables. The results are presented in table 2-2 below.
table 2-2. Construct Validity
Component
1 2 3 4 5 6
Continue1 .015 .124 -.363 .867 -.075 .065
Continue2 -.045 .178 -.288 .897 -.002 .036
MRRmc1 .054 .034 .796 -.164 -.013 -.018
MRRmc2 .077 -.117 .770 -.145 -.147 -.111
MRRmc3 -.019 -.009 .844 -.306 .146 -.057
OrgPowermc1 .903 -.008 -.105 -.023 .050 -.117
OrgPowermc2 .930 -.018 .163 -.005 -.015 .098
OrgPowermc3 .883 -.074 .137 -.011 -.031 .127
OrgPowermc4 .931 .021 -.046 -.004 .028 -.080
Gender .050 .242 -.025 -.067 .935 .034
RiskProp1 -.060 .847 .056 .195 .164 -.011
RiskProp2 -.024 .820 .085 .126 .070 .067
RiskProp3 -.160 .738 -.087 .045 .254 -.110
RiskProp4 .147 .839 -.063 -.038 -.108 -.083
WorkExp .014 -.089 -.155 .074 .030 .965
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
The items in table 2-2 correlate higher with their own “construct” (factor) than they 
correlate with others (Shadish et al, 2002). The convergent and discriminant validity is 
confirmed in this table.
manipulation Validity
In order to assess whether or not the treatments are effective as intended, we tested 
manipulation validity following the procedure as proposed by Straub et al, (2004). As 
part of our between-subject experiment design, we intentionally exposed subjects to 
different treatments in order to control that our manipulation check variables (MRRmc 
and OrgPowermc) sufficiently vary across treatment-groups. In table 2-3 we present the 
mean values of the manipulation check variables MRRmc and OrgPowermc for each 
of the four treatment conditions. As expected from our pre-tests, we find the variable 
MRRmc to be different in the MRR high (partner) and low (opponent) conditions, with 
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only minor movement on the OrgPower high and low conditions. And we find the vari-
able OrgPowermc to be different on the OrgPower low and high conditions, without 
changing as the result of the MRR treatment conditions. This indicates that the treat-
ments are effective in size and direction.
table 2-3. Mean Values of MRRmc and OrgPowermc per treatment condition
OrgPower
low
OrgPower
high
MRR 
low 
(opponent)
MRRmc 3.74(1.41) MRRmc 4.02(0.93) MRRmc 3.86 (1.22)
OrgPowermc 2.90(1.32) OrgPowermc 4.97(0.71) OrgPowermc 3.82 (1.50)
N=21
N=21
N=17
N=16
N=37
N=38
MRR high
(partner)
MRRmc 5.68(0.82) MRRmc 5.18(1.05) MRRmc 5.40 (0.98)
OrgPowermc 2.27(0.90) OrgPowermc 6.00(0.84) OrgPowermc 4.32 (2.06)
N=18
N=18
N=23
N=22
N=41
N=40
MRRmc 4.64 (1.52) MRRmc 4.70 (1.15)
OrgPowermc 2.61 (1.17) OrgPowermc 5.55 (0.93)
N=39 N=39
Table 2-4 shows the results of an MANOVA in which the treatment conditions are en-
tered as independent variables and the MRRmc variable and OrgPowermc variable are 
considered to be the dependent variables. The table shows that the MRR treatments 
are highly significant (at .000) on their own MRRmc variable and that OrgPower is not 
significant (.349) at that variable. The table also shows that the OrgPower treatments are 
highly significant (at .000) on its own OrgPowermc variable and that the MRR treatments 
are not significant (.685) at that variable.
We consider the R2 of .319 and .698 to be acceptable as a result of the iterative test-
ing and improving the treatment-conditions (and reducing background noise) in the 
scenario that was performed. We consider our manipulation tests to have sufficiently 
covered the testing techniques for manipulation validity as proposed by Straub et al, 
(2004). 
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table 2-4. Manipulation Test 2x2 MANOVA
Dependent variable
MRRmca
Dependent Variable
OrgPowermcb
Independent variable
Type III Sum of 
Squares F-Value (Sig)
Type III Sum of
Squares F-Value (Sig)
Main Effect MRR 44.293 35.779(.000) .888 .888 (.349)
Main Effect OrgPower .206 .166 (.685) 154.439 154.458(.000)
Interaction Effect
MRR * OrgPower 2.692 2.174 (.145) 12.814 12.816 (.001)
a) R2 is .319 and b). R2 is 698
regression Analysis on main and moderating Effects
In order to test whether moderation effects could be found, we followed procedures 
according to (Sharma et al, 1981). Additionally we used the operational guidance on 
multiple-regression of interaction effects as presented by Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) and 
Aiken and West (1991). Table 2-5 shows the results of the moderated regression analyses 
with Continue as the dependent variable. The presentation of moderation effects is 
adopted from Tanriverdi (2006).
table 2-5. Moderated Regression Analysis on Continue
Variable(s) Entered
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
controls
main 
Effect
main 
Effect Interaction
Gender
WorkExp
RiskProp
OrgPower
MRR
MRR x OrgPower
     -.154
      .219
      .315**
     -.152
      .219
      .313*
     -.016
     -.100
      .118
      .248*
     -.003
     -.414***
    -.077
     .114
     .248*
     .010
    -.424***
     .207*
R2
F
ΔR2
ΔF
     .121
   3.262
     .121
  3.262*
      .121
    3.282
      .000
      .020
     .279
  18.386
     .158
  15.104***
     .321
  22.606
     .042
  4.220*
+p<.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Dependent variable is Continue
For interpretation of the model, we first took into account the subjects of our study 
and the control variables. We found WorkExp not to be significant, where it was found 
to be significant in earlier studies (Cuellar et al, 2006; Cuellar et al, 2007). This could be 
explained by the low level and low variance in working experience of the subjects that 
participated in this experiment. The control variables Gender, WorkExp and RiskProp are 
presented in Model 1. Model 2 consists of the control variables of model 1, extended 
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with OrgPower. Model 2 does not confi rm a signifi cant negative infl uence of OrgPower 
on the decision to continue as was expected from earlier studies and hypothesized here 
as hypothesis 1. From model 3 we conclude that MRR has a signifi cant negative eff ect on 
Continue, which confi rms hypothesis 2. 
In hypothesis 3 we proposed that the negative infl uence of MRR on Continue would 
be weaker in the high organization power domain and stronger in the low organization 
power domain. Therefore, we expect to fi nd a signifi cant positive regression coeffi  cient 
for the interaction variable MRR x OrgPower in model 4. We found hypothesis 3 con-
fi rmed in table 2-5. According to the procedures of Sharma et al, (1981), we conclude 
that OrgPower is a moderator on the relationship between MRR and Continue, since it 
only acts as a moderator and it has no a direct eff ect on Continue.
For interpretation purposes we present the regression plots in fi gure 2-2 below. The 
fi gure shows the regression lines for the high and low values of organization power. 
The regression lines are not parallel, and do intersect within the range of treatment and 
measurement conditions we used in our experiment. Since the order of the two regres-
sion lines changes, this type of interaction is called “disordinal” (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003, 
p.78).
The results of the moderation analysis show that the interaction eff ect between MRR 
and OrgPower is consistent with our expectations. 
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figure 2-2. Regression plots with Organization Power as moderator
Figure 2-2 shows that the regression line in the high organization power conditions is 
more fl at than in the low organization power conditions, which refl ects the interaction 
eff ect as confi rmed in hypothesis 3. The infl uence of MRR on the deaf eff ect is weaker in 
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conditions of low organization power and stronger in conditions of high organization 
power.
As indicated in this study, in the low organization power conditions, decision makers 
might show competitive arousal when the message comes from an opponent and they 
are more likely to continue the project and respond deaf to the risk warning. In the 
low organization power condition, the decision maker is still likely to listen to the risk 
warning if the messenger is seen as a collaborative partner. We expected that in the high 
organization power conditions decision makers are more likely to follow any advice, 
regardless whether the message comes from a collaborative partner or an opponent, 
however the results showed this is not the case. This is also shown in figure 2-2. We 
had expected to find an ordinal interaction in which the regression line that represents 
the high organization power conditions would remain below the regression line that 
represents the low organization power conditions. Interestingly, the two regression 
lines in figure 2-2 cross, which indicates that high organizational power through top 
management support not always helps to reduce the deaf effect. The left side of figure 
2-2 shows that high organizational power through top management support is helpful 
to reduce the deaf effect when the messenger, i.e. the internal auditor, is seen as an 
opponent. The right side of figure shows that high organizational power through top 
management support is contra productive in case the messenger is seen as a collabora-
tive partner, since it will increase the deaf effect instead of reducing it. 
2.5 DIscussIon
Before discussing the limitations of our study and the ideas for further research, we 
consider the main findings and the implications. The study’s three main findings are: 
(1) The continuation of a course of action (deaf response to a risk warning) is not 
significantly influenced by the organization power of the internal auditor. Based on 
literature we expected that high top management support would have a positive 
influence on internal audit effectiveness; however this is not always the case (H1 not 
confirmed in our experiment); 
(2) The influence of MRR on the deaf effect is strengthened when the messenger has 
low organization power. When the messenger has low organization power, deci-
sion makers are more likely to let their continuation-decision be influenced by the 
messenger-recipient relationship, i.e. when the messenger is seen as a collaborative 
partner rather than an opponent. 
(3) We expected that in the high organization power conditions decision makers are 
more likely to follow any advice, regardless whether the message comes from a col-
laborative partner or an opponent. However, the results of our study indicate that 
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high organization power of the internal auditor (through high top management 
support) is helpful and even necessary for reducing the deaf effect on risk warnings 
when the auditor is seen as an opponent. In the contrary, high organization power 
of the internal auditor (through high top management support) may be contra-
productive and will not reduce the deaf effect on risk warnings when the auditor is 
seen as a collaborative partner.
This study is perhaps a first attempt to examine the deaf effect with moderation analysis 
providing an insight into the effects of the organization power of the internal auditor 
on deaf effect in the context of IT-projects. This study introduced and tested the effects 
of two variables – (1) the organization power of the internal auditor – on the decision 
to continue a course of action despite the risk warning – and (2) messenger-recipient 
relationship. The second construct had been recently tested by Nuijten et al, (2016) in 
the context of the deaf effect. The first construct had not been tested in the context of 
the deaf effect earlier. The question of whether the messenger is seen as a collaborative 
partner or as an opponent highly influenced the continuation decision (deaf effect) of 
the decision maker. The construct on the messenger-recipient relationship was derived 
from stewardship theory and our results were consistent with expectations according 
to stewardship theory. We contribute to research on stewardship theory by providing 
stronger evidence for the impact of MRR on the deaf effect and further testing it at a 
micro inter-personal level between the internal auditor and senior management. 
The organization power of the internal auditor through top management support 
did not appear to have a main effect on the continuation decision in a way that was 
expected from whistle-blowing theory. As expected, the organization power through 
top management support for internal audit turned out to be a strong moderator for the 
MRR in the proposed direction, but it did not turn to have a significant main effect on the 
continuation decision (H1 was not confirmed). This might be explained by our finding 
that high organization power of the internal auditor who is seen as a collaborative part-
ner may have a contra productive effect on the decision to continue a course of action. 
In this study we confirmed that decision makers are less likely to turn a deaf effect 
to risk warnings, when the messenger is seen as a collaborative partner. Additional 
practical implication of this study is that the organization power of the internal audit 
function plays a role in the MRR relationship on the deaf effect. This includes the level 
of support the internal auditor receives from top management. Although one may think 
the hypotheses in our experiment were not difficult to predict, yet our results were 
surprising and brought originality in this area of academic research. More specifically, 
our experiment found empirical support for the moderating role of the decision maker’s 
organization power on the relationship between MRR and the deaf effect. When the 
internal auditor is seen as an opponent and has a high organization power through top 
management support, the decision makers will tend to turn less deaf ear to the risk 
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warnings of the internal auditor who therefore will be more effective. While it may seem 
to be logical that in the high organization power conditions decision makers are more 
likely to follow any advice, regardless whether the message comes from a collaborative 
partner or an opponent, this study suggests that the advantage of high organization 
power does not always reduce the deaf effect and can be even contra productive in case 
the internal auditor is seen as a collaborative partner. Our study provides evidence that 
high organization power through high top management support is helpful and even 
necessary for reducing the deaf effect on risk warnings when the internal auditor is seen 
as an opponent. 
Knowing how the opponent and collaborative partner role interact with organization 
power of the internal auditor and the effects thereof on deaf effect, the internal audi-
tor could consider switching between these two roles to reduce deaf effect on the risk 
warnings and hence increase internal audit effectiveness. The results of our study could 
help internal auditors to upgrade the internal audit profession by improving their skills 
and expertise enabling them deploying these two roles in communication of the risk 
warnings more effectively. We support other researches to further explore this challeng-
ing area of internal audit effectiveness.
limitations and further research
Our study has several limitations. It is possible that the results would be different in 
other settings as there are other organizational and political factors that may also affect 
managers’ deaf effect responses to risk warnings. Therefore, any generalization of the 
findings of this study to other settings should be treated with caution.
The experiment conducted in this study allowed us to achieve high internal validity 
and therefore it took a necessarily narrow focus and small number of variables so as to 
achieve a high degree of control over extraneous variables. The use of post-graduate 
student participants could also restrict external validity of our results. Although the use 
of students for this experiment we justify by aiming to generalize our conclusions to 
theory and not to particular population, for further research we need to replicate the 
organization power part of the experiment in different experimental conditions with 
more experienced participants as well.
Our measures of the OrgPower construct in the context of internal auditor – manager 
relationship were self-developed given our particular level (inter personal) and context. 
Although they were derived from literature, tested and improved in the preparations of 
this study and shared with experts, they ask for more refinement and testing in further 
research.
In our study we focus on the deaf effect at the level of the internal auditor as provider 
of an objective assessment and the decision taker’s view on the messenger (as a col-
laborative partner or an opponent) as a determinant. This inter-personal view is only 
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one level in the corporate governance framework implementation following steward-
ship theory principles. We did not study the possible effects at a department-level or 
at an organizational corporate governance level and we recommend to examine these 
in future research. Despite the above limitations, this study shows the importance and 
relevance of a scientific examination of internal audit effectiveness and the deaf effect as 
one of its determinants. To our knowledge, only a few academic studies have examined 
the role of the organization power (through top management support) of the internal 
auditor in the effectiveness of internal audit, and even fewer have researched this issue 
empirically.
In our study we operationalized organizational power through top management 
support following the line of reasoning from whistle-blowing theory. Although internal 
audit literature confirms that top management support is a highly relevant way to ob-
tain organizational power, we should realize that internal auditors might also find other 
ways to build organization power, for example through highly recognized expertise. Our 
results not necessarily apply to the full spectrum of different ways to obtain organization 
power and future research on this topic is highly recommended.
Finally, we realize that our manipulation of high organization power through top 
management support may put the spotlight on the negative repercussions if managers 
in the organization would ignore the risk warning of the internal auditor. As we know 
from framing literature, such framing in terms of losses might influence decision makers’ 
risk taking preferences and thus could influence their decisions to continue a course 
of action despite the risk warning of the internal auditor. For that reason, it may be 
interesting to pursue future research on top management support that puts a spotlight 
on the positive side and gains in case decision makers would implement audit recom-
mendations.
To our knowledge, our study is the first to identify this finding and we recommend 
challenging it in further research. For example, one could explore more in detail what 
constitutes effective top management support, how much it would be enough, when it 
could be excessive and inappropriate and what are its effects on the relation between 
the messenger and the recipient on a long run. Furthermore, student subjects with more 
work experience or managers from the field could be considered in a follow up study.
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APPEnDIx 1. 
scEnArIo (Experiment)
Imagine that you are the Senior Vice President of the Pensions Operations department 
within a large insurance company. You inherited a prestigious IS-project called PENSION-
VIEW. As Project owner, you became responsible for the successful implementation of 
PENSION-VIEW and for realizing the benefits for your organization with this in-house 
developed system.
With this IS-project you could be the first insurance company in the market that grants 
all citizens (customers and potential customers) access to the complete set of their 
personal pension information. If your insurance company is the first in the market to 
provide this service at a reliable level, the expected gain to your company would be 60 
million euros, as documented in a detailed business case for the project.
Your main competitors have all decided to wait for the supplier of a standard software-
package to provide a module to the insurance-market that integrates and presents their 
pension data. If your implementation is too late or does not prove reliable during the 
first month of operations, you will miss your competitive advantage and your organiza-
tion will gain nothing.
The main challenge and risk of the PENSION-VIEW project are the large number of 
interfaces to retrieve reliable information from other information systems that contain 
pension data.
Your PENSION-VIEW project is close to implementation and under time-pressure to 
continue implementation as planned. 
According to standard procedures, Mr. Johnson of the Internal Audit department has 
recently reviewed the testing-procedures of your project.
Mr. Johnson reports that he has found serious weaknesses in the design and execu-
tion of the testing activities on the data exchange with other information systems. 
As a consequence, he reports that the project should be redirected and should not be 
continued as planned.
scenario 1 (positive manipulation) (OrgPower = High): Within the company, internal 
auditors  receive an enormous support by the Executive Board of the company. Strong 
top management support is shown by the fact that Executive Board pays great atten-
tion on implementing audit recommendations by project owners and even follows up 
personally on that. As a consequence, Mr. Johnson in his role as an internal auditor has a 
very strong orgAnIZAtIon PowEr within the company.
Mr. Johnson has a long history of working collAborAtIVEly with IS project teams 
with the goal of helping to identify and manage project risks, thus enabling project 
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owners to be successful. He is seen by the project management as adding value to the 
process. Thus, Mr. Johnson is treated as a trustED PArtnEr to management. 
scenario 2 (negative manipulation) (OrgPower = Low): Within the company, internal 
auditors  receive a very poor support by the Executive Board of the Bank. Poor top man-
agement support is shown by the fact that Executive Board does not pay attention to 
implementing audit recommendations by project owners and does not follow up on 
that in any fashion. As a consequence, Mr. Johnson in his role as an internal auditor has 
a very low orgAnIZAtIon PowEr within the company.
Mr. Johnson has a long history of working AgAInst IS project teams with the goal of 
exposing project failings, thus embarrassing project owners. He is seen as policeman 
who does not add any value to the development process. Thus, Mr. Johnson is treated as 
an oPPonEnt who Is not to bE trustED.
scenario 3 (positive manipulation) (OrgPower = High): Within the company, internal 
auditors  receive an enormous support by the Executive Board of the Bank Strong top 
management support is shown by the fact that Executive Board pays great attention on 
implementing audit recommendations by project owners and even follows up person-
ally on that. As a consequence, Mr. Johnson in his role as an internal auditor has a very 
strong orgAnIZAtIon PowEr within the company.
Mr. Johnson has a long history of working AgAInst IS project teams with the goal of 
exposing project failings, thus embarrassing project owners. He is seen as policeman 
who does not add any value to the development process. Thus, Mr. Johnson is treated as 
an oPPonEnt who Is not to bE trustED.
 
scenario 4 (negative manipulation) (OrgPower = Low): Within the company, internal 
auditors  receive a very poor support by the Executive Board of the Bank. Poor top man-
agement support is shown by the fact that Executive Board does not pay attention to 
implementing audit recommendations by project owners and does not follow up on 
that in any fashion. As a consequence, Mr. Johnson in his role as an internal auditor has 
a very low orgAnIZAtIon PowEr within the company.
Mr. Johnson has a long history of working collAborAtIVEly with IS project teams 
with the goal of helping to identify and manage project risks, thus enabling project 
owners to be successful. He is seen by the project management as adding value to the 
process. Thus, Mr. Johnson is treated as a trustED PArtnEr to management. 
As you left the meeting room, you saw two courses of action. You could decide to redi-
rect the project (thus, not continue as planned). Or, you could decide to continue (thus, 
move the system into production as planned).
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take.
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mEAsurEs
continue (dependent variable)
Variable Item Wording 
Continue1 (1=Definitely Redirect; 8=Definitely Continue)
Indicate whether you would decide to continue the project as planned or redirect, and how 
strong your leaning would be
Continue2 (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)
I will certainly continue the PENSION-VIEW project as planned (i.e., without redirection)
mrr (independent variable) 
Variable
MRR (1=Collaborative partner; 0=Opponent)
orgPower (moderator variable)
Variable
OrgPower (1=High Organization Power; 0=Low Organization Power)
mrrmc (used as a manipulation check)
Variable (Anchors), Item Wording 
MRRmc1 (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)
I consider Mr. Johnson to be a trusted partner to my PENSION-VIEW project
MRRmc2 (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)
I consider Mr. Johnson to be a collaborative partner to my PENSION-VIEW project
MRRmc3 (1=Non-Trusted Opponent; 7=Trusted Partner)
I consider Mr. Johnson to be a __________ to my PENSION-VIEW project
orgPowermc (used as a manipulation check)
Variable (Anchors), Item Wording 
OrgPowermc1 (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)
Mr. Johnson has a high organization power within the company
OrgPowermc2 (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)
Mr. Johnson is highly supported by executives in the company
OrgPowermc3 (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)
Mr. Johnson is poorly supported by executives in the company
OrgPowermc4 (1=Low Organization Power; 7=High Organization Power)
Mr. Johnson has a __________ organization power in the company
risk Propensity (used as a control variable)
Variable Item Wording (Anchors: 1=Extremely LESS likely than others; 7=Extremely MORE likely than 
others)
RiskProp1 Your tendency to choose risky alternatives based on the assessment of other people on 
whom you must rely
RiskProp2 Your tendency to choose risky alternatives relying on an assessment that is high in technical 
complexity
RiskProp3 Your tendency to choose risky alternatives which could have major impact on the strategic 
direction of your organization
RiskProp4 Your tendency to choose risky alternatives despite considerable failures in risky choices you 
made in the past

3
Nudging with Descriptive Social 
Norms to Overcome the Deaf Effect 
for IT Project Risk Warnings
chAPtEr oVErVIEw
Information technology (IT) project escalation (i.e., continued commitment to a failing IT 
project) is both a common and costly problem for organizations. Internal auditors, who are 
role prescribed to issue risk warnings should they determine that a project is going awry, 
complain that senior management, as message recipients, often turn a deaf ear to such 
warnings. This phenomenon, known as the deaf effect, can contribute to the problem of 
project escalation. To overcome the deaf effect, internal auditors, as messengers, need better 
ways of gaining the attention of message recipients. In this paper, we investigate the concept 
of nudging with descriptive social norms as a technique that internal auditors could use to 
help overcome the deaf effect. Specifically, we focus on two questions: 1) are recipients less 
likely to exhibit the deaf effect when they are nudged by the messenger with a descriptive 
social norm?, and 2) does the messenger-recipient relationship (i.e., whether the messenger 
is seen as a partner or as an opponent) influence the effectiveness of nudging? To address 
these questions, we conducted a scenario-based experiment. Our results showed that: (1) 
the deaf effect was reduced when the messenger included a descriptive social norm in the 
risk warning message, and (2) the influence of the descriptive norm on the deaf effect was 
moderated by the messenger-recipient relationship. Specifically, the inclusion of a descrip-
tive social norm in the risk warning was more effective when the messenger was seen as a 
partner rather than an opponent. 
key words: IT project escalation, deaf effect, nudging, descriptive social norm, internal 
audit effectiveness, internal auditor
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3.1 IntroDuctIon
Information technology (IT) project escalation (i.e., continued commitment to a failing IT 
project) occurs quite frequently (30-40% of projects are affected) and represents a waste 
of valuable organizational resources, as these projects tend to receive continued fund-
ing in spite of the fact that they are unlikely to ever deliver the business value for which 
they were undertaken. Internal auditors represent a valuable line of defence against 
such waste, as they are role prescribed to issue risk warnings should they determine 
that a project is going awry. Yet, clearly internal auditors cannot be effective in halt-
ing escalation unless they can get senior managers to heed their warnings. Too often, 
internal auditors complain that senior management turns a deaf ear to such warnings, a 
phenomenon known as the deaf effect (Keil and Robey, 1999; 2001). 
While there have been a few studies of the deaf effect (Keil and Robey, 1999; 2001), 
they have tended to focus on characteristics of the messenger and his/her relationship 
with the recipient that tend to be stable and not easily changed. What is needed and 
largely missing from the extant literature is knowledge about what the auditor can do 
to craft the message in a way that overcomes the deaf effect. Aside from one experiment 
by Nuijten et al, (2016) that investigated the effect of gain-loss framing, we know of 
no studies that have examined how auditors can contextualize their message so as to 
more strongly influence message recipients. In this paper, we draw on the concept of 
nudging with descriptive social norms (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004) as a technique that 
internal auditors could use to help overcome the deaf effect. Nudging stems from the 
idea that small changes in the way that information about choices are presented can 
lead to better decisions. Thaler and Sunstein (2009), along with others, argue that using 
descriptive social norms can influence the decision making of individuals in such a way 
as to produce desired behaviour without forcing compliance. 
In this study, we examine whether nudging with descriptive social norms has the 
potential to help auditors to overcome the deaf effect by inducing message recipients to 
be more receptive to risk warnings. Our aim is to address two research questions: 1) Are 
recipients less likely to exhibit the deaf effect when they are nudged by the messenger 
(i.e., internal auditor) with a descriptive social norm?, and 2) Does the messenger-recip-
ient relationship (i.e., whether the messenger is seen as a partner or as an opponent) 
influence the effectiveness of nudging? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First we situate our study within 
the small, but growing, stream of literature on the deaf effect in information systems 
projects. Then we provide a brief overview of nudging and the theory on why descrip-
tive social norms can be an effective tool for nudging. After introducing our research 
model and hypotheses, we describe our research methodology, followed by the results 
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we obtained. We conclude the paper with discussion and implications for research as 
well as practice. 
3.2 lItErAturE rEVIEw AnD thEory bAsE
Keil and Robey (1999, p. 82) coined the term “deaf effect,” defining it as a situation in 
which actors in positions of authority “turn a deaf ear to signs of trouble.” In this and a 
subsequent article (Keil and Robey, 2001) they provide specific examples of the deaf 
effect in IS projects based on interviews with both internal and external auditors who 
spoke of their frustration in blowing the whistle on a troubled project only to find that 
their risk warnings were ignored (or worse, caused them to be fired from their job). Fol-
lowing the initial field-based observations of the deaf effect reported by Keil and Robey 
(1999; 2001), several researchers including Cuellar (2009) began to conduct scenario-
based laboratory experiments to investigate the factors that influence the deaf effect. 
In a recent paper Nuijten et al, (2016) draw on stewardship theory and show that when 
an auditor is seen as a collaborative partner, message recipients will be less likely to turn 
a deaf ear to risk warnings issued by the auditor. The theory behind this is that decision 
makers are more likely to be responsive to risk warnings when the messenger has the 
clear goal to contribute to management performance instead of exposing management 
failures. Thus, prior research suggests that the messenger-recipient relationship (MRR) 
is a key factor that influences the deaf effect. In our research, we leverage the work of 
Nuijten et al, (2016) by examining how the information delivered by a messenger can be 
presented in a way that provides a further nudge to the recipient. 
Behavioural economists have introduced the idea that nudging can be an effective 
means of eliciting desired behaviour without exercising strong forms of control or 
forcing compliance (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). The concept of nudging relates to the 
messenger-recipient relationship in the sense that nudging occurs within the context of 
that relationship and it involves presenting information in a way that promotes a desired 
response without forcing compliance. In this study, we develop a research model that 
brings together nudging and MRR.
Specifically, we posit that nudging with descriptive norms will be more effective when 
the technique is used in a stewardship based model whereby the descriptive norms 
being espoused by the messenger are generated in an MRR context in which the mes-
senger is viewed as a partner rather than an opponent.
While prior research has advanced our understanding of the deaf effect, the effect of 
nudging with descriptive social norms has not been examined in this context. This gap 
in our understanding is an important one to explore because nudging with descriptive 
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social norms represents an intervention that would be easy to implement in practice 
and there are good theoretical reasons to believe that it could reduce the deaf effect. 
nudging with Descriptive social norms
One of the most effective ways to nudge is through social influence (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2009). For example, it has been shown that the behaviour of peers affects productivity 
and tax compliance in field settings (Tayler and Bloomfield, 2011). Similarly, Mas and 
Moretti (2009) found that cashiers in a retail setting became more productive when a 
highly productive worker was introduced into their shift. Examples like these clearly 
show that the social influence of peers can be significant.
The cumulative findings from prior research on normative social influence show that 
the actions of other people have a powerful effect on both behavioural intentions and 
actual behavior (Sherif, 1936; Deutch and Gerard, 1955; Cialdini et al, 1990; Cialdini and 
Goldstein, 2004; Jacobson et al, 2011). Many norms-based interventions appear to have 
an influence on human behavior (e.g. Cialdini et al, 1990; Cialdini et al, 1991; Cialdini, 
2005; Schultz et al, 2007; Griskevicius et al, 2008) and numerous studies can be found on 
the effect of descriptive social norms in the areas of sociology, psychology and behav-
ioural research. Research has shown that communicating a descriptive social norm (i.e., 
how most people behave in a given situation) induces conformity to the communicated 
behavior (Nolan et al, 2008; Schultz, 1999; Griskevicius et al, 2006).
Thaler and Sunstein (2009) further explain the use of a descriptive social norm in 
nudging and its positive effects on eliciting desired behavior. They recount numerous 
examples in which messengers can nudge individuals to behave in a certain way sim-
ply by informing them about what other people are doing. One example of this is the 
online promotion of organ donation in the state of Illinois where their website brings 
the power of social norms into play by plainly stating: “87% of adults in Illinois feel that 
registering as an organ donor is the right thing to do” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, p. 184). 
Such nudges work because we generally like to do what most other people consider to 
be the right thing to do in a given situation. 
3.3 rEsEArch moDEl AnD hyPothEsEs
Influence of descriptive social norms and how they could apply to the deaf 
effect
Descriptive social norms can serve as a decisional shortcut for behaviour (Cialdini et al, 
1990). They are thought to influence behaviour because they provide information about 
the right way to act in certain situations (Cialdini, 1984; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; 
Jacobson et al, 2011). For example, Goldstein et al, (2008) examined how hotel guests 
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behave when a card has been placed on the bathroom towel rack asking them to reuse 
their towels. In a field experiment, they tried to increase towel reuse by testing the effect 
of putting different messages on the card. One of the messages included a social norms 
appeal, stating “JOIN YOUR FELLOW GUESTS IN HELPING TO SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT,” 
and emphasized that the majority of hotel guests reuse their towels. This message 
proved to be much more effective than messages without a social norms appeal such as 
“HELP SAVE THE ENVIROMENT.” Similar results were also obtained by other researchers, 
for example, by Schultz et al, (2008) (in their towel re-use experiment in hotel rooms), 
Lapinski et al, (2013) (for the effects of social norms and behavioural privacy on hand 
washing), Maloney et al, (2013) (on effects of descriptive norms on voting behavior), and 
Lapinski et al, (2007) (water conservation attitudes and behavior).
Mollen et al, (2013), examined the influence of social norms on food choices by con-
ducting a field experiment in an on-campus food court. Effects of different messages on 
students’ food choice were compared against each other and a no-message control con-
dition. They found that a healthy descriptive norm message resulted in healthier choices 
as compared with the no norm control condition. Similarly, in an experiment with 1,200 
Australian citizens, Wenzel (2005a; 2005b) found that simply informing taxpayers of the 
high rate of compliance increased compliance levels.
Similarity enhances the power of descriptive social norms. Cialdini and Goldstein 
(2004) posited that when making choices, people look at those who are similar to 
them. For example, Nolan et al, (2008) found that California residents’ energy saving 
was mostly influenced by their belief that other people were saving energy (the social 
norm). Moreover, the key factor for their choice to save energy was specifically which 
other people – other Californians, other people in their city, or other people in their 
specific community. Based on the idea that people are most influenced by similar oth-
ers, the effect of social norms became stronger as the group was becoming closer and 
more similar to the people of their own community. Similarly, in the Goldstein et al, 
(2008) experiment on hotel towel reuse described earlier, the most effective message 
displayed to the guests was the one mentioning that the majority of guests had reused 
their towels when staying in the specific hotel room in which the guest was staying 
(Goldstein et al, 2008).
On the basis of the abovementioned literature related to nudging and descriptive 
social norms, we theorize that when decision makers are nudged by an internal auditor 
with risk warnings containing a descriptive social norm they will be more likely to listen 
to these risk warnings. The underlying logic for this assertion is that decision makers 
are more likely to heed the advice of the internal auditor if they believe that their peers, 
when facing similar situations, tend to follow the advice of the auditor with respect to 
risk warnings. Thus we state the following hypothesis:
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h1. Decision makers will be less likely to exhibit the deaf effect and continue a failing 
course of action when the risk warnings and recommendations communicated by the 
messenger contains a descriptive social norm indicating what the decision makers’ peers 
normally do under these circumstances.
While this would appear to be a straightforward and therefore potentially uninteresting 
hypothesis, it is important to note that descriptive social norms may not always be ef-
fective (Jacobson et al, 2011). Indeed, there is no guarantee that providing a descriptive 
social norm will work as intended. For example, in an attempt to reduce the theft of 
petrified wood from Arizona’s Petrified Forest National Park, visitors were exposed to 
the following message: “Many past visitors have removed petrified wood from the Park, 
changing the natural state of the Petrified Forest” (Cialdini, 2003; Cialdini et al, 2006). 
While the message was designed to reduce the theft of petrified wood, it had the 
unintended effect of increasing the theft of wood by about 8%, as people interpreted 
the salient message to be “theft is common” rather than “theft is bad” (Griskevicius et 
al, 2006). Similarly, Schultz et al, (2007) in their field experiment on household energy 
consumption also showed that normative messages could have undesirable effects. 
Following this, it is by no means certain that in our study context, nudges based on a 
descriptive social norm will necessarily have the desired effect in terms of reducing the 
deaf effect. 
Influence of messenger-recipient relationship on the deaf effect 
In deaf effect situations, messengers report risk warning messages to decision makers 
who have the choice to assign relevance to these messages and take corrective action or 
not to listen to the risk warning and continue the project as planned (Nuijten et al, 2016). 
In our domain of interest, the auditor plays the role of the messenger who delivers a risk 
warning and the project owner plays the role of the recipient (and decision maker) who 
must decide whether or not to act on the risk warning. Nuijten et al, (2016) differentiate 
between a messenger-recipient relationship (MRR) in which the auditor is seen as a col-
laborative partner and one in which the auditor is seen as an opponent. In their study, 
Nuijten et al, (2016) found that decision makers are more likely to heed the auditor’s risk 
warning and discontinue the course of action when the messenger is considered to be 
a collaborative partner instead of an opponent. In our study, we re-test the effects of 
the MRR on the deaf effect. Thus, we hypothesize the following replication hypothesis:
h2. Decision makers will be less likely to exhibit the deaf effect and continue a failing 
course of action when the messenger issuing risk warnings and advocating project 
redirection is seen as a collaborative partner. 
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Interaction of messenger-recipient relationship and descriptive social norms
Lapinski and Rimal (2005) and Rimal et al, (2005) suggest the need to understand the 
role of potential moderators that can influence the nature of the relationship between 
descriptive social norms and behaviours. In a study along these lines, Berger and Rand 
(2008) show that descriptive social norms can actually decrease (rather than increase) 
compliance when the descriptive social norm is associated with an undesirable group. 
Extrapolating from this finding, we theorize that it may also be important to consider 
the source of the descriptive social norm and how the target recipient views the source. 
Prior work has shown that decision makers are more receptive to a risk warning when it 
comes from an internal auditor who is perceived as a Collaborative Partner rather than 
an Opponent (Nuijten et al, 2016). Thus, decision makers are more likely to listen to a 
risk warning when the messenger is someone who aims to help management instead of 
revealing management’s non-performance. 
Based on the above, we theorize an interaction between the messenger-recipient 
relationship (MRR) (i.e., whether the messenger is seen as a Partner or an Opponent) 
and the use of a descriptive social norm designed to nudge behaviour. Specifially, we 
theorize that decision makers should be more receptive to a risk warning message con-
taining a descriptive social norm when it comes from an internal auditor who is seen as 
a Collaborative Partner then when it comes from an internal auditor who is considered 
to be an Opponent. In other words, MRR is likely to moderate the relationship between 
a descriptive social norm and the deaf effect. Specifically, we expect that when the mes-
senger is seen by the decision makers as a Collaborative Partner, the influence of the 
messenger’s use of a descriptive social norm in reducing the deaf effect will be greater. 
We also expect that when the messenger is seen as an Opponent the messenger’s use 
of a descriptive social norm will be less effective and may even backfire. Thus, we state 
the following hypothesis:
h3. The MRR (i.e., whether the messenger is seen as a Partner or an Opponent) will 
moderate the influence of a risk warning message containing a descriptive social norm 
on the deaf effect. Specifically, the recipient will be more likely to listen to a risk warning 
message containing a descriptive social norm when the messenger (i.e., auditor) is seen 
as a Collaborative Partner. Conversely, a risk warning message containing a descriptive 
social norm will be less effective or even counterproductive when the messenger is seen 
as an Opponent. 
Based on our literature review and theorizing, we developed the research model shown 
in Figure 3-1 which we test in this study. 
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figure 3-1. Research Model
As shown in the model, our dependent variable is a decision-maker’s willingness to 
continue a troubled project, which serves as a proxy for the deaf effect, as it provides 
an indication of the degree to which the auditor’s risk warning and recommendation to 
redirect the project influences the decision-maker. Our predictor variable is whether or 
not the message delivered by the auditor contains a descriptive social norm. The model 
suggests that MRR (whether the messenger is seen as a Collaborative Partner or an Op-
ponent) will moderate the relationship between a descriptive social norm and the deaf 
effect.
In our analysis, gender, work experience, and risk propensity were included as control 
variables. We based this inclusion on the results of prior work by Cuellar et al, (2006) 
revealing that the deaf effect can be influenced by both gender and work experience, 
as well as prior work by Lee et al, (2014) showing that risk propensity can also influence 
the deaf effect. 
3.4 mEthoD
To test our model we conducted a scenario-based laboratory experiment. We created 
the setting for the investigation of the phenomenon and we had control over the in-
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dependent variable(s) and the random assignment of the participants to the treatment 
and non-treatment conditions (Boudreau et al, 2001). We manipulated the risk warning 
message of the internal auditor (by including or not including nudging with a Descrip-
tive Social Norm) and the Messenger-Recipient Relationship (MRR) (Collaborative vs. 
Opponent) in a 2x2 factorial design. 
Participants
Our participants consisted of 171 undergraduate students who were enrolled in Ac-
counting and Information Systems courses at two Belgian Universities. The students had 
an average age of 23 years and an average work experience of 1.5 years. Seventy-five 
percent of the students had a European nationality and the majority were Belgian citi-
zens. Sixty-three percent were male and 37% were female. 
Prior to starting the experiment at the beginning of class, participants were told that 
the study was about business decision making in an information system project situa-
tion. Participation in the experiment was voluntary and participants were told that their 
answers would be anonymous. Then we assigned randomly participants to one of the 
four experimental scenarios (i.e. treatment groups). Of the 171 responses, 147 were us-
able; 24 responses could not be used either because they were incomplete or because 
multiple responses were provided to the main question (i.e., the decision to continue). 
Keil et al, (2007) and Keil and Park (2009) provide an extensive discussion of the appro-
priateness of student subjects in the immediate domain of experiments involving bad 
news reporting on IT projects. They state that the decision to use student subjects must 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis (Keil and Park, 2009) and argue that for studies 
focusing on theory application such as ours, data from student subjects are acceptable 
(Keil et al, 2007). While the appropriateness of student subjects has been debated, Sitkin 
and Weingart (1995) suggest that the use of student subjects is often appropriate when 
the experiment involves human decision making. Prior research on the deaf effect has 
employed student subjects (Cuellar et al, 2006; Lee et al, 2014). Moreover, Nuijten et al, 
(2016) tested a core model of the deaf effect including the MRR construct with both 
students and practitioners and found that the pattern of results was consistent regard-
less of the type of subject used in the experiment. This finding is consistent with prior 
work showing that “real-world decision makers possess information-processing charac-
teristics and biases that are extremely similar to their student counterparts” (Ashton and 
Kramer, 1980, p. 3). Finally, according to Cook and Campbell (1979), it is perfectly ap-
propriate to trade off some external validity in order to achieve strong internal validity. 
In this respect, experiments with student subjects are beneficial because they provide a 
relatively homogenous subject pool, and enable the experiment to be conducted in an 
isolated and controlled setting (i.e. a classroom), using standardized procedures. Once 
internal validity has been established for the purpose of theory testing, external valid-
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ity can be further addressed by testing across multiple contexts and different types of 
participants.
scenario and treatments
In our scenario we asked the participants to consider themselves to be the project 
owner of an information systems project within an insurance company. The scenario 
used in this experiment was based on one used by Nuijten et al, (2016) and involves 
a situation in which the subject (playing the role of a project owner) is informed that 
Mr. Johnson from the Internal Audit department has recently found serious problems 
with the project and advises that the project should be redirected (i.e., not continue as 
planned).
Consistent with prior studies in behavioural economics that have used similar treat-
ments (e.g., Goldstein et al, 2008; Kredenster et al, 2012), we created the following mes-
sage for our descriptive social norm treatment: “Mr Johnson informed you that MOST 
of your PEER COLLEAGUES Project Owners within THIS company REDIRECT the project 
under these circumstances. Subsequently, Mr. Johnson advised you to JOIN YOUR FEL-
LOW PEERS and REDIRECT the project LIKE YOUR PEERS DO.” As a control, we crafted the 
following message that did not include a descriptive social norm: Mr. Johnson advised 
you to REDIRECT the project. 
In a manner consistent with Nuijten et al, (2016), we independently manipulated the 
messenger-recipient relationship (MRR) to be either collaborative or not. For the col-
laborative treatment, we stated: “Mr. Johnson (the Internal Auditor) has a long history 
of working COLLABORATIVELY with IS project teams with the goal of helping to identify 
and manage project risks, thus enabling project owners to be successful. He is seen by 
the project management as adding value to the process. Thus, Mr. Johnson is treated as 
a TRUSTED PARTNER to management.” For the opponent treatment, we stated: “Mr. John-
son (the Internal Auditor) has a long history of working AGAINST IS project teams with 
the goal of exposing project failings, thus embarrassing project owners. He is seen as 
policeman who does not add any value to the development process. Thus, Mr. Johnson 
is treated as an OPPONENT WHO IS NOT TO BE TRUSTED.”
The complete scenario and manipulations can be found in the Appendix.
constructs and measures
Our independent variables were manipulated and treated as dichotomous variables. The 
presence or absence of a descriptive social norm was captured in the variable SocNorm 
(1=Message including a descriptive social norm; 0=Message without a descriptive social 
norm). Messenger recipient relationship was captured in the variable MRR (1=collabora-
tive partner; 0=opponent). 
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In our experiment we use the decision to continue a troubled information systems 
project (Continue) despite the auditor’s risk warning and recommendation to redirect 
the project as the dependent variable. Consistent with Nuijten et al, (2016) we assessed 
this construct by applying two measurement items (Continue1 and Continue2). 
 Consistent with prior studies (Keil et al, 2000; Cuellar et al, 2006), risk propensity 
(RiskProp) was measured using four items adapted from Sitkin and Weingart (1995). In 
the Appendix all of the construct measures that were employed are shown. 
3.5 rEsults
manipulation checks
We conducted manipulation checks to ensure that our treatments were effective. The 
descriptive social norm manipulation check consisted of a single item which was used 
to assess whether subjects noticed and were able to recall whether or not the scenario 
contained a descriptive social norm. Possibly due to the placement of the manipula-
tion check at the end of the experiment, it may have been difficult for participants to 
remember the details of the manipulation and thus forty-four participants did not 
pass the manipulation check question. To be on the conservative side and to ensure 
the manipulation validity of our study we only included respondents who passed the 
manipulation checks on social norms. Thus, we retained 103 responses for subsequent 
analysis.
As a manipulation check for MRR we adopted the 3-item scale used by Nuijten et al, 
(2016). A two-way ANOVA with interaction was conducted by entering the manipula-
tions as independent variables and using the MRR manipulation check as the dependent 
variable. The two-way ANOVA confirmed that the MRR manipulation was effective and 
that there was no significant interaction effect. The results of this ANOVA are shown in 
Table 3-1a.
table 3-1a. Manipulation Test ANOVA
 Independent variable Type III Sum of Squares F Sig.
Main Effect SocNorm .468 .366 .547
Main Effect MRR 126.611 99.058 .000
Interaction Effect
 SocNorm * MRR .097 .076 .784
Dependent Variable: MRR-manipulation check
R2 is .501
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measurement model Assessment
For testing our research model, we chose Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis. By using 
PLS we could assess both the measurement model and structural model together (Gefen 
et al, 2000; Gefen et al, 2011). 
SmartPLS (Ringle et al, 2005) version 2.0 was used for the analysis. Before testing our 
structural model, we determined the validity of our measurement model through tests 
of convergent and discriminant validity as described by Chin (1998) and Fornell and 
Larcker (1981). 
convergent validity
Two different assessments were made for convergent validity: (1) individual item reli-
ability, and (2) construct reliability. Individual item reliability was assessed by examining 
the item-to-construct loadings for each construct that was measured with multiple indi-
cators. In order for the shared variance between each item and its associated construct 
to exceed the error variance, the standardized loadings should be greater than 0.70. As 
seen in Table 3-1b, all of our loadings exceeded this threshold.
table 3-1b. Item to Construct Loadings
Construct Item Item-to-Construct Loading
Continue Continue1 0.971
Continue2 0.967
Risk Propensity RiskProp1 0.791
RiskProp2 0.819
RiskProp3 0.791
RiskProp4 0.775
We also considered the construct reliability for each block of measures, as shown 
in Table 3-1c. Composite reliability scores and Cronbach’s alpha scores both measure 
the internal consistency among a given construct’s items. Unlike Cronbach’s alpha, the 
composite reliability score does not assume that all indicators are equally weighted. 
Therefore Cronbach’s alpha tends to be a lower bound estimate of reliability (Chin, 1998). 
Bearden et al, (1993) claim that a score of .7 indicates extensive evidence of reliability. 
Table 1c shows that the reliability for each of our constructs exceeds this threshold. For-
nell and Larcker (1981) view Average Variance Extracted (AVE) as a measure of construct 
reliability. The guideline threshold for AVE is 0.5, which means that 50 percent or more of 
variance of the indicators is accounted for (Chin, 1998). As Table 1c indicates, both of the 
multi-item constructs in our measurement model exceeded the established criterion for 
AVE.
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table 3-1c. Construct Reliability 
AVE Composite Reliability Cronbach’s Alpha
Continue 0.939 0.968 0.935
RiskProp 0.631 0.872 0.805
Discriminant validity
We conducted two tests for discriminant validity. First, we calculated each indicator’s 
loading on its own construct as well as its cross-loadings on all other constructs. In Table 
3-2 we see that each indicator loads higher on its own construct than it does on any 
other constructs. We also see that the indicators for a given construct have a higher load-
ing with their own construct than do the indicators associated with any other construct. 
This provides good evidence of discriminant validity (Chin, 1998). 
table 3-2. Item to Own Construct Correlation vs Correlations With Other Constructs
Construct Item
Continue Gender 
Expt2
RiskProp Expt1 WorkExp
continue Continue1 0.97 0.12 0.42 -0.01
Continue2 0.96 0.17 0.39 0.05
riskProp RiskProp1 0.32 0.04 0.79 0.08
RiskProp2 0.34 0.16 0.81 0.10
RiskProp3 0.32 0.05 0.79 -0.02
RiskProp4 0.34 0.12 0.77 -0.01
workExp WorkExp 0.01 -0.10 0.04 1.00
gender Gender 0.15 1.00 0.12 -0.10
Pls structural model Assessment
Having an adequate measurement model in place, we tested our hypotheses by examin-
ing the structural model. The explanatory power of a structural model can be evaluated 
by examining the R-squared value for the ultimate dependent variable. Figure 3-2 shows 
that the explanatory power of our structural model is adequate with an R-squared of 
.422 for our dependent variable Continue. 
After calculating path estimates for the structural model, we applied bootstrapping to 
generate the corresponding t-values. With significance levels of .05, .01 and 0.001, the 
t-values for a one-tailed test would be 1.645, 2.326 and 3.091, respectively (which is ac-
ceptable given the directional nature of the hypotheses). Path coefficients and t-values 
for the models are presented in figure 3-2.
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As shown in fi gure 3-2, the SocNorm to Continue path is signifi cant (path-coeffi  cient 
of -0.150 and t-value of -1.805 and p= 0.036) and in the expected direction, thus indicat-
ing support for Hypothesis 1. The fi gure also shows that the path from MRR to Continue 
is signifi cant (path-coeffi  cient of -0.441 with t-value of 5.325 and p < 0.001) and in the 
expected direction, thus indicating support for Hypothesis 2. 
In order to test our moderation hypothesis, we constructed an interaction term using 
the product indicator procedure as described by Chin et al, (1996). Figure 3-2 shows that 
the interaction term (SocNorm x MRR) was signifi cant at the p < .05 level in a 1-tailed 
test (t=- 1.730 and p = 0.042), indicating that the eff ect of SocNorm on the deaf eff ect is 
strengthened when we shift from a messenger who is seen as an Opponent to one who 
is seen as a Partner. This result supports Hypothesis 3. 
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*significant at p < .05 level (one-tailed test)
** significant at p < .01 level (one-tailed test)
*** significant at p < .001 level (one-tailed test)
Figure 3-2. Structural Model Results
figure 3-2. Structural Model Results
*signifi cant at p < .05 level (one-tail d test)
** signifi cant at p < .01 level (one-tailed test)
*** signifi cant at p < .001 level (one-tailed test)
For interpretation of the moderating eff ect we present the interaction plot in Figure 3-3 
below. In order to facilitate accurate interpretation of the fi gure, we performed a regres-
sion analysis in which we used the standardized versions of our control variables, i.e. risk 
propensity, gender and work experience, as suggested by Dawson (2014). Consistent 
with Aiken and West (1991), two lines were plotted, each representing one of the two 
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values of the moderator (MRR). The lines are not parallel, but do not intersect within 
the scale of treatment and measurement conditions we used in our experiment. As the 
sequence of the two lines stayed unchanged, this type of interaction is called “ordinal” 
(Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003, p.78).   
The results of the moderation analysis show that the interaction effect between Soc-
Norm and MRR on Continue is consistent with our expectations. 
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Figure 3-3.  Interaction plots with MRR as moderator
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figure 3-3.  Interaction plots with MRR as moderator 
We performed simple slope tests of these lines to determine if their slopes are sig-
nificantly different from zero. As we can see from Figure 3-3, nudging with a descriptive 
social norm has the intended effect - i.e., reduces the deaf effect (as measured by the 
decision to continue) when the risk warning message comes from an internal auditor 
who is seen as a Collaborative Partner. To confirm this we performed a simple slope test 
in SPSS. The simple slope test revealed that the slope of this line was significantly differ-
ent from zero (std. beta = -.326; p = .019). Based on the interaction plot, nudging with a 
descriptive social norm appears to have no effect or even a slightly opposite effect when 
the risk warning message comes from an internal auditor who is seen as an Opponent. 
A simple slope test revealed, however, that the slope of this line was not significantly 
different from zero (std. beta = .094; p = .525). 
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3.6 DIscussIon
Before discussing the implications of our study, it is appropriate to consider the main 
findings and the limitations. The study’s three main findings are: 
(1) Nudging with a descriptive social norm can significantly reduce the deaf effect 
response to a risk warning issued by an internal auditor. 
(2) The influence of a descriptive social norm on the deaf effect is strengthened when 
the messenger is seen as a Collaborative Partner rather than an Opponent. When 
the messenger is seen as a Collaborative Partner, decision makers are more likely to 
pay attention to the risk warning message of the internal auditor. However, when 
the messenger is seen as an Opponent, nudging with a descriptive social norm is 
ineffective.
(3) Decision makers are less likely to continue a failing course of action when the mes-
senger who delivers a risk warning is seen as a Collaborative Partner rather than an 
Opponent. This finding is consistent with a previously reported study (Nuijten et al, 
2016) and has replication value.
limitations 
This research involved a laboratory experiment which allowed us to achieve high internal 
validity but at some cost in terms of external validity. Experimental designs for studies 
such as ours should not be evaluated based on the degree to which they reflect actual 
organizational settings, but rather on whether they contribute to our ability to test causal 
relationships that extend our understanding of human decision making (Dobbins et al, 
1988). To achieve a high level of internal validity our study took a necessarily narrow 
focus and involved a small number of variables so as to achieve a high degree of control. 
Hence, in our experimental approach we were unable to include all the complexities of 
real work situations. This trade-off of higher internal validity for lower external validity 
is common in laboratory experiments and should not be considered to be a flaw. At the 
same time, any generalization of the findings of this study to other settings should be 
done with caution. It is possible that the results would be different in other settings as 
there are other organizational and political factors that may also affect managers’ deaf 
effect responses to risk warnings.
The use of student participants could also limit the external validity of our results. 
Although students often serve as valid surrogates for managers in this type of research, 
further research is needed to determine if these findings can be replicated with more 
experienced participants.
Despite the above limitations, this study contributes to our understanding of how 
internal auditors can reduce the deaf effect and thereby influence the trajectory of 
troubled IS projects by issuing risk warnings that contain descriptive social norms. This 
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is the first empirical study that we are aware of that examines whether nudging with a 
descriptive social norm can improve the effectiveness of the Internal Audit function with 
respect to the management of IT projects.
Implications 
Prior research on the deaf effect has focused on characteristics of the messenger and his/
her relationship with the recipient that tend to be stable and not easily changed. By focus-
ing on what the auditor can do to craft the message in a way that overcomes the deaf 
effect, our research contributes to this discourse and addresses an important theoretical 
gap. Specifically, we introduce a novel research model that builds on prior work by Nuijten 
et al, (2016) and combines MRR with the idea of nudging with descriptive social norms. 
Ours is the first study to show that nudging with a descriptive social norm can signifi-
cantly reduce the deaf effect response to an auditor’s risk warning. Further, our results 
suggest that nudging with descriptive norms is more effective when the technique is 
used in a stewardship based model whereby the descriptive norms provided by the 
messenger take place in an MRR context in which the messenger is viewed as a partner 
rather than an opponent. Finally, our results confirm the findings of Nuijten et al, (2016) 
who reported that when the messenger is seen as a collaborative partner this can have 
a direct impact in terms of reducing the deaf effect.
The study has important practical implications because it suggests that auditors can 
use tactics from behavioural economics (i.e. nudging) to reduce the deaf effect. Un-
like other factors which have been discussed in the deaf effect literature, nudging is a 
technique that can be quickly and easily applied. That being said, the effectiveness of 
nudging will be maximized when auditors have invested the time to establish collabora-
tive relationships with the managers to whom they must deliver risk warnings. 
Further research is warranted to explore the effect of other types of nudging on the 
deaf effect response to risk warnings. One approach is to make things easy for message 
recipients by, for example, minimizing bureaucratic procedures or obstacles that could 
prevent them from taking appropriate actions to deal with risks. Another approach 
might be to change the character of project review meetings so that the default is that 
a project will not go forward in the presence of major risks that remain unaddressed. 
Conversely, if the situation can be structured in a way such that ignoring the auditor’s 
risk warning and pressing forward requires effort to justify, this will have the effect of 
nudging the recipient in the desired direction. Another approach to nudging could 
involve choosing the best time in which to deliver the risk warning. For example, it may 
be the case that a recipient will be more likely to act on a risk warning immediately after 
a performance appraisal as opposed to before such an appraisal takes place. We hope 
that our work will encourage others to investigate other types of nudging that could be 
effective in reducing the deaf effect.
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APPEnDIx 1. 
scenario and measures
Imagine that you are the Senior Vice President of the Pensions Operations department 
within a large insurance company. You inherited a prestigious IS-project called PENSION-
VIEW. As Project Owner, YOU became responsible for the successful implementation of 
PENSION-VIEW and for realizing the benefits for your organization with this in-house 
developed system.
With this IS-project you could be the first insurance company in the market that grants 
all citizens (customers and potential customers) access to the complete set of their 
personal pension information. If your insurance company is the first in the market to 
provide this service at a reliable level, the expected gain to your company would be 60 
million euros, as documented in a detailed business case for the project.
Your main competitors have all decided to wait for the supplier of a standard software-
package to provide a module to the insurance-market that integrates and presents their 
pension data. If your implementation is too late or does not prove reliable during the 
first month of operations, you will miss your competitive advantage and your organiza-
tion will gain nothing.
The main challenge and risk of the PENSION-VIEW project are the large number of 
interfaces to retrieve reliable information from other information systems that contain 
pension data.
Your PENSION-VIEW project is close to implementation and under time-pressure to 
continue implementation as planned. 
According to standard procedures, Mr. Johnson from the Internal Audit department 
has recently reviewed the testing-procedures of your project.
Mr. Johnson reports that he has found serious weaknesses in the design and execution 
of the testing activities on the data exchange with other information systems that may 
lead to reliability problems in the first month of operations with severe consequences 
for the company. As a consequence, he reports that the project should be redirected 
(thus, not continue as planned).
scenario 1 (with manipulation) (socnorm = nudged (normative) message): 
Mr. Johnson (the Internal Auditor) has a long history of working COLLABORATIVELY 
with IS project teams with the goal of helping to identify and manage project risks, 
thus enabling project owners to be successful. He is seen by the project management 
as adding value to the process. Thus, Mr. Johnson is treated as a TRUSTED PARTNER to 
management. 
Mr Johnson informed you that MOST of your PEER COLLEAGUES Project Owners 
within THIS company REDIRECT the project under these circumstances. Subsequently, 
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Mr. Johnson advised you to JOIN YOUR FELLOW PEERS and REDIRECT the project LIKE 
YOUR PEERS DO.
scenario 2 (without manipulation) (socnorm = not nudged (Plain) message): 
Mr. Johnson (the Internal Auditor) has a long history of working AGAINST IS project 
teams with the goal of exposing project failings, thus embarrassing project owners. He 
is seen as policeman who does not add any value to the development process. Thus, Mr. 
Johnson is treated as an OPPONENT WHO IS NOT TO BE TRUSTED.
Mr. Johnson advised you to REDIRECT the project. 
scenario 3 (with manipulation) (socnorm = nudged (normative) message): 
Mr. Johnson (the Internal Auditor) has a long history of working AGAINST IS project 
teams with the goal of exposing project failings, thus embarrassing project owners. He 
is seen as policeman who does not add any value to the development process. Thus, Mr. 
Johnson is treated as an OPPONENT WHO IS NOT TO BE TRUSTED.
Mr Johnson informed you that MOST of your PEER COLLEAGUES Project Owners 
within THIS company REDIRECT the project under these circumstances. Subsequently, 
Mr. Johnson advised you to JOIN YOUR FELLOW PEERS and REDIRECT the project LIKE 
YOUR PEERS DO.
scenario 4 (without manipulation) (socnorm = not nudged (Plain) message): 
Mr. Johnson (the Internal Auditor) has a long history of working COLLABORATIVELY 
with IS project teams with the goal of helping to identify and manage project risks, 
thus enabling project owners to be successful. He is seen by the project management 
as adding value to the process. Thus, Mr. Johnson is treated as a TRUSTED PARTNER to 
management. 
Mr. Johnson advised you to REDIRECT the project. 
As you left the meeting with Mr. Johnson, you saw two courses of action. You could 
decide to REDIRECT the project (thus, not continue as planned). Or, you could decide to 
CONTINUE as planned (thus, move the system into production as planned).
You must decide which of the two courses of action to take.
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mEAsurEs
continue (dependent variable)
Variable Item Wording 
Continue1 (1=Definitely Redirect; 8=Definitely Continue)
Indicate whether you would decide to continue the project as planned or redirect, and how 
strong your leaning would be
Continue2 (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)
I will certainly continue the PENSION-VIEW project as planned (i.e., without redirection)
mrr (moderator variable)
Variable
MRR (1=Collaborative partner; 0=Opponent)
socnorm (independent variable)
Variable
SocNorm (1=Message including a descriptive social norm; 0=Message without a descriptive social norm)
mrrmc (used as a manipulation check)
Variable (Anchors)
Item Wording 
MRRmc1 (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)
I consider Mr. Smith to be a trusted partner to my PENSION-VIEW project
MRRmc2 (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree)
I consider Mr. Smith to be a collaborative partner to my PENSION-VIEW project
MRRmc3 (1=Non-Trusted Opponent; 7=Trusted Partner)
I consider Mr. Smith to be a __________ to my PENSION-VIEW project
risk Propensity (used as a control variable)
Variable Item Wording (Anchors: 1=Extremely LESS likely than others; 7=Extremely MORE likely than 
others)
RiskProp1 Your tendency to choose risky alternatives based on the assessment of other people on whom 
you must rely
RiskProp2 Your tendency to choose risky alternatives relying on an assessment that is high in technical 
complexity
RiskProp3 Your tendency to choose risky alternatives which could have major impact on the strategic 
direction of your organization
RiskProp4 Your tendency to choose risky alternatives despite considerable failures in risky choices you 
made in the past
4
The influence of ‘Timing’ on the 
effectiveness of the Internal Audit 
function
chAPtEr oVErVIEw
The focus of this paper is on the factors that determine the timing of the risk warning mes-
sage communication by the internal auditor and hence that might be of influence on the 
effectiveness of Internal Audit (IA). While there has been a lot of research on various factors 
influencing IA effectiveness, to our knowledge, no attention has been paid for exploring tim-
ing in relation to IA effectiveness. In this study we investigate which factors determine the 
right timing (not too learly and not too late) for the internal auditor to communicate the risk 
warning message so that IA will be more effective. For the purpose of our study we defined 
IA effectiveness as the extent to which the auditee is willing to listen to the risk warning 
messages and implement the internal auditor’s advice. We applied a Focus Groups research 
method by performing Focus Group interviews with internal auditors as well as auditees 
that were asked to freely discuss about these timing factors from their experience.
To our knowledge, this exploratory study is first within the research of IA effectiveness that 
obtained an overview of and insight in the various factors that might influence the right timing 
for communication of the risk warning message by the internal auditor. In general, the internal 
auditors and the auditee’s agree with each other with regard to the importance of these timing 
factors for the effectiveness of the IA. There where discrepancies were noted in this respect, more 
alignment between the internal auditors and the auditees is required as to the right time to act.
In this paper we discuss the results and the implications of our qualitative study, both for 
research and practice of internal auditing. With this study we contribute to the knowledge of 
the factors influencing the IA effectiveness as well as the better understanding of ‘timing’ in 
decision making processes.
keywords: timing factors, internal audit effectiveness, internal auditor, risk warning 
messages, focus groups
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4.1 IntroDuctIon
“Timing matters. And it matters in every aspect of business: from the launch of a new product 
to decisions about when to change strategic direction, spin off part of a company, accept a 
counteroffer, or invest in new equipment. History is full of innovative products and services 
that failed because they were too early. The market wasn’t ready. The technology had too 
many bugs. Supporting infrastructure didn’t exist. More commonly, in a world racing on 
steroids, the fatal flaw is being late. We should have moved more quickly. Our strategy would 
have worked if only we had executed earlier. Timing is everything. Act too early or too late, 
and the results can be disappointing – or even disastrous.” (Albert, 2013, p.1).
If the timing is everything in every aspect of the business to make a difference between 
success and disaster, it is also a relevant factor for the effectiveness of the Internal Audit 
(IA). With our study we aim to investigate these timing factors that may be of influence 
on the IA effectiveness.
The internal Auditor performs the audit according to prescribed audit methodology 
and standards. The audit process has its own planning and sequential steps and own 
rhythm. At the same time, the internal auditor operates in a dynamic organizational en-
vironment that has its own tempo and dynamic. In certain situations the internal auditor 
needs to communicate the findings and recommendations (i.e., the risk warnings) even 
though the audit investigation is not yet finalised, simply because the time is right to 
act and make a difference. In other situations the auditor considers to wait and holds 
reporting of findings and recommendations since the time is not right yet.
This brings us to the question ‘which timing related factors determine that the time 
is right (not too early and not too late) for the internal auditor to communicate the risk 
warnings to the auditee so that the auditee will follow the internal auditor’s advice?’ 
We know little about when is the time right for the internal auditor to communicate 
the risk warnings to the auditees. Lenz et al, (2014) found that the IA function can be 
considered effective when organizations follow their internal auditors’ (independent) 
advice for improvement. According to Lenz and Sarens (2012) the IA report is an output 
that is effective when it may trigger intended change, and it is that intended change 
- that specific outcome and possibly lasting impact that accomplishes the desired im-
provement - that matters. And if the timing of ‘when to act’ is everything and it matters 
(Albert and Bell, 2002), we make the assumption that the timing of the internal auditor’s 
trigger of the intended change matters in being effective.
Prior research on factors influencing IA effectiveness has tended to focus predomi-
nantly on factors such as the acceptance and implementation of the audit recommenda-
tions, the size of the audit department, compliance with the auditing standards, the 
positioning of the IA department in the organization and relation with the Audit Com-
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mittee, and interaction with line managers (Arena and Azzone, 2009), top management 
support (Cohen and Sayag, 2010; Van Peursem, 2005; Mihret and Yismaw 2007), staff 
expertise, executing the audit plan, audit communication (Mihret and Yismaw, 2007), 
organizational support’ (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a and 2006b). Lenz and Hahn (2015) 
performed an comprehensive review on the available literature on effectiveness of IA 
and we note timing has not been addressed as a factor for IA effectiveness. Recent re-
search by Nuijten (2012), Nuijten et al, (2014) and Nuijten et al, (2016) focussed on causes 
of deaf effect (the reluctance of the message recipient to hear risk warnings issued by 
the messenger) on strategic topics such as continuation of an escalating IS-project and 
suggested that deaf effect can be considered as a deficiency in the IA’s effectiveness. 
Despite the abovementioned and many other studies on the effectiveness of IA, our 
knowledge of the relevance of timing factors on the IA effectiveness is limited. Similarly, 
in the organizational literature there are not much studies on point-moment problems 
i.e. as a situation unfolds, when is the right moment to act (Albert and Bell, 2002).
With our research we aim to examine which timing related factors have influence on 
the IA effectiveness, which for the purpose of this study we relate to the deaf effect (Nui-
jten et al, 2012; 2014; 2016) i.e., the auditee’s willingness to listen or not to listen to the 
internal auditor’s risk warning message. We furthermore address an important theoreti-
cal gap concerning the effectiveness of IA and timing factors and aim to contribute to an 
improved understanding of the factors influencing IA effectiveness in general. With this 
study we also aim to contribute to the organizational literature of timing by providing 
input to better understand timing factors in decision making processes in general.
From a practical perspective, we aim at providing the internal auditors relevant input 
so that they can use the information about the right timing of their communication of 
risk warning messages to more effectively convince the auditees to accept and imple-
ment audit recommendations.
We address our questions in a qualitative research by using the Focus Groups inter-
views research method.
The paper is organised as follows: we start with a brief overview of the literature on 
the IA effectiveness and timing in general. We further describe our research question 
and research methodology. Then we further elaborate on our results followed by a 
discussion on the implications of our study for research as well as practice. In the An-
nexes we present the Focus Groups interview guide including the questions we used in 
our study as well as the comprehensive coding list including the code definitions that 
emerged from our study.
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4.2 lItErAturE rEVIEw
Our literature review aims to address an important knowledge gap concerning the IA 
effectiveness and the factors that determine the right timing for communicating the risk 
warnings by the internal auditor. During our literature review we were able to find a lot 
of research on effectiveness of the IA function; however we could not find researchers 
who specifically paid attention to the timing factors in terms of ‘when is the right timing 
for the internal auditor to act’, how and why these factors contribute the internal audi-
tor’s effectiveness.
Below we view a number of examples of recent literature to show the knowledge gap 
in the area of IA effectiveness, concerning the timing of the internal auditor’s communi-
cation of the risk warning messages to the auditee.
We first start with a brief overview of timing literature from the organizational research 
followed by an overview of literature from the area of effectiveness of IA. 
timing in the organizational literature
Albert and Bell (2002) comprehensively examined the organizational literature and 
concluded there is a little research on point-moment problems i.e. as a situation unfolds, 
when is the right moment to act? (Albert and Bell, 2002). In the literature, timing ques-
tions are mostly focused on sequencing problems (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), 
rate problems (Eisenhardt, 1989; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998, Gersick, 1989), synchrony 
problems (Perlow, 1999), deadlines (Waller et al, 2001), and duration and coordination 
(Ancona et al, 2001a). Twersky and Kahneman (1974) have examined errors and biases 
in decision making heuristics, but not specifically how these errors and biases influence 
the decision when to act (Albert and Bell, 2002). In the area of innovation literature, Tyre 
and Orlikowski (1994) examined the patterns of timing of adaptations of technologies 
that support productive operations. Rogers (1983) states that when organizations rush 
and introduce new technologies too early, they fail to identify and correct problems that 
later hamper productive use of the technology.
Mitchell and James (2001) examined the role of timing in theory development and 
research methodology and found that in any investigation of a causal relationship be-
tween X and a Y, the time when X and Y occur and are measured is crucial for determining 
whether X causes Y, as well as the true strength of that relationship. They however did 
not examine when is the right time of X and Y to occur so that their causal relationship 
is the strongest. Blount and Janicik (2001) examined how organizational actors respond 
when timing changes affect their own personal schedules and asserted that the suc-
cessful timing of organizational activities depends not only on effective planning and 
coordination but also on temporal responsiveness-the ability of organizational actors to 
adapt the timing of their activities to unanticipated events. 
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Although the importance of timing is acknowledged in the literature (Blount and 
Janick, 2001, Ancona, et al, 2001b, Lawrence 1988, Albert and Bell, 2002), we still do not 
know much about when is the right point of moment to act. Hence, we know little about 
when is the right moment for the internal auditor to communicate the risk warning mes-
sage to the auditees so that the auditee is more willing to listen to this risk warning 
message.
Internal Audit effectiveness
In the literature various scholars have defined ‘effectiveness’ in general and ‘effectiveness 
of IA’ in particular. According to Dittenhofer (2001) something is “effective” when it is 
adequate to achieve a desired condition. In relation to the internal auditing process, Dit-
tenhofer (2001) posited that the achievement of the internal auditing process is when 
internal auditing accomplishes the task described by the internal auditing objective’. 
From that perspective, effectiveness is synonymous with the achievement of goals.
Internal auditing as an independent activity that helps organizations to improve their 
operations (IIARF, 2015). In this respect, Lenz (2013) pointed out that the IA function can 
be considered effective when organizations follow the internal auditors’ (independent) 
advice for improvement (Lenz, 2013).
Furthermore, Sawyer (1995) considers management’s commitment to use audit re 
Sawyer (1973) stated that management acceptance of, and support for, the Internal 
Audit function has long been seen as critical to the success to that function. commen-
dations and its support in strengthening internal audit is vital to audit effectiveness 
(Sawyer, 1995). And Lenz and Sarens (2012) consider the IA report is effective when it 
brings to the intended change and accomplishes the desired improvement, which is all 
what matters.
In the internal auditing literature we could find a lot of research on effectiveness of 
the IA function; however we could not find researchers who specifically paid attention 
to the question which timing factors determine the right time of the internal auditor’s 
communication of risk warnings, how and why these factors contribute the Auditee to 
listen or not to listen to the Auditor’s risk warning message.
We address this knowledge gap below in this paper by showing some examples of 
researches in the area of IA effectiveness.
Mihret and Yismaw (2007) conducted a case study to identify factors impacting the 
Internal Audit effectiveness and stated that the Internal Audit is effective if it meets the 
intended outcome it is supposed to bring about. They used a model in their case study, 
which considers four potential factors – internal audit quality, management support, or-
ganizational setting, and Auditee attributes to explain audit effectiveness. They showed 
that interaction of these factors improves audit effectiveness; however their model did 
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not consider the ‘when’ (timing) aspect of the Auditor’s communication of the risk warn-
ing messages to the Auditees.
Cohen and Sayag (2010) conducted an empirical examination of the IA effectiveness 
determinants and found evidence showing that next to top management support, 
organizational independence and career and advancement, also the quality of audit 
work in terms of compliance with formal standards as well as a high level of efficiency 
in the audit’s planning and execution improves the audit’s effectiveness. The timing 
factors however are not part of these determinants of the IA effectiveness. Mihret et al, 
(2010) provided propositions and research agenda on potential antecedents of internal 
audit effectiveness and its possible association with company performance. The timing 
of the Auditor’s communication is however not mentioned among these antecedents 
of internal audit effectiveness. Similarly, Arena and Azzone (2009) summarise three ap-
proaches employed in the extant literature to evaluate IA effectiveness: (1) those using 
the level of implementation of internal audit recommendations (Mihret and Woldeyo-
hannis, 2008; Arena and Azzone, 2009); (2) output or outcome measures (using opinion 
of internal audit customers, for example management (Arena and Azzone, 2009) and 
(3) process measures (compliance with the Statements for the Professional Practice of 
Internal Auditing) (Al-Twaijry et al, 2003). According to Soh and Martinov Bennie (2011) 
in practice, the most commonly employed measures of IA effectiveness are still related 
to its efficiency with regard to delivery of the annual IA work plan and the acceptance 
and adoption of IA recommendations. These measure still do not include the timing of 
the communication of the risk warning messages by the Internal Auditor.
Based on survey data from 46 heads of internal audit (chief audit executives, CAEs) in 
private organizations in Germany, Lenz and Sarens (2012) and Lenz et al, (2014) identi-
fied four key dimensions or categorical blocks of effectiveness of IA functions: organi-
zation, IA resources, IA processes and IA relationships. Although quite comprehensive 
tough, this study do not include the timing dimension that may be of influence on the 
effectiveness of the internal auditor.
Another paper worth mentioning here is the paper of Lenz and Hahn (2015). Recently, 
Lenz and Hahn (2015) performed a comprehensive review on the available literature 
on effectiveness of IA. By generally considering publications from 1999 onward, their 
paper provided a synopsis of what academic literature says about IA effectiveness. When 
providing a review of the existing empirical literature on IA effectiveness, Lenz and Hahn 
(2015) distinguished two different streams, the “supply-side” perspective, i.e. empirical 
studies based on self-assessments of the Auditors, and the “demand-side” perspective, 
i.e. empirical studies based on other stakeholders’ perspectives. While Stream 1 and 
stream 2 address important factors of the internal audit effectiveness, the subject mat-
ter related to role of the timing factors in the internal audit effectiveness is still under-
examined area.
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Elliott et al, (2007) do not examine the timing factors as to the right moment for the 
internal auditor to act but in their paper they make the assertion that IA reports are not 
always well received, they are sometimes not perceived well and their findings are not 
always viewed as particularly significant, at times as trivial. This could be an indication 
that there are factors that could be determinants of the ‘right moment’ for the Internal 
Auditor to communicate the risk warnings so that the Auditee will view his/her message 
as particularly significant in trivial moments and will listen to it.
The above examples of studies on IA effectiveness do not consider the timing factors 
that may be of influence on the effectiveness of the IA. Therefore with this study we are 
attempting to identify the timing factors influencing the right moment for the internal 
auditor to communicate the risk warning message to the auditee so that the auditee 
will be willing to listen more to this risk warning message. This is related to both the 
timing of the reporting/communicating the risk warning messages (when is the best 
time to address a potential audit issue) by the internal auditor as part of planned audit 
engagements but also to the communication of the risk warning messages outside audit 
assignments (like for example during account management meetings with auditees or 
other occasions when the auditor has contact with the auditee).
4.3 rEsEArch QuEstIon
We define the following research question:
research Question type of 
Question
1 Which timing factors are proposed to be of influence on the Auditee’s willingness to listen 
or not to listen to the Auditor’s risk warning message?
Why (Causal 
relationship)
1.1 How do the timing factors influence (in general) the Auditee’s decision to listen (or 
not to listen) to the risk warning message?
How
Based on our literature review for the purpose of this study, we define the effectiveness 
of IA function as Auditee’s willingness to listen or not to listen to the Auditor’s risk warn-
ing message. 
In this study we do not use a model based on a specific theory on which to base our 
analysis of the timing factors we want to explore.
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4.4 rEsEArch mEthoD
In this section we elaborate thoroughly our systematic approach we employed for data 
gathering and their analyses. In line with Gioia et al, (2012) in this section we explain 
exactly what we did in designing and executing the study and the procedures we used 
to define our categories, themes, and dimensions.
focus groups interviews design
This study is a qualitative exploratory study based on a Focus Groups interviews method.
Focus groups are first mentioned as a market research technique in the 1920s (Basch, 
1987) and were used by Merton in the 1950s to examine people’s reactions to wartime 
propaganda (Kitzinger, 1994). Morgan (1997) defines Focus Groups as a research 
technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the 
researcher. “A Focus Group isn’t just getting a bunch of people together to talk” (Krueger 
and Casey, 2009, p. 2). A Focus Group is a special type of group in terms of purpose, 
size, composition and procedures. It is a way to better gather information to understand 
how people feel or think about an issue, product or service. Focus Groups are used to 
gather opinions (Krueger and Casey, 2009, p. 2). The group is ‘focused’ in the sense that 
it involves some kind of collective activity – such as viewing a film, examining a single 
health education message or simply debating a particular set of questions (Kitzinger, 
1994).
Focus Groups are relatively inexpensive and can provide fairly dependable data within 
a short time frame (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013, p. 113).
The purpose of our study is to identify the timing factors that may be of influence 
of IA effectiveness and look for any patterns of these timing factors. We intend to use 
the qualitative data obtained in our Focus Groups interviews to deeper understand the 
phenomenon under investigation and for later quantitative testing in our next study. 
The output of the session is a list of ideas and behavioural observations, which we aim 
to use for quantitative testing in further research. In exploratory research, the qualitative 
data that Focus Groups produce may be used for enriching all levels of research ques-
tions and hypotheses, and for comparing the effectiveness of design options (Blumberg 
et al, 2014, p. 157). Therefore we believe that this method will be most suitable to apply 
in our study.
In our Focus Group interviews we were interested in what the internal auditors and 
the auditees think about the timing factors that may influence the effectiveness of IA 
function as well as how they think and why they think as they do. According to Sekaran 
and Bougie (2013) Focus Groups discussions on a specific topic at a particular location 
and at a specified time provide the opportunity for a flexible, free-flowing format for the 
members. Therefore we invited the participants to talk freely in their native language on 
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the subject and we used unstructured open- ended questions. This was in accordance 
with the approach by Sekaran and Bougie (2013) who say that the unstructured and 
spontaneous responses are expected to reflect the genuine opinions, ideas, and feel-
ings of the members about the topic under discussion (Sekaran and Bougie, 2013, p. 
113-114).
The goal of our study is to go ‘in-depth’ into the topic, and therefore we spend large 
amount of time conducting the research with a relatively small number of people. 
Therefore our study is not intended to generalize.
We planned two Focus Groups interviews with representatives of Internal Audit and 
two Focus Groups interviews with representatives of management (the ‘Auditee’) within 
a large Dutch financial institution. This is in line with the Focus Groups approach (Kitz-
inger, 1994) according to which many ‘focus group studies’ rely on no more than 4 or 
5 groups, and this may be a perfectly adequate number when working with particular 
populations (Kitzinger, 1994). Morgan (1997, p. 43-45) recommends conducting three 
to five Focus Groups interviews to obtain trustworthy answer to the research question 
as more groups seldom provide meaningful new insights and are costly. Additionally, 
we applied a mix-and-match design according to Morgan (1997). This implies that next 
to the four homogenous Focus Groups, we planned one mixed Focus Group interview 
(three representatives of internal auditors and three representatives of the auditee 
together). By having a mixed discussion, we aimed at obtaining new statements that 
would not come up among those who will share the same perspective (Morgan 1997, 
p. 68).
Our decision of whom to invite in the Focus Groups interviews was driven by the pur-
pose of our study In Focus Group research the strategy is to use “purposeful” sampling 
whereby the researcher selects participants based on the purpose of the study (Krueger 
and Casey, 2009, p. 64; Morgan 1997, p. 35). According to Morgan (1997) a randomly 
sampled group is unlikely to hold a shared perspective on the research topic and may 
not even be able to generate meaningful discussion. As the purpose of our study is to 
explore and understand the timing factors that are of influence on the right timing 
the internal auditor to communicate the risk warning message to the auditees so that 
the auditee will be willing to listen or not listen to this message, we distinguished two 
types of participants in our study: the internal auditors and the auditees. Separating the 
participants in two groups was based on the procedures by Krueger and Casey (2009) 
who recommend doing so in order to be able to compare and contrast how the internal 
auditors and auditees talk about the issue under investigation. (Krueger and Casey, 
2009, p. 66-67).
In line with Morgan (1997), we composed our Focus Groups of homogenous groups 
of people – people with something in common that is relevant to the topic of the study. 
The goal is homogeneity in background and not in attitudes (Morgan, 1997, p. 35-37). 
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Thus, our Focus Groups were homogenous in nature as we defined two Focus Groups 
consisting of internal auditors and two consisting of representatives of the auditee and 
one mixed group of internal auditors and auditees.
All the Focus Group interviews were conducted by the researcher. Each Focus Group 
consisted of six participants. This choice was made based on the approach of Krueger 
and Casey (2009) who defined the ideal size of a Focus Group for most non-commercial 
topics to be five to eight participants. According to Krueger and Casey (2009) the quality 
of the study is not dependent on the size of the sample but the intent is to achieve 
‘theoretical saturation’ which is akin to redundancy (Krueger and Casey, 2009).
Most of the research participants in our Focus Groups already knew each other. 
This choice was based on available guidance we could find in the literature. Decisions 
for choice between strangers and acquaintances should rely on the basic criterion of 
whether a particular group of participants can comfortably discuss the topic in ways that 
are useful to the researcher (Morgan, 1997, p. 37-38). At the other hand, we could not 
avoid that the participants were acquaintances to each other due to the organizational 
setting in which we conducted our research. The fact that research participants already 
knew each other had the additional advantage that friends and colleagues could relate 
each other’s comments to actual incidents in their shared daily lives (Kitzinger, 1994). 
According to Morgan (1997), in some cases, it may be almost impossible to recruit a full 
group of acquaintances (e.g. among service recipients); in other cases, it may be almost 
impossible to avoid (e.g. in organizational settings).
Tables 4-2 throughout 4-6 in Annex 2 provide an anonymized insight into the back-
ground of our respondents.
Data collection
Throughout the study we used accepted systematic procedures for data collection, data 
handling and data analysis. The conclusions of our study are drawn on the level of the 
Internal Audit function being our unit of analysis (the ‘thing’) we study (Blumberg et 
al, 2014; Sekaran and Bougie, 2013). The data for the purpose of this study has been 
collected at individual level of observation i.e. the level of internal auditor and auditees.
As explained earlier, we conducted five Focus Group interviews of approximately 1 
hour. With the fifth interview we reached the goal of ‘saturation’, which was the point 
at which additional data collection no longer generated new understanding about the 
topic (Morgan, 1997, p. 43).
Each Focus Group interview lasted approximately 1 hour and was tape recorded. 
For conducting our interviews we created and followed accepted protocol according 
to Krueger and Casey, (2009) to ensure that results are trustworthy and accurate (see 
Appendix 1). To determine whether the topic will work in a Focus Group setting we 
discussed the approach with and obtained input from other professionals.
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We asked open-ended questions about the timing factors that may be of influence 
of IA effectiveness during the interview. For Krueger and Casey (2009), open-ended 
questions are a hallmark of Focus Group interviewing. These questions imply that a few 
words or a phrase are insufficient as an answer and they trigger explanations, descrip-
tions or illustrations (Krueger and Casey, 2009, p. 200-202 ).
During the interviews, the researcher listened carefully to the participants. The re-
searcher took brief minutes by writing key words and phrases per participant. During 
the interviews, we asked participants to explain their responses if these were unclear 
to us. At the end of each interview, a summary of the key findings was created by the 
researches and the participants were asked to confirm or adjust the summary if incorrect 
or incomplete (Krueger and Casey, 2009, p. 200-202).
From each taped recorded interview we produced a literal transcript that was executed 
by an independent service provider. This resulted in approximately 25 pages transcript 
per interview. The transcripts were checked by the researcher for completeness and cor-
rectness and corrected where necessary.
coding
First Cycle coding
The purpose of our data analysis is to identify the factors determining the right timing 
for communicating the risk warning message by the internal auditor and hence that 
may be of influence of IA effectiveness. We also looked for any patterns of these timing 
factors. We performed our data analysis by using the text analysis software Atlas.ti.
Based on the iterative coding approach of Saldana (2013), we divided our coding into 
two stages: First Cycle and Second Cycle coding. For the First Cycle coding we applied 
the coding procedures for descriptive coding according to Miles et al, (2014). A descrip-
tive code assigns labels to data to summarize in a word or short phrase – most often a 
noun – the basic topic of a passage of qualitative data and eventually provide an inven-
tory of topics for indexing and categorizing (Miles et al, 2014, p. 74).
We developed a coding scheme with codes that emerged after conducting all our 
interviews. This coding scheme included different descriptive codes by which we identi-
fied and classified specific words or phrases in the text related to the timing factors. 
As we could not find previous studies that explore the timing factors related to the 
effectiveness of the IA function, our coding approach was not set before going to the 
interviews and we did not define in advance a list of codes or phrases based on theory 
regarding the timing factors. Our codes emerged from and were defined during the First 
Cycle coding process.
According to Miles et al, (2014, p. 81-85) codes will drive the retrieval and organization 
of the data for analysis and therefore they must be precise and their meaning shared 
amongst analysts. Miles et al, (2014) explain that whether codes are pre-specified or 
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developed along the way, clear operational definitions are required so they can be 
applied consistently by a single researcher over time, and multiple researchers will be 
thinking about the same phenomena as they code (Miles et al, 2014, p. 84). Similarly, 
as we developed our codes iteratively along the way, we made clear and precise rules 
and definitions for each code we applied. Each code definition included the descrip-
tion of the code (the ‘what’) and whether the source of the code was the Auditor or the 
Auditee (the ‘who’). According to Weber (1984), the advantage of codes that are explicit, 
clear and precise is that such explicit codes should generate similar results in different 
context, which can establish a high level of reproducibility. 
Based on the approach of Miles et al, (2014) we further discussed our code rules and 
definitions with other researchers that resulted in their improvement and fine-tuning as 
the study proceeded.
Second Cycle coding
In the First Cycle coding we initially summarized segments of data and detected reoc-
curring patterns. We then proceeded with the Second Cycle coding by pattern coding. 
With pattern coding as a Second Cycle method, we grouped these summaries into a 
smaller number of categories, themes, or constructs (Miles et al, 2014, p. 86). This is also 
in line with the Second Cycle approach by Saldana (2013) who prescribed collapsing the 
original number of First Cycle codes into a smaller number as the data is reanalysed and 
this way it could be found that larger segments of text are better suited to just one key 
code rather than several smaller ones (Saldana, 2013, p. 206-209).
Consistent with this approach, we grouped the First Cycle codes in categories or 
themes resulting in key codes including the codes that have something in common with 
each other. For this we followed an iterative process again as we did during the First 
Cycle coding (Miles et al, 2014, Saldana, 2013, p. 70-93). Consequently we improved the 
themes by eliminating duplicate or redundant themes, combining and reorganising the 
themes.
All the individual codes, their coding definitions along with a list of words, phrases and 
sentences that qualify for receiving a code as well as the code categories are provided 
in the Coding schemes in tables 4-8 throughout 4-25 in the Appendix 3. The categories 
we defined and the category definitions according to which the individual codes were 
assigned to a category can be found in table 4-7, in the same Appendix of this paper.
4.5 rEsults
As described in the previous section, we scanned all five transcripts of the Focus Group 
interviews for specific words and phrases that can be associated with the factors that 
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determine the right timing for the internal auditor to communicate the risk warning 
message to the auditee.. After completion of our coding procedures, we proceeded with 
performing an analysis to see what timing factors were indicated by the internal auditors 
and the auditees when talking about IA effectiveness and we analysed the differences.
During the iterative coding and analysis we identified various timing factors which 
were mentioned by the internal auditors and the auditees to be of importance for the 
IA effectiveness. This list might be useful since it could be used in future research of IA 
effectiveness in specific as well as the timing in general.
Table 4-1 lists the timing factors mentioned by the internal auditors and the auditees 
per category in alphabetical order (based on Atlas.ti). It shows how often timing fac-
tors were mentioned by the internal auditors and the auditees during the interviews. 
We conducted five Focus Group interviews and the fifth interview reached the point of 
‘saturation’ as the additional data collection no longer generated new timing factors. In 
the two interviews with only internal auditors and one mixed interview, which together 
lasted approximately three hours, there were in total 109 instances of timing factors. 
Similarly, in the two interviews with only auditees and one mixed interviews, which to-
gether also lasted approximately three hours, there were in total 102 instances of timing 
factors.
As with other qualitative methods of data collection, there are no hard and fast rules 
when it comes to reporting results. Our study sought to obtain perceptions of people 
on a complex topic. According to Krueger and Casey (2009) no instrument is available to 
measure the multiple views obtained on a complex concept (Krueger and Casey, 2009, 
p. 201). According to Morgan (1997), there are three basic factors that influence how 
much emphasis a given topic should receive in interpreting and reporting focus group 
data: how many groups mentioned the topic, how many people within each of these 
groups mentioned the topic, and how much energy and enthusiasm the topic gener-
ated among participants (Morgan 1997, p. 63).
Additionally, according to Morgan (1997) quantitative uses of coding are possible as 
these could be useful in analysing data from focus groups (Morgan, 1997, p. 61). Accord-
ing to Miles et al, (2014) in qualitative research a lot of counting occurs when a theme or 
a pattern is being isolated as this is done based on something that (a) happens a number 
of times and (b) consistently happens in a specific way. The estimations we make in our 
qualitative analysis like “important”, “significant”, or “recurrent”, are, in part, based on 
counting, comparisons, and weights (Miles et al, 2014, p. 282).
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table 4-1. Summary of occurrences of timing factors by Auditors and Auditees
category timing factors occurrences Auditors occurrences Auditees
Alignment 9 9
Audit issue classification 5 9
Audit opinion 1 1
Audit procedures 19 19
Auditee’s agenda 13 13
Change 10 8
Character 3 1
Content 2 0
Design phase 3 0
External factors 1 2
Focus 1 6
Incidents 3 6
Preference 5 5
Project 4 7
Regulator 2 3
Relation Auditor-Auditee 4 1
Strategic events 8 3
Type of audits 16 9
Simple counting of codes without performing any statistical tests was applied for ana-
lysing content of Focus Groups in the study of Morgan and March (1992). Also Shively 
(1992) has used comparisons between ethnic groups by descriptive counting. Similarly, 
in their school improvement study, Miles et al, (2014), did a content analysis of the re-
sponses, totalled them and derived a display of the results (Miles et al, 2014, p. 283).
Following the examples in the abovementioned studies, we first analysed the data col-
lected from our Focus Groups interviews by counting how often certain timing factors 
were mentioned during the interview and by which group. Although we paid attention 
to how frequently the timing factors were mentioned by the internal auditors and the 
auditees, we did not assume that what is said most frequently is most important. Krueger 
and Casey (2009) advise that sometimes a really key insight might have been only said 
once in a series of groups (Krueger and Casey, 2009, p. 121). Krueger and Casey (2009, 
p. 127) further advise to pay attention to frequency, but counting things up as numbers 
can be misleading in focus groups reports. In line with Krueger and Casey (2009, p.127), 
we did not include numbers in our analysis but we used modifiers like no one, some, a 
few, most or all.
We devoted some more space to explaining and comparing the emerging themes and 
patterns derived of our data from the internal auditors and the auditees. We compared 
and contrasted across groups and described what was said in the groups (Krueger and 
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Casey, 2009, p. 121). As advised by Gioia et al, (2012), we included informant quotes to 
be able to see the linkages among the quotes in the text and the identified concepts/
themes and dimensions.
Identified timing factors
In the below section we describe the outcomes of our analysis of the timing factors. 
Our first outcome is the list of timing factors influencing the IA effectiveness that were 
identified by the internal auditors and the auditees in the Focus Groups interviews. We 
identified in total 47 timing factors (refer to table 4-8 throughout 4-25 in Appendix 3) 
and we categorised these into 18 timing factors categories (refer to table 4-1 above).
The second outcome of our study is obtaining an insight of which timing factors are 
the internal auditors’ and auditees’ opinions in line which each other (with regard to 
number of occurrences) as well as in their opinions that differ from each other (with 
regard to number of occurrences).
As earlier described in this paper, we first counted how often the identified timing 
factors were mentioned during the Focus Groups interview and by which group. But we 
did not assign any importance based on the number of occurrences of the mentioned 
timing factors (Krueger and Casey, 2009).
The full excel overview of the timing factors, the number of their occurrences and 
quotes can be obtained from the researcher upon request.
balanced view
In this paper first we show (in alphabetical order) the timing factors identified in our 
study for which we see a pattern of balanced view (i.e. equal number of occurrences) 
between the internal auditors and the auditees. We continue with examples of different 
views (differences in number of occurrences) as to the role that these timing factors may 
have for determining the right timing for the internal auditor to act and hence for the 
IA effectiveness.
Alignment
For the timing factor alignment both the internal auditors and the auditees showed a 
balanced view i.e. equal number of occurrences. (refer to table 4-8 in Appendix 3). From 
the various identified alignment timing factors (refer to table 4-8 in Appendix 3), the au-
ditees mentioned the alignment among the three line of defence functions the most. One 
of the auditee’s said (quote translated from Dutch): “It is nonsense if the Auditor reports 
on a certain issue when the second line is not yet ready with its investigation”. This is in line 
with what the internal auditors said as one of the internal auditors said (quote translated 
from Dutch): “The alignment among the first, second and the third line of defence is very 
important for the timing: first line identified issues first, thereafter second line does its check 
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and the third line (internal auditor) comes after the first and the second line have done their 
job. This way, the Auditor will be able to communicate the right message to Auditee”.
Audit opinion 
The analysis of our data showed that the internal auditors and the auditees mentioned 
this factor in equal instances (only once) but their views were different with regard to 
the content of the timing factor. So, one of the auditee’s said (quote translated from 
Dutch): “The auditor is always too late in communicating the audit opinion. The audit opin-
ion is based upon a situation at an X-point of time and at the time that his message comes 
to upper management it is too late as they are more up to date and have already resolved 
the issue”. While one of the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “The 
acceptance of the auditor’s message depends on the context defined by the auditor. And if 
the auditor has created a context by communicating an audit opinion of the report as ‘weak, 
he can start with communicating this audit opinion early so that the auditee will react on 
the issues smoothly. If the audit opinion is ‘adequate’ and this is early communicated then 
nobody will pay attention to the audit issues”.
Audit procedures 
The analysis of the interviews shows that audit procedures (refer to table 4-11 in Ap-
pendix 3) as a timing factor was mentioned most frequently and in equal occurrences 
by both the internal auditors and the auditees. This may be an indication that both the 
internal auditors and the auditees recognised the audit procedures equally as an timing 
factor and they both consider this timing factor to have an equal influence on the right 
moment the internal auditor to communicate the risk warning message to the auditee. 
From all the combined instances of audit procedures identified during the interviews 
with internal auditors, the audit procedures related to having periodic update meetings 
with the auditee during the audit and the audit procedures related to having sufficient 
audit evidence prior to communicating the risk warning message were mentioned the 
most. With regard to the audit procedures related to the periodic update meetings, one 
of the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “We introduced weekly update 
meetings with the auditee because they requested these meetings from us. The auditees did 
not want to be surprised by us if we communicate our issues at the end of the audit. And 
this has to do with the timing”. This was confirmed by the internal auditee as one of the 
auditees said (quote translated from Dutch): “The best practice that I experience is that I 
agree with the Auditor to have weekly meetings during the audit. Even if we seat half an hour 
together to discuss about potential audit issues, that helps me in the discussion later on and 
in taking action for resolving the issues”.
With regard to the audit procedures related to having sufficient audit evidence prior to 
communicating one of the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “At one 
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hand as an auditor you want to signal a high risk issue as soon as possible but at the other 
hand you still have to properly investigate the matter in order to determine the impact of the 
issue”. This seems to be partly in line with the expectation of the auditee as one of the 
auditees said (quote translated from Dutch): “There should be an evidence of course, there 
should be a feeling that something is wrong, but I do not like to wait six months to hear of it. 
I want the Auditor to walk into my office right away and inform me about the issue”.
From all the combined instances of audit procedures identified during the interviews 
with auditees, the audit procedures related to the factual accuracy of the identified audit 
issues by the internal auditor and the audit procedures related to the auditor’s audit time 
schedule were mentioned the most. One of the auditees said the following regarding 
the audit procedures related to the factual accuracy of the identified audit issues (quote 
translated from Dutch): “The moment when the Auditor aligns the factual accuracy of the 
audit issue with the Auditee is of crucial importance for acceptance of the audit recommen-
dations by the Auditee”. This was found also addressed by the internal auditors as one of 
the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “We can communicate our audit 
issue at once but in our methodology we have to do a factual accuracy check before we 
communicate our audit issue. So, the communication is done in several steps”.
Auditee’s agenda
As with the audit procedures, the combined instances of the auditee’s agenda as a cat-
egory of timing factors was in general also identified significantly more often compared 
to the other identified timing factors (refer to table 4-12 in Appendix 3). The auditees 
and the internal auditors indicated this factor in equal number of occurrences. Specifi-
cally, from the interviews we noted that the auditee’s agenda related to too busy periods 
of the auditee throughout the year was mentioned in equal instances by the internal 
auditors and the auditees. As an illustration, one of the auditees said (quote translated 
from Dutch): “I have experienced very often when we have very busy periods we ask the 
Auditor to come one month later because then we can be able to listen to his message”. 
This view is shared by the internal auditors as one of the internal auditors said (quote 
translated from Dutch): “I am doing an audit within a department and I know, two weeks in 
the month you are not welcome as they are doing their reconciliations and closures. In this 
period the Auditee is not receptive for our message”.
From the collected data in the interviews we noted some instances when the internal 
auditors mentioned the auditee’s agenda related to their appraisal cycles by the end of the 
year to have a role in determining the right timing of the internal auditor’s risk warning 
message. For instance, one of the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): 
“We notice that in the last time it is more and more difficult to us to report on audit issues as 
we are moving towards the end of the year because everyone wants to have a clean sheet at 
the end of the year. And this has to do with the Auditees appraisals and KPI’s and that kind of 
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things”. This view was also expressed by the auditees in two instances during our inter-
views. For instance, one of the auditees said (quote translated from Dutch): “Sometimes 
I have the feeling that we do not want to get any audit issue from the Auditors at the end of 
the year. This has to do with our various KPI’s etc. etc.”. It is interesting to note that in all 
four interviews this timing factor was mentioned by both the internal auditors and the 
Auditees; however in the fifth interview which was mixed interview with internal audi-
tors and auditees this timing factor was not mentioned at all by both parties. This may 
indicate that the appraisal cycles and the KPI’s of the auditees is a sensitive topic and the 
internal auditors and the auditees presumably do not feel comfortable to discuss this 
topic in a mixed Focus Group interview. 
Another factor influencing the timing of the internal auditor’s risk warning message 
identified by the auditees is the auditee’s agenda related to the occasions when the audi-
tees are themselves busy improving their organization. In this respect, one of the auditees 
said (quote translated from Dutch): “Nothing is more annoying than when we are long 
busy by ourselves with building something and the Auditors come later with his message 
‘by the way you have forgotten to build a dual control somewhere’. Then it is too late, it costs 
much money and much hassle”. 
Only one internal auditor in the interviews mentioned this timing factor in relation to 
the effectiveness of the IA. The internal auditor said (quote translated from Dutch): “You 
are aware that the Auditee knows that many things are not in order and they have many 
things to do on their own to improve. In these cases you report issues that are already known 
to Auditee and I ask myself if this is effective with regard to timing of our audit communica-
tion”. 
Preference
The preference as a timing factor was also mentioned in equal number of occurrences 
by the internal auditors and the auditees. They both have a similar view regarding the 
role of this timing factor for the IA effectiveness. As an illustration, one of the auditee’s 
said (quote translated from Dutch): “ I want to be informed by the auditor about the issues 
as soon as possible and prefer they not to wait till the audit is finalised. Timely interaction 
with the auditor is for me very important so that I can take timely action. For acceptance of 
the auditor’s issues I find this very important”. This is in line with what the internal audi-
tors said as one of the internal auditors noted (quote translated from Dutch): “My own 
experience, actual more personal rule, is that the earlier you communicate your message to 
the Auditee the better. In a later stage you can communicate these issues again but then is 
much more easier”.
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Different view
Below we proceed with showing the timing factors identified in our study for which 
we see a pattern of different view (with regard to number of occurrences) between the 
internal auditors and the auditees as to the role that these factors may have for deter-
mining the right time of the internal auditor to communicate the risk warning message 
and hence to the effectiveness of IA function.
Audit issue classification
Audit issue classification as a combined timing factor was mentioned more often by the 
auditees compared to the internal auditors (refer to table 4-9 in Appendix 3). The risk in-
dication was mostly mentioned by the auditees to be a determinant for the right timing 
of the internal auditor’s risk warning message. As an illustration, one of the auditees said 
(quote translated from Dutch): “The earlier I know of a high risk issue the better. But I have 
now received a report with two high risk issues in it, which I see after two months from the 
start of the audit. I think, this way I cannot take the Auditor seriously”. One of the internal 
auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “For critical or high risk findings we have our 
audit rules to communicate the message directly at the moment we have identified the risk”. 
Change
On the basis of the interviews, we noted that change as a category of timing factors was 
identified frequently (refer to Table 4-13 in Appendix 3). The internal auditors indicated 
the this timing factors more often than the auditees. From the combined instances, 
change in staff as a timing factor was indicated by the internal auditors and by the audi-
tees the most. One of the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “Recently 
in two audits we experienced that Auditee said to us that we are too early because they have 
just appointed new management”. The opposite was said by one of the auditees (quote 
translated from Dutch): “If the manager of a certain department has just started, the Audi-
tor is more than welcome to give a kind of ‘baseline’ recommendations”.
Change in processes as a timing factor was viewed in equal occurrences by both the 
internal auditors and the auditees. In this respect, one of the auditees said (quote trans-
lated from Dutch): “If I have to start with designing an purchase process tomorrow, then I 
want to have the Auditors with their recommendations day before yesterday”. This is in line 
with what one of the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “In cases when 
the Auditee is redeveloping a certain process, it is much cheaper and effective if we look at 
the process change at the moment of the change and give our recommendation during this 
change instead waiting to do the audit as planned by the end of the year”. Interestingly, 
one another internal auditor said the opposite of what the colleague has said (quote 
translated from Dutch): “I think we have become much more flexible because if the auditee 
is in the middle of remediation or revising a process or has any other issues to solve, you 
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have to have a good reason to do the audit. It is much better to postpone it till the auditee 
has finished”.
Character
The factor Character of the internal auditor as a timing factor was mentioned only once by 
the auditees compared to the internal auditors who mentioned this factor twice during 
the interviews. One of the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “There is 
something in the character of the auditor that determines the timing of his/her communica-
tion. I used to know auditors that can connect with management more easy than others”. 
While one of the auditee said (quote translated from Dutch): “I think that sometimes the 
auditor are too nice. Or they do not dare to report their issues immediately but wait long and 
hesitate to communicate their message”.
External factors
The external factors related to market developments as a timing factor was identified 
once by the internal auditors and in two instances by the auditees and both groups agree 
with regard to the meaning of this timing factor. During the Focus Groups interviews 
one of the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “I think the timing of 
the auditor’s message should go along with the developments in the outside market”. While 
one of the auditees illustrated this timing factor as an indicator for the IA effectiveness 
through an example saying (quote translated from Dutch): “If you look what happens 
with the oil sector at the moment, then this should be trigger for the auditor to look at the 
impact of these outside developments within the organization at that moment and not wait 
until 2018 when it could be too late”.
Focus
With regard to focus as a timing factor, we noted notable discrepancy between the num-
ber of occurrences in the Focus Groups interviews with internal auditors and auditees. 
While the internal auditors mentioned this timing factors only once, the auditees talked 
about the importance of both internal auditor’s focus and auditee’s focus as timing fac-
tor in six instances. So, one of the auditee’s said (quote translated from Dutch): “When we 
have certain topics that are very important, we want the auditor to look at these at a certain 
moment. My experience is that the auditor is very sensitive in such moments and respond 
to it accordingly”. One of the auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “In times when 
certain topics are very topical to management you do not have to do much as an auditor to 
have an impact”.
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Incidents
The incidents as a timing factor were mentioned in some more instances by the auditees 
compared to the internal auditors. One of the auditees said (quote translated from 
Dutch): “Let me tell you an example. When we had a recent cybercrime incident, the Audi-
tor came afterwards when the incident has already happened. It was too late. The calf had 
been droned already! Where was the Auditor one year before this incident happened”? This 
is also illustrated by one of the internal auditors who said: “There are several topics, such 
as cybercrime incidents, where timing does not play any role. In this case you do not need to 
think about when it would be a good timing to report on this topic but you can do that at any 
time because the Auditee is alert for this topics”. 
Project
Both the internal auditors and the auditees identified Project as a timing factor that has 
a role in determining the right moment for the internal auditor to communicate the risk 
warnings to the auditees. The internal auditors mentioned this factor in less occurrences 
than the auditees did. One of the internal auditors pointed out the exact moment for 
the internal auditor to act and said (quote translated from Dutch: “The ‘go-no go’ decision 
moment of a project is an important moment to report your issues so that the Auditee can 
take additional actions for issue resolution. Similarly, one of the auditees emphasised the 
moment when the internal auditor is too late with his risk warning messages and said 
(quote translated from Dutch):” If you want to audit a project then give your input during 
the project or prior to start of the project. But do not come afterwards to give me a kind of a 
‘report mark’ when I have already finalised the project”.
Regulator
The Regulator’s requests and investigations were also identified to be a timing factor that 
plays a role for the right moment for the internal auditor to act i.e. to communicate 
the risk warning message. Both the internal auditors and the auditees identified this 
timing factor with a slight difference as to the number of the occurrences in favour of 
the auditee. With regard to this factor, one of the internal auditors said (quote translated 
from Dutch): “It can be that timing is also determined by the regulators. If we know that the 
regulator will come in to do a certain research, then we can report our recommendation 
earlier to the Auditee and they will be more ready to listen to us”. This was also confirmed by 
one of the auditees who said (quote translated from Dutch): “There are regulatory driven 
audits resulting from regulator involvement or regulator’s letters, and there is little to do as 
to the timing of these audits. They should be done and we have little to say about it”.
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Relation Auditor-Auditees
The Relation between the Auditors and the Auditees was recognised by both the Auditors 
and Auditees as a timing factor relevant for the effectiveness of the Internal Auditor. The 
Auditors mentioned this timing factor more often as the Auditees identified this factor 
in only once instance. So one of the Auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “If the 
auditor has a good relation with the Auditee and the auditor is trusted by the Auditee, then 
the auditor knows that at the moment he communicates his message to the Auditee he will 
listen to the auditor’s message. So, in this case you cannot make much mistakes with the 
timing of your message”. The Auditee said (quote translated from Dutch): “In the past, the 
relation with the auditors was not so good and in these times the auditor’s messages were 
not easy accepted. by us no matter the timing of the message”.
Strategic events
The Strategic events as a timing factor was mentioned much more often by the internal 
auditors compared to the auditees. With regard to the Strategic events related to critical 
management decisions (e.g. related to Initial Public Offering (IPO), go-no go decisions, 
decision to continue or discontinue a business), one of the internal auditors said (quote 
translated from Dutch):” In the times of the IPO, the Auditee was much more ready to listen 
to our recommendations and came directly into action”. This timing factor was also identi-
fied by the auditees during the interviews as one of the auditees said (quote translated 
from Dutch): “Prior to the IPO, we had several audit issues that we paid insufficient attention 
to. At the moment when IPO decision was close, suddenly these audit issues became very 
important and we had to resolve them as soon as possible”.
Type of audits
As it can be seen from table 4-1, the timing factor related to the type of audits was 
perceived by the internal auditors also to have an impact on the IA effectiveness. The 
auditees recognise this timing factor as well but in much smaller number of instances. 
From all identified types of audits during the interviews (refer to table 4-25 in Appen-
dix 3), we noted that the auditee did not mention the role of the timing in continuous 
auditing, audits on existing processes, maintenance audits, post-mortem audits and theme 
audits. We assume the reason for this could be that auditees are not familiar with the 
different types of audits or they are aware of these but have no experience with regard 
to the role of the timing for communicating the risk warning message to them by the 
internal auditor. The internal auditors considered all the identified types of audits to play 
a role in the timing of the internal auditor’s risk warning message. 
For both the internal auditors and the auditees the timing in mandatory audits and soft 
controls audits during the interviews were recognised in equal number of occurrences. 
One of the internal auditors said the following about the timing factors in mandatory 
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audits (quote translated from Dutch): “If we say to the Auditee that a certain audit must 
be done tomorrow, than this audit is mandatory audit and the timing is different from the 
regular planned audits. For it brings sense of urgency on all sides and the communication 
of the audit issues goes more smooth”. The auditees showed a different view related to 
this factor as one of the auditees said (quote translated from Dutch): “The mandatory 
audits have to be simply done no matter whether we find it nice or not nice. The timing in 
these audits has no role as the audit must be done. But for many other types of audits I think 
that the Auditor has to make better link with my management agenda, and in this case the 
timing is very important to me”.
The internal auditors and the auditees find the timing related to soft controls audits 
to be important but showed different views during the interviews. For example one of 
the Auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “When you want to include behaviour 
issues in your message, then the right timing to do that is the final closing meeting and not 
before that. In this meeting the Auditee will show their culture and you can include that in 
your audit opinion”. While one of the auditees said (quote translated from Dutch): ”If the 
Auditor has found governance or soft controls related issues, I think he/she should put these 
issues on the table as soon as possible”.
From our interviews with the internal auditors we noted one interesting metaphor 
as to the right time the internal auditor to act in so called post-mortem audits. In this 
occasion, one of the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): “If you do a 
kind of post-mortem audit just after the placing of the ‘monument’, this is a right timing, but 
six months later you are too late”.
timing factors identified by the internal auditors but not by the auditees and 
vice versa
We conclude this section by showing the timing factors mentioned by the internal audi-
tors but not by the auditees and vice versa.
From the data collected during the Focus Groups interviews we identified that the 
auditees did not identify content of the internal auditor’s message and design phase as 
timing factors for the effectiveness of the internal auditor. These factors were however 
identified by the internal auditors although small number of instances. So, with regard 
to the content of the internal auditor’s message, one of the internal auditors said (quote 
translated from Dutch): “At the moment when you communicate something to people and 
they understand what you want to say, they cannot do something else then accept your 
message. This is the right moment for the auditor to push ahead towards solutions”. With 
regard to design phase one of the internal auditors said (quote translated from Dutch): 
“You can already look at the design of something. And then you are in time because then the 
Auditees want to have your advices and learn from you”.
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Also, the timing factor Character of the auditee was mentioned only once by the in-
ternal auditors during the interviews but not mentioned by the auditees. The internal 
auditor who identified this factor and said (quote translated from Dutch): “There other 
‘soft’ factors that play a role for the auditor to choose how to approach the Auditee and 
when. Because if you know in advance that the Auditee is a surly person, then you have to 
think carefully about what would be a handy timing to approach this person”. Only two 
internal auditors identified the timing factor Strategic events-separation & integration 
emphasising its great importance. To illustrate this, one of the internal auditors said 
(quote translated from Dutch): “I was involved in a very important separation and inte-
gration programme where every hour was of a crucial importance for the Auditee. In this 
situation, the Auditee wanted to know of my audit concerns within 5 minutes”.
As to the timing factor related to the audit procedures concerning the auditor’s audit 
time schedule one of the of the auditees said (quote translated from Dutch): “Because 
the audit department had to finalise all audits of the previous year till January 2016, it is my 
perception that the internal Auditors communicated their risk messages and reports before 
the deadline in a hurried way instead of having finalised their investigation properly. So, in 
this case the internal deadlines determined the timing of the auditor’s message”. Interest-
ingly, this timing factor was not mentioned by the internal auditors in the Focus Groups 
interviews. This may indicate that the internal auditors do no perceive this factor to play 
a role in the determination of the right timing for the internal auditor to communicate 
the risk warning message. This shows that the internal auditors and the auditees have 
different opinions with regard to this timing factor and its role for the IA effectiveness. 
4.6 DIscussIon
In this section we will be discussing the main findings of our study, the implications of 
our study for research and practice and the limitations of the study and suggestions for 
further research.
main findings
As our study was exploratory in its nature we firstly achieved to identify the timing 
factors that may be of influence on the IA effectiveness and obtain a better understand-
ing thereof. The overview of these timing factors we provided with this study can help 
internal auditors and auditees to identify the right timing for communication of the risk 
warning messages by the internal auditors and hence can be useful for managing the 
effectiveness of the IA effectiveness.
Secondly, the analysis of the data generated during all five Focus Groups interviews, 
revealed that the timing factors indicated by the participants are multiple and diverse, 
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dependable whether these were indicated by the auditees or the internal auditors. In 
majority of the instances, we noted that both the internal auditors and the auditees 
recognise these timing factors to be relevant for the effectiveness of the IA. In a small 
number of instances the internal auditors and the auditees expressed a different view 
of the timing factors. This information identified in our study could be of used by the 
internal auditors and the auditees to start a discussion with each other and align their 
understanding as to when is the right timing for communicating risk warning message 
by the internal auditor in such a way that the internal auditor can have the most impact 
for the organization.
Thirdly, during the Focus Groups discussions it appeared that the timing factors 
emerging from our discussions were experienced by the participants as ‘eye opener’ 
as they recognised to have not yet thought of these timing factors and their possible 
impact on the effectiveness of the internal auditor.
The timing factors identified in our study can be of importance to both the internal 
auditors and the auditees as these can facilitate them to better attune with each other 
as to when is the right time to communicate the risk warning message by the internal 
auditors and better adapt the timing of their activities to unanticipated events.
Implications for theory and practice
As discussed earlier in this paper, prior research on effectiveness of the IA function (Lenz 
and Hahn, 2015) was mainly focussed on the ‘supply-side’ perspective Internal Audit 
(e.g. the role of the Chief Audit Executive, the skills and competencies of the internal 
auditors, the organizational specifics, its politics and culture, the support from senior 
management and the impact of the board, directly or through the audit committee 
(AC)). The ‘demand-side’ perspective of the other stakeholders (e.g. whether manage-
ment will or will not implement recommendations made by the internal auditor) is still 
under-examined area (Lenz and Hahn, 2015). Our study adds a new dimension to this 
‘demand-side’ perspective as our study results showed that the timing are recognized 
by both the internal auditors and the auditees as an important element for accepting 
the internal auditor’s recommendations by the auditees and hence an important factor 
for IA effectiveness. Our study indicates that the timing of the communication of the risk 
warning messages by the internal auditor to the auditees do matter in perceiving the 
internal auditor’s warning messages to be significant in trivial moments of time Elliott 
et al, (2007).
Next, our study adds the timing dimension to the Mihret and Yismaw’s (2007) model 
of IA effectiveness, which considers four potential factors – internal audit quality, man-
agement support, organizational setting, and auditee attributes – to explain audit ef-
fectiveness. The interaction between these factors and the timing factors we identified 
in this study may potentially improve audit effectiveness.
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Our study resulted in an overview of different factors determining the right moment 
for the internal auditor to act. Based on the statements given by the internal auditors 
and the auditees during the Focus Groups interviews, we could distinguish three groups 
of timing factors as shown below: 
1. Standard timing factors emerging from regular ‘business as usual’ situations. Exam-
ples are timing factors related to alignment, audit procedures and auditee’s agenda. 
These timing factors could be easily recognised and are repetitive in their nature. 
2. Mandatory timing factors emerging from regulator’s requests that are unavoidable 
and cannot be postponed. These timing factors could also be easy to identify by 
both the internal auditors and the auditees as the timing emerges from a mandatory 
event whose timing is known on beforehand.
3. Special timing factors emerging from exceptional situations that require special at-
tention by the auditees and the internal auditors. These are not standard and easy to 
identify timing factors as these occur based on unanticipated and complex events. 
Examples are timing factors related to incidents, audit issue risk classification, 
change, strategic events, projects, audits abroad, and soft controls audits.
Based on the assertion made by Mitchell and James (2001) that the successful timing 
of organizational activities depends not only on effective planning and coordination 
but also on temporal responsiveness - the ability of organizational actors to adapt the 
timing of their activities to unanticipated events, we assume that the ability of the in-
ternal auditor to adapt the timing of the communication of the risk warning messages 
to standard (‘business as usual’), mandatory or special (unanticipated) events within the 
organization is a very important element for the IA effectiveness. 
We furthermore believe that our study provides input that could be used as an inter-
esting path for obtaining more support to the Music Theory concepts, similarly to what 
Albert and Bell (2002) did in their paper. By applying Music Theory concepts such as to-
nality, rhythm, musical shape, and harmony, Albert and Bell (2002) analysed why the FBI 
launched its assault upon David Koresh’s compound in Waco, Texas, when it did. In their 
paper Albert and Bell (2002) advised that to understand timing, one must understand 
the mechanisms that create and release tension, that generate a sense of movement 
and pattern, and that stimulate the need for and produce closure and rest. Similarly, in 
further research we could do more research work based on these Music Theory concepts 
to be able to better understand the identified timing factors in our study and deploy 
these more effectively in the area of internal auditing and its effectiveness.
Our study has also practical implications. During the interviews the participants indi-
cated they were unaware of the timing factors that may play a role in the effectiveness 
of the internal auditor’s risk warning message. Consequently, an important practical 
implication of this study is that the internal auditors and the auditees became aware of 
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the existence of factors determining the right timing for the internal auditor to act as 
well as and the role thereof for the IA effectiveness. Our study did not aim at providing 
a recipe for determining the right timing of the communication of the risk warnings but 
provided and overview of the these timing factors, which we recommend to the internal 
auditors and auditees to use when they enter in a discussion about the timing as these 
could help them is determining the right moment to act. 
Our study has also practical implications for the skills required from the internal 
auditor dependable on the type of timing factors that influence the internal auditor’s ef-
fectiveness. A potential implication could be that in standard (‘business as usual’) situa-
tions, the organization will require internal auditors who are more skilled for performing 
repetitive and predictable tasks while for special and unanticipated events the internal 
auditors would be required to possess skills of agility and communication sensitivity. 
Distinguishing between different timing factors and linking these with the required 
internal auditor skills will presumably contribute to upgrading the IA function.
The knowledge about the existence of timing factors identified in our study as well 
as the awareness of their diversity and different nature, can further contribute to the 
internal auditors and the auditees to attune with each other the right moment of the 
action and improve their skills and responsiveness as well as to better adapt the timing 
of their activities to predictable or unpredictable events. We presume our study provides 
the internal auditors with useful indicators of the timing factors to better manage and 
improve the effectiveness of IA.
limitations and suggestions for further research 
We finalise this paper with stating the limitations and giving suggestions for further 
research.
Our study is an important first step towards understanding the timing factors as to 
when is the right time to act for the internal auditor in the context of IA effectiveness. 
Our study has however some limitations, which we discuss below.
Our study is exploratory in nature and it is based on interviews only within one large 
financial institution in The Netherlands. Therefore, one should be cautious in generalis-
ing the outcomes of this study. It is possible that the results would be different in other 
settings as there may be other timing factors that may also affect the right moment of 
the internal auditor’s communication of the risk warning message. In the follow up of 
this study we could further explore the effect of the timing factors on the IA effective-
ness in different settings like smaller financial institutions, insurance companies, within 
The Netherlands and/or abroad.
During our interviews, timing factors related to audits performed abroad were men-
tioned in very small instances. As the timing factors may be different for audits abroad 
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due to many reasons, further research is needed to obtain better view on and the impor-
tance of these timing factors for the IA effectiveness.
Also, our study provided first insights into the timing factors that determine the right 
timing for the internal auditor to communicate the risk warning messages to the audi-
tee. These timing factors have different meanings and can be interpreted in various ways 
with regard to their importance for the IA effectiveness. Further quantitative research 
is needed to obtain empirical support to be able to make further analysis of these tim-
ing factors for the level of their importance and making comparisons thereof between 
groups. In the next study it could be therefore interesting to consider performing a Q 
methodological study that could provide more qualitative and quantitative support for 
the timing factors identified in our study, enabling ranking and comparisons of the fac-
tors for their importance by Q methodological factor analysis.
Our study could also be followed up by further investigating whether the timing fac-
tors we identified could be of influence on the deaf effect (i.e., reluctance of the message 
recipient to hear risk warnings of the messenger) for risk warning messages being as 
mediator or moderator between the internal auditor and the deaf effect.
Despite the limitations, our study shows the importance and the relevance of a 
scientific examination of the timing factors that may affect the effectiveness of the IA 
function. Academic studies that have (qualitatively as well as empirically) examined 
the role of the timing factors in the effectiveness of IA are, to our knowledge, not yet 
available. We believe our study opens up new challenges for future research and we 
encourage others to advance our understanding of the timing factors in the context of 
the IA effectiveness.
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APPEnDIx 1.
focus group Interview protocol
Introduction Interview with Internal Auditor:
Good afternoon and welcome. Thanks for taking the time to join our Focus Group in-
terview. We invite you to tell us about your experiences about the timing factors that 
influence Auditees’ decision to continue or redirect a risky-course of action after your 
reported your risk warning message (written or oral).
The internal auditor performs the audit according to prescribed audit methodology 
and standards The audit process has its sequential steps and own planning. At the other 
hand, the audit takes place in a dynamic organizational environment that has its own 
tempo and dynamic. 
In our study we propose that the timing for reporting of the risk warning message by 
the internal auditor influences the effectiveness of the internal auditor (to listen or not 
to listen to the risk warning message by the internal auditor).
Introduction Interview with Auditees:
Good afternoon and welcome. Thanks for taking the time to join our Focus Group in-
terview. We invite you to tell us about your experiences about the timing factors that 
influence your decision to continue or redirect a risky-course of action after the internal 
auditor reported to you his risk warning message (written or oral). 
The internal auditor performs the audit according to prescribed audit methodology 
and standards The audit process has its sequential steps and own planning. At the other 
hand, the audit takes place in a dynamic organizational environment that has its own 
tempo and dynamic. 
In our study we propose that the timing for reporting of the risk warning message by 
the internal auditor influences the effectiveness of the internal auditor (to listen or not 
to listen to the risk warning message by the internal auditor).
For both interviews with Internal Auditor and Auditee:
Please talk freely about the timing factors or conditions that were of influence on your 
decision to listen or not to listen to the auditor’s risk warning message. 
We want to tap into your experiences and your opinions about these timing factors. 
There are no right or wrong answers. All points of view are welcome. Please feel free to 
share your point of view even if it differs from what others have said.
Our study is not aimed to reach agreement on the content but on better understand-
ing (causes, indicators and effects) of the timing factors related to IA effectiveness. 
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We will capture and transcript for methodological reasons. Of course we maintain 
full confidentiality on the information you share with us. We will exclude all names or 
identities from our transcription. 
Please talk freely. If you have a cell phone, please put it on a quite mode.
Our study consists of two questions related to the timing factors that may be of influ-
ence on the IA effectiveness within ABN AMRO Bank. The questions are:
Questions for the Internal Auditor:
Question 1: Which timing factors are proposed to be of influence on the Auditee’s willingness 
to listen or not to listen to the auditor’s risk warning message? (Why)
Question 2: How do the timing factors influence (in general) the Auditee’s decision to listen 
(or not to listen) to the risk warning message?
Questions for the Auditee:
Question 1: Which timing factors are proposed to be of influence on your willingness to listen 
or not to listen to the auditor’s risk warning message? (Why)
Question 2: How do the timing factors influence your decision (in general) to listen (or not to 
listen) to the risk warning message?
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APPEnDIx 2.
Anonymous Description of respondents
table 4-2. Anonymous Description of respondents in first focus group interview
role and experience gender nationality Age Auditor/Auditee
Head Internal Audit, >25yrs
Director Audit, >20yrs
Male
Male
Dutch
Dutch
50-55
50-55
Internal Audit
Internal Audit
Director Audit, >20yrs
Senior audit manager, >15yrs
Male
Male
Dutch
Dutch
50-55
45-50
Internal Audit
Internal Audit
Senior audit manager, >15yrs Female Dutch 40-45 Internal Audit
Senior audit manager, >20yrs Male Dutch 55-60 Internal Audit
table 4-3. Anonymous Description of respondents in second focus group interview
role and experience gender nationality Age Auditor/Auditee
Director Audit, >20yrs
Senior audit manager, >20yrs
Male
Male
Dutch
Dutch
40-45
50-55
Internal Audit
Internal Audit
Audit manager, >15yrs
Audit manager, >10yrs
Male
Female
Dutch
Dutch
40-45
30-35
Internal Audit
Internal Audit
Senior auditor, >10yrs Female Dutch 35-40 Internal Audit
Senior auditor, >5yrs Female Dutch 30-35 Internal Audit
table 4-4. Anonymous Description of respondents in third focus group interview
role and experience gender nationality Age Auditor/Auditee
Chief Operating Officer, >25yrs
Head of department A, >20yrs
Male
Male
Dutch
Dutch
55-60
45-50
Auditee
Auditee
Head of department B, >20yrs
Head of department C, >15yrs
Male
Male
Dutch
Dutch
50-55
45-50
Auditee
Auditee
Head of department D, >20yrs Female Dutch 40-45 Auditee
Officer department E, >20yrs Female Dutch 45-50 Auditee
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table 4-5. Anonymous Description of respondents in forth group interview
role and experience gender nationality Age Auditor/Auditee
Head of department F, >25yrs
Head of department G, >20yrs
Male
Female
Dutch
Dutch
55-60
45-50
Auditee
Auditee
Account manager department H, >10yrs
Business manager department I, >20yrs
Male
Male
Dutch
Dutch
30-35
45-50
Auditee
Auditee
Risk officer department J, >15yrs Male Dutch 40-45 Auditee
table 4-6. Anonymous Description of respondents in fifth focus group interview
role and experience gender nationality Age Auditor/Auditee
Senior audit manager, >15yrs
Audit manager, >10yrs
Male
Male
Dutch
Dutch
45-50
35-40
Internal Audit
Internal Audit
Senior auditor, >10yrs
Chief Operating Officer, >25yrs
Female
Male
Dutch
Dutch
30-35
55-60
Internal Audit
Auditee
Head of department K, >20yrs Male Dutch 45-50 Auditee
Head of department L, >25yrs Male Dutch 55-60 Auditee
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APPEnDIx 3.
Iteratively developed coding schemes and coding categories
table 4-7. Code categories and definitions
category timing factors category definition
Alignment Relation between the timing factors and the alignment between the auditors 
and the external accountant, or between the auditors and first and second line 
of defence functions, or the alignment with the audit plan with respect to type of 
audits to be executed, or the alignment between the audits and the budget needs 
of the auditees.
Audit issue classification Relation between the timing factors and the risk classification of audit findings
or the severity of the audit issues identified by the auditor.
Audit opinion Relation between the timing factors and the audit opinion reported by the auditor 
as a result of the audits.
Audit procedures Relation between the timing factors and the auditor’s procedures related to the 
planned time schedule during the audit, or to the audit principle of executing the 
audit activities with due care, or to the audit procedures related to supporting the 
audit issues by the auditor by sufficient evidence before communicating the audit 
issue, or to the audit procedures related to the auditor’s factual accuracy check 
during the audit, or to the audit activities of the auditor during the fieldwork phase 
of the audit, or to communicating the initial observations in the orientation phase 
of the audit, or to the audit procedures related to the quarterly audit opinion that 
the auditor reports to the auditees, or to update meetings of the auditor with the 
auditee throughout the audit.
Auditee’s agenda Relation between the timing factors and the occasions when auditee’s staff is 
absent due to e.g. holiday or any other reason, or the auditee’s end of year appraisal 
cycle, or when management is busy working on their own solutions within the 
organization or periods when auditee is too busy with various activities.
Change Relation between the timing factors and changes in applications within the 
auditee’s organization, or changes in laws or regulations, or changes in staff within 
the auditee’s organization, or when the auditee is engaged in process change.
Character Relation between the timing factors and the personal character of the auditee or 
the personal character of the auditor.
Content Relation between the timing factors and the moment when the auditee 
understands the content of the auditor’s message.
Design phase Relation between the timing factors and the auditor looking at the design phase of 
a process, control, systems etc. before its implementation.
External factors Relation between the timing factors and outside market developments.
Focus Relation between the timing factors and the shift of audit focus related to what 
topics they find important, or the shift of auditee’s focus related to what topics they 
find important.
Incidents Relation between the timing factors and incidents or events that trigger alertness 
by management.
Preference Relation between the timing factors and the personality trait (unrelated to 
other situations) of the auditee as to when to communicate audit issues or the 
personality trait (unrelated to other situations) of the auditor as to when to 
communicate audit issues.
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table 4-7. Code categories and definitions (continued)
category timing factors category definition
Project Relation between the timing factors and projects done by auditees.
Regulator Relation between the timing factors and the regulator’s requests and 
investigations.
Relation Auditor-Auditee Relation between the timing factors and the relation between the auditor and the 
auditee.
Strategic events Relation between the timing factors and the critical management decisions made 
by the auditee specifically when reference is made to Initial Public Offering (IPO), 
go-no go decisions, decision to continue or discontinue a business line, strategical 
issues, or the separation or integration programmes of the auditee.
Type of audits Relation between the timing factors and various types of audits such as audits 
abroad, continuous audits, audits on existing process, maintenance audits, audits 
on management request, mandatory audits, post-mortem audits, soft control 
audits and theme audits.
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 o
f b
ud
ge
t
Au
di
to
r: 
“F
or
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
of
 th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 m
es
sa
ge
 
it 
is
 im
po
rt
an
t w
he
th
er
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
is
 a
lig
ne
d 
w
ith
 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e’s
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s r
el
at
ed
 to
 
bu
dg
et
s. 
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e,
 if
 th
ey
 n
ee
d 
an
 e
xt
ra
 b
ud
ge
t t
o 
re
so
lv
e 
an
 is
su
e 
th
en
 th
e 
au
di
to
r i
s m
or
e 
eff
ec
tiv
e 
if 
he
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
es
 th
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e’s
 
bu
dg
et
 ro
un
ds
”.
ta
bl
e 
4-
9.
 C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r A
ud
it 
is
su
e 
cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
ri
sk
 in
di
ca
ti
on
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 ri
sk
 c
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
ud
it 
fin
di
ng
s
hi
gh
 ri
sk
, c
rit
ic
al
 ri
sk
, h
oo
g 
ris
ic
o,
 c
rit
ic
al
 fi
nd
in
g,
 h
ig
h 
fin
di
ng
hi
gh
 ri
sk
, c
rit
ic
al
 ri
sk
, c
rit
ic
al
 
fin
di
ng
, h
ig
h 
fin
di
ng
Au
di
to
r: 
“F
or
 c
rit
ic
al
 o
r h
ig
h 
ris
k 
fin
di
ng
s w
e 
ha
ve
 o
ur
 
au
di
t r
ul
es
 to
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
 d
ire
ct
ly
 a
t 
th
e 
m
om
en
t w
e 
ha
ve
 id
en
tifi
ed
 th
e 
ris
k.
  
Au
di
te
e:
 I t
hi
nk
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 d
ire
ct
 co
rr
el
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
he
ig
ht
 o
f t
he
 ri
sk
 in
di
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
n 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
 a
nd
 
th
e 
tim
in
g.
 T
he
 e
ar
lie
r I
 k
no
w
 o
f a
 h
ig
h 
ris
k 
is
su
e 
th
e 
be
tt
er
. B
ut
 I h
av
e 
no
w
 re
ce
iv
ed
 a
 re
po
rt
 w
ith
 tw
o 
hi
gh
 
ris
k 
is
su
es
 in
 it
 w
hi
ch
 I s
ee
 a
fte
r t
w
o 
m
on
th
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
st
ar
t o
f t
he
 a
ud
it.
 I t
hi
nk
, t
hi
s w
ay
 I c
an
no
t t
ak
e 
th
e 
au
di
to
r s
er
io
us
ly
”.
se
ve
ri
ty
 o
f a
ud
it
 
is
su
es
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
se
ve
rit
y 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
s 
id
en
tifi
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
au
di
to
r
er
ns
t v
an
 w
at
 je
 v
in
dt
, e
rn
st
ig
, 
se
ns
e 
of
 u
rg
en
cy
se
ve
rit
y 
of
 th
e 
fin
di
ng
s, 
se
rio
us
, 
se
ns
e 
of
 u
rg
en
cy
Au
di
to
r: 
“W
ha
t I
 fi
nd
 to
 b
e 
im
po
rt
an
t f
or
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
is
 
th
e 
se
ve
rit
y 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
s w
e 
ha
ve
 id
en
tifi
ed
. F
or
 
ex
am
pl
e,
 re
ce
nt
ly
 w
e 
fo
un
d 
on
e 
ve
ry
 se
ve
re
 is
su
e 
at
 
th
e 
ve
ry
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 o
f o
ur
 a
ud
it.
 N
or
m
al
ly
 w
e 
w
ou
ld
 
w
ai
t w
ith
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
of
 a
n 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
 a
fte
r w
e 
ha
ve
 in
ve
st
ig
at
ed
 th
e 
m
at
te
r c
om
pl
et
el
y,
 b
ut
 in
 th
is
 
ca
se
 w
e 
st
ar
te
d 
th
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
di
re
ct
ly
. A
nd
 b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
se
ns
e 
of
 u
rg
en
cy
 o
f t
hi
s i
ss
ue
 
w
as
 v
er
y 
hi
gh
, t
he
 A
ud
ite
e 
w
as
 re
ad
y 
to
 li
st
en
 to
 o
ur
 
m
es
sa
ge
 st
ra
ig
ht
aw
ay
”.
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r A
ud
it 
op
in
io
n
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
A
ud
it
 o
pi
ni
on
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
au
di
t o
pi
ni
on
 re
po
rt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
au
di
to
r a
s 
a 
re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
au
di
ts
w
ea
k,
 a
de
qu
at
e,
 z
w
ar
e 
ra
pp
or
t
w
ea
k,
 a
de
qu
at
e,
 h
ea
vy
 re
po
rt
Au
di
to
r: 
“T
he
 a
cc
ep
ta
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 m
es
sa
ge
 
de
pe
nd
s o
n 
th
e 
co
nt
ex
t d
efi
ne
d 
by
 th
e 
au
di
to
r. 
An
d 
if 
th
e 
au
di
to
r h
as
 c
re
at
ed
 a
 co
nt
ex
t b
y 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
an
 a
ud
it 
op
in
io
n 
of
 th
e 
re
po
rt
 a
s ‘
w
ea
k,
 h
e 
ca
n 
st
ar
t 
w
ith
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
th
is
 a
ud
it 
op
in
io
n 
ea
rly
 so
 
th
at
 th
e 
au
di
te
e 
w
ill
 re
ac
t o
n 
th
e 
is
su
es
 sm
oo
th
ly
. 
If 
th
e 
au
di
t o
pi
ni
on
 is
 ‘a
de
qu
at
e’
 a
nd
 th
is
 is
 e
ar
ly
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
ed
 th
en
 n
ob
od
y 
w
ill
 p
ay
 a
tt
en
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
s. 
 
Au
di
te
e:
 “T
he
 a
ud
ito
r i
s a
lw
ay
s t
oo
 la
te
 in
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
th
e 
au
di
t o
pi
ni
on
. T
he
 a
ud
it 
op
in
io
n 
is
 b
as
ed
 u
po
n 
a 
si
tu
at
io
n 
at
 a
n 
X-
po
in
t o
f t
im
e 
an
d 
at
 th
e 
tim
e 
th
at
 h
is
 m
es
sa
ge
 co
m
es
 to
 u
pp
er
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t i
t i
s t
oo
 la
te
 a
s t
he
y 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
up
 to
 d
at
e 
an
d 
ha
ve
 a
lre
ad
y 
re
so
lv
ed
 th
e 
is
su
e”
.
The influence of ‘Timing’ on the effectiveness of the Internal Audit function 95
ta
bl
e 
4-
11
. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r A
ud
it 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
A
ud
it
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s-
au
di
t t
im
e 
sc
he
du
le
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
re
la
te
d 
to
 th
e 
pl
an
ne
d 
tim
e 
sc
he
du
le
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
au
di
t
pl
an
ni
ng
, v
er
tr
ag
in
g,
 in
te
rn
e 
de
ad
lin
es
, d
ea
dl
in
e,
 a
ud
it 
ge
dr
ev
en
 d
oo
r t
ijd
sd
ru
k,
 
au
di
to
r’s
 ti
m
e 
sc
he
du
le
pl
an
ni
ng
, d
el
ay
, i
nt
er
na
l 
de
ad
lin
es
, d
ea
dl
in
e,
 a
ud
it 
dr
iv
en
 b
y 
tim
e 
pr
es
su
re
, 
au
di
to
r’s
 ti
m
e 
sc
he
du
le
Au
di
te
e:
 “B
ec
au
se
 th
e 
au
di
t d
ep
ar
tm
en
t h
ad
 to
 
fin
al
is
e 
al
l a
ud
its
 o
f t
he
 p
re
vi
ou
s y
ea
r t
ill
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
16
, t
he
 in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
ito
rs
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
ed
 th
ei
r r
is
k 
m
es
sa
ge
s a
nd
 re
po
rt
s b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
de
ad
lin
e 
in
 a
 h
ur
rie
d 
w
ay
 in
st
ea
d 
of
 h
av
in
g 
fin
al
is
ed
 th
ei
r i
nv
es
tig
at
io
n.
 
So
, i
n 
th
is
 ca
se
 th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 d
ea
dl
in
es
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
of
 th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 m
es
sa
ge
”.
A
ud
it
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s-
du
e 
ca
re
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 th
e 
au
di
t p
rin
ci
pl
e 
of
 
ex
ec
ut
in
g 
th
e 
au
di
t a
ct
iv
iti
es
 
w
ith
 d
ue
 c
ar
e
zo
rg
vu
ld
ig
he
id
, r
ev
ie
w
 n
ie
t 
kl
aa
r
du
e 
ca
re
, n
ot
 re
ad
y
Au
di
to
r: 
“If
 y
ou
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
th
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
s t
oo
 
so
on
 w
ith
ou
t h
an
dl
in
g 
th
e 
is
su
e 
w
ith
 d
ue
 ca
re
 b
y 
ex
ec
ut
in
g 
al
l t
he
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 a
ud
it 
ac
tiv
iti
es
, t
hi
s c
an
 
re
su
lt 
in
 y
ou
 d
oi
ng
 th
in
gs
 tw
ic
e 
an
d 
th
en
 y
ou
 a
re
 n
ot
 
eff
ec
tiv
e 
an
ym
or
e”
.
A
ud
it
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s-
ev
id
en
ce
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 th
e 
au
di
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
re
la
te
d 
to
 s
up
po
rt
in
g 
th
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
s 
by
 th
e 
au
di
to
r 
by
 s
uffi
ci
en
t e
vi
de
nc
e 
be
fo
re
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
th
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
go
ed
 v
er
ha
al
 h
eb
be
n,
 
ev
id
en
ci
ng
, e
vi
de
nc
e,
 
on
de
rb
ou
w
in
g,
 g
oe
d 
on
de
rz
oe
ke
n
to
 h
av
e 
a 
go
od
 s
to
ry
, 
ev
id
en
ci
ng
, e
vi
de
nc
e,
 
su
pp
or
tin
g 
do
cu
m
en
ta
tio
n,
 
pr
op
er
ly
 in
ve
st
ig
at
e
Au
di
to
r: 
“Y
ou
 ca
n 
be
 a
ls
o 
to
o 
ea
rly
 in
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
th
e 
au
di
t m
es
sa
ge
. Y
ou
 d
o 
no
t h
av
e 
a 
go
od
 st
or
y 
ye
t 
bu
t y
ou
 w
an
t t
o 
do
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 w
ith
 it
. T
hi
s i
s i
n 
m
y 
op
in
io
n 
da
ng
er
ou
s”.
Au
di
te
e:
 “T
he
re
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
an
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
of
 co
ur
se
, 
th
er
e 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
fe
el
in
g 
th
at
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 is
 w
ro
ng
, b
ut
 
I d
o 
no
t l
ik
e 
to
 w
ai
t s
ix
 m
on
th
s  
to
 h
ea
r o
f i
t. 
 I w
an
t t
he
 
Au
di
to
r t
o 
w
al
k 
in
to
 m
y 
offi
ce
 ri
gh
t a
w
ay
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
 
m
e 
ab
ou
t t
he
 is
su
e”
.
A
ud
it
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s-
fa
ct
ua
l a
cc
ur
ac
y
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
au
di
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
re
la
te
d 
to
 
th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 fa
ct
ua
l a
cc
ur
ac
y 
ch
ec
k 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
au
di
t
fa
ct
ua
l a
cc
ur
ac
y
fa
ct
ua
l a
cc
ur
ac
y
Au
di
to
r: 
“W
e 
ca
n 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
ou
r a
ud
it 
is
su
e 
at
 
on
ce
 b
ut
 in
 o
ur
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 w
e 
ha
ve
 to
 d
o 
a 
fa
ct
ua
l 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 c
he
ck
 b
ef
or
e 
w
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
ou
r a
ud
it 
is
su
e.
 S
o,
 th
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
is
 d
on
e 
in
 se
ve
ra
l s
te
ps
”.
Au
di
te
e:
 “T
he
 m
om
en
t w
he
n 
th
e 
au
di
to
r a
lig
ns
 th
e 
fa
ct
ua
l a
cc
ur
ac
y 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
 w
ith
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
is
 o
f c
ru
ci
al
 im
po
rt
an
ce
  f
or
 a
cc
ep
ta
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 b
y 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e”
.  
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r A
ud
it 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
A
ud
it
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s-
fie
ld
w
or
k
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 th
e 
au
di
t a
ct
iv
iti
es
 o
f t
he
 
au
di
to
r d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
fie
ld
w
or
k 
ph
as
e 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t
tij
de
ns
 d
e 
ve
ld
w
er
k,
 a
ud
it 
w
er
kz
aa
m
he
de
n
du
rin
g 
fie
ld
w
or
k,
 a
ud
it 
ac
tiv
iti
es
Au
di
to
r: 
“M
y 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
is
 th
at
 w
e 
tr
y 
sh
or
tly
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
fie
ld
w
or
k 
to
 g
iv
e 
a 
ki
nd
 o
f P
ow
er
Po
in
t 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
to
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
an
d 
du
rin
g 
th
is
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
w
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
ou
r m
es
sa
ge
. T
he
 
au
di
t r
ep
or
t c
om
es
 la
te
r, 
 a
fte
r t
hi
s p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
an
d 
is
 m
or
e 
a 
co
nfi
rm
at
io
n 
of
 w
ha
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
sa
id
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n”
. 
Au
di
te
e:
 “T
he
 is
su
es
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
ed
 d
ire
ct
ly
 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 a
re
 sp
ot
te
d.
 T
he
 a
ud
it 
re
po
rt
 a
t t
he
 e
nd
 o
f 
th
e 
au
di
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 fo
rm
al
ity
, t
he
 a
ud
it 
re
po
rt
 is
 n
ot
 
th
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t fi
nd
in
gs
 b
ut
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
fie
ld
w
or
k 
th
e 
is
su
es
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
ed
  a
nd
 
cl
ar
ifi
ed
”.
A
ud
it
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s-
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
ph
as
e
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
th
e 
in
iti
al
 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 in
 th
e 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
ph
as
e 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t
tij
de
ns
 d
e 
or
ië
nt
at
ie
 fa
se
 v
an
 
de
 a
ud
it
du
rin
g 
th
e 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
ph
as
e 
of
 
th
e 
au
di
t
Au
di
to
r: 
”If
 y
ou
 w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 a
n 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
au
di
t, 
yo
u 
sh
ou
ld
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
yo
ur
 co
nc
er
ns
 a
nd
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 w
he
n 
yo
u 
pe
rf
or
m
 
th
e 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
ph
as
e 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t. 
So
, t
he
 a
ud
ite
e 
kn
ow
s a
lre
ad
y 
in
 e
ar
ly
 st
ag
e 
ab
ou
t t
he
 ri
sk
s”.
A
ud
it
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s-
qu
ar
te
rl
y 
re
po
rt
in
g
w
he
n 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
au
di
t p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
re
la
te
d 
to
 th
e 
qu
ar
te
rly
 a
ud
it 
op
in
io
n 
th
at
 th
e 
au
di
to
r r
ep
or
ts
 to
 th
e 
au
di
te
es
el
ke
 k
w
ar
ta
al
 e
en
 a
ud
it 
op
in
io
n,
 e
in
d 
va
n 
he
t k
w
ar
ta
al
, 
kw
ar
ta
al
pa
ra
di
gm
a
qu
ar
te
rly
 a
ud
it 
op
in
io
n,
 e
nd
 o
f 
th
e 
qu
ar
te
r, 
qu
ar
te
rly
 p
ar
ad
ig
m
Au
di
to
r: 
“T
he
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 a
ud
it 
re
po
rt
in
g 
is
 o
f s
ta
tic
 
na
tu
re
 a
nd
 m
y 
op
in
io
n 
is
 th
at
 w
e 
sh
ou
ld
  n
ot
 re
po
rt
 
ou
r a
ud
it 
op
in
io
n 
ea
ch
 q
ua
rt
er
 b
ut
 a
t t
he
 m
om
en
t 
w
he
n 
th
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
 o
cc
ur
s”.
Au
di
te
e:
 “I
 fi
nd
 th
at
 th
e 
au
di
to
rs
 li
ve
 in
 a
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 
pa
ra
di
gm
. A
nd
 th
is
 is
 b
ec
au
se
 th
e 
Au
di
t C
om
m
itt
ee
 
w
an
ts
 to
 h
av
e 
a 
qu
ar
te
rly
 a
ud
it 
op
in
io
n.
 B
ut
 th
is
 is
 n
ot
 
m
y 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l t
im
in
g 
pa
ra
di
gm
. I
 ca
n 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 
th
at
 th
is
 q
ua
rt
er
ly
 re
po
rt
 m
us
t b
e 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
Au
di
t 
du
e 
to
 th
e 
Au
di
t C
om
m
itt
ee
, b
ut
 th
is
 d
oe
s n
ot
 fi
t 
in
to
 m
y 
tim
in
g 
w
he
n 
I a
m
 b
us
y 
w
ith
 m
y 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l 
ch
al
le
ng
es
”.
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od
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sc
he
m
e 
fo
r A
ud
it 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
A
ud
it
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s-
up
da
te
 m
ee
ti
ng
s
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 u
pd
at
e 
m
ee
tin
gs
 o
f t
he
 
au
di
to
r w
ith
 th
e 
au
di
te
e 
th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 th
e 
au
di
t
up
da
te
 m
ee
tin
gs
, w
ek
el
ijk
se
 
m
ee
tin
gs
, t
w
ee
w
ek
el
ijk
se
 
m
ee
tin
gs
, b
ila
 g
es
pr
ek
, 
pe
rio
di
ek
 o
ve
rle
g
up
da
te
 m
ee
tin
gs
, w
ee
kl
y 
m
ee
tin
gs
, b
i-w
ee
kl
y 
m
ee
tin
gs
, 
bi
la
te
ra
lly
 m
ee
tin
g,
 p
er
io
di
c 
m
ee
tin
g
Au
di
to
r: 
“W
e 
in
tr
od
uc
ed
 w
ee
kl
y 
up
da
te
 m
ee
tin
gs
 
w
ith
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 re
qu
es
te
d 
th
es
e 
m
ee
tin
gs
 fr
om
 u
s. 
Th
e 
Au
di
te
es
 d
id
 n
ot
 w
an
t t
o 
be
 
su
rp
ris
ed
 b
y 
us
 if
 w
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
ou
r i
ss
ue
s a
t t
he
 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t. 
An
d 
th
is
 h
as
 to
 d
o 
w
ith
 th
e 
tim
in
g.
Au
di
te
e:
 “T
he
 b
es
t p
ra
ct
ic
e 
th
at
 I e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
is
 th
at
 
I a
gr
ee
 w
ith
 th
e 
Au
di
to
r t
o 
ha
ve
 w
ee
kl
y 
m
ee
tin
gs
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
au
di
t. 
Ev
en
 if
 w
e 
se
at
 h
al
f a
n 
ho
ur
 to
ge
th
er
 
to
 d
is
cu
ss
 a
bo
ut
 p
ot
en
tia
l a
ud
it 
is
su
es
, t
ha
t h
el
ps
 
m
e 
in
 th
e 
di
sc
us
si
on
 la
te
r o
n 
an
d 
in
 ta
ki
ng
 a
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
re
so
lv
in
g 
th
e 
is
su
es
”. 
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r A
ud
ite
e’
s 
ag
en
da
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
A
ud
it
ee
’s 
ag
en
da
-
ab
se
nc
e 
st
aff
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
oc
ca
si
on
s 
w
he
n 
au
di
te
e’
s 
st
aff
 
is
 a
bs
en
t d
ue
 to
 e
.g
. h
ol
id
ay
 o
r 
an
y 
ot
he
r r
ea
so
n
ni
et
 m
en
se
n 
vo
or
 d
e 
bl
ok
 
ze
tt
en
 v
oo
r d
e 
va
ka
nt
ie
, d
rie
 
m
an
 n
ie
t z
ijn
, e
r n
ie
m
an
d 
is
pe
op
le
 to
 p
ut
 o
n 
pr
es
su
re
 
be
fo
re
 h
ol
id
ay
s, 
th
re
e 
pe
op
le
 
ab
se
nt
, n
ob
od
y 
is
 p
re
se
nt
Au
di
to
r: 
“Y
ou
 sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 p
us
h 
pe
op
le
 b
ef
or
e 
th
ey
 g
o 
on
 h
ol
id
ay
. I
f y
ou
 w
an
t t
o 
di
sc
us
s y
ou
r a
ud
it 
re
po
rt
 
ju
st
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
le
av
es
 o
n 
ho
lid
ay
, t
ha
t i
s n
ot
 
th
e 
rig
ht
 ti
m
in
g 
fo
r y
ou
r c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 I k
no
w
 h
ow
 
m
y 
ag
en
da
 lo
ok
s l
ik
e 
on
e 
da
y 
be
fo
re
 m
y 
ho
lid
ay
 a
nd
 
th
is
 is
 th
e 
ca
se
 w
ith
 A
ud
ite
e’s
 a
ge
nd
a 
as
 w
el
l. 
So
, y
ou
 
ne
ed
 to
 a
lig
n 
th
e 
tim
in
g 
of
 y
ou
r a
ud
it 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e’s
 a
ge
nd
a”
.
Au
di
te
e:
 “Y
ou
 ca
n 
in
flu
en
ce
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t. 
If 
yo
u 
do
 n
ot
 w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 a
n 
au
di
t i
n 
a 
pe
rio
d 
w
he
n 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
th
re
e 
ke
y 
pe
op
le
 a
bs
en
t y
ou
 ca
n 
as
k 
th
e 
au
di
to
rs
 to
 re
-p
la
n 
th
e 
au
di
t. 
It 
is
 n
on
se
ns
e 
to
 d
o 
au
di
t w
he
n 
ke
y 
st
aff
 is
 a
bs
en
t”.
A
ud
it
ee
’s 
ag
en
da
-
en
d 
of
 y
ea
r 
ap
pr
ai
sa
l
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 th
e 
au
di
te
e’
s 
en
d 
of
 y
ea
r 
ap
pr
ai
sa
l c
yc
le
be
oo
rd
el
in
gs
sc
or
es
, e
in
d 
va
n 
he
t j
aa
r, 
KP
I’s
, c
le
an
 
sh
ee
t, 
af
re
ke
nm
et
ho
di
ek
, 
be
oo
rd
el
in
g,
 P
PP
 c
yc
lu
s
ap
pr
ai
sa
l s
co
re
s, 
en
d 
of
 y
ea
r, 
KP
I’s
, c
le
an
 s
he
et
, a
pp
ra
is
al
 
m
et
ho
d,
 a
pp
ra
is
al
, P
PP
 c
yc
le
Au
di
to
r: 
“A
s s
oo
n 
as
 w
e 
m
ov
e 
to
w
ar
ds
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
ye
ar
 it
 is
 m
or
e 
an
d 
m
or
e 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
he
av
y 
is
su
es
 o
r a
ud
it 
re
po
rt
s b
ec
au
se
 th
es
e 
ha
ve
 a
n 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
Au
di
te
e’s
 a
pp
ra
is
al
 sc
or
es
. T
hi
s d
oe
s n
ot
 
sa
y 
th
at
 o
ur
 is
su
es
 a
re
 in
co
rr
ec
t b
ut
 si
m
pl
y 
w
e 
ge
t 
m
or
e 
re
si
st
an
ce
 fr
om
 m
an
ag
em
en
t b
ec
au
se
 o
f t
he
ir 
ap
pr
ai
sa
ls.
Au
di
te
e:
 “S
om
et
im
es
 I h
av
e 
th
e 
im
pr
es
si
on
 th
at
 b
y 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
ye
ar
 w
e 
do
 n
ot
 w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 a
ny
 a
ud
it 
is
su
es
 d
ue
 to
 o
ur
 K
PI
’s 
et
c.
.”.
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od
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g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r A
ud
ite
e’
s 
ag
en
da
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
A
ud
it
ee
’s 
ag
en
da
-
th
em
se
lv
es
 b
us
y 
w
it
h 
so
lu
ti
on
s
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
oc
ca
si
on
s 
w
he
n 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
is
 b
us
y 
w
or
ki
ng
 o
n 
th
ei
r 
ow
n 
so
lu
tio
ns
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
ze
lf 
be
go
nn
en
 z
ijn
, z
el
f a
an
 h
et
 
bo
uw
en
 z
ijn
, w
e 
zi
jn
 e
r m
ee
 
be
zi
g,
 u
itg
ev
oe
rd
st
ar
te
d 
by
 th
ei
r o
w
n,
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
up
 s
om
et
hi
ng
 b
y 
th
ei
r o
w
n,
 w
e 
ar
e 
bu
sy
 w
ith
 it
 b
y 
ou
rs
el
ve
s, 
im
pl
em
en
te
d
Au
di
to
r: 
“Y
ou
 a
re
 a
w
ar
e 
th
at
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
kn
ow
s t
ha
t 
m
an
y 
th
in
gs
 a
re
 n
ot
 in
 o
rd
er
 a
nd
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
m
an
y 
th
in
gs
 to
 d
o 
on
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
to
 im
pr
ov
e.
 In
 th
es
e 
ca
se
s 
yo
u 
re
po
rt
 is
su
es
 th
at
 a
re
 a
lre
ad
y 
kn
ow
n 
to
 A
ud
ite
e 
an
d 
 I a
sk
 m
ys
el
f i
f t
hi
s i
s e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
tim
in
g 
of
 
ou
r a
ud
it 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n”
.
Au
di
te
e:
 “W
e 
ha
ve
 st
ar
te
d 
w
ith
 im
pr
ov
in
g 
da
ta
 
qu
al
ity
. W
e 
kn
ow
 th
at
 w
e 
ha
ve
 is
su
es
 w
ith
 d
at
a 
qu
al
ity
 a
nd
 w
e 
ar
e 
bu
sy
 w
ith
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
 it
. T
he
n 
 th
e 
au
di
to
r c
om
es
 si
x 
m
on
th
s l
at
er
 a
nd
 w
an
ts
 to
 lo
ok
 a
t 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
is
su
es
 a
ga
in
. T
he
 ti
m
in
g 
is
 n
ot
 co
nv
en
ie
nt
, 
th
e 
au
di
to
r i
s t
oo
 la
te
”.
A
ud
it
ee
’s 
ag
en
da
-
to
o 
bu
sy
 p
er
io
ds
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
pe
rio
ds
 w
he
n 
au
di
te
e 
is
 to
o 
bu
sy
 w
ith
 v
ar
io
us
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
tw
ee
 w
ek
en
 p
er
 m
aa
nd
 b
en
 
je
 n
ie
t w
el
ko
m
, e
in
d 
va
n 
de
 k
w
ar
ta
al
, b
eg
in
 v
an
 d
e 
kw
ar
ta
al
, d
ru
kk
e 
tij
d,
 d
ru
kk
e 
pe
rio
de
s, 
dr
uk
, p
ie
km
om
en
te
n,
 
dr
uk
 h
eb
be
n
tw
o 
w
ee
ks
 p
er
 m
on
th
 n
ot
 
w
el
co
m
e,
 b
us
y 
tim
e,
 b
us
y 
pe
rio
d,
 b
us
y,
 p
ea
k 
tim
es
, t
o 
be
 
to
o 
bu
sy
Au
di
to
r:”
 I a
m
 d
oi
ng
 a
n 
au
di
t w
ith
in
 a
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t 
an
d 
I k
no
w
, t
w
o 
w
ee
ks
 in
 th
e 
m
on
th
 y
ou
 a
re
 n
ot
 
w
el
co
m
e 
as
 th
ey
 a
re
 d
oi
ng
 th
ei
r r
ec
on
ci
lia
tio
ns
 a
nd
 
cl
os
ur
es
. I
n 
th
is
 p
er
io
d 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
is
 n
ot
 re
ce
pt
iv
e 
fo
r 
ou
r m
es
sa
ge
”.
Au
di
te
e:
 “I
 h
av
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 v
er
y 
of
te
n 
w
he
n 
w
e 
ha
ve
 v
er
y 
bu
sy
 p
er
io
ds
 w
e 
as
k 
th
e 
au
di
to
r t
o 
co
m
e 
on
e 
m
on
th
 la
te
r b
ec
au
se
 th
en
 w
e 
ca
n 
be
 a
bl
e 
to
 li
st
en
 
to
 h
is
 m
es
sa
ge
”.
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co
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 d
efi
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A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
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In
te
rv
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w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
ch
an
ge
 in
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
au
di
te
e’
s 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
ap
pl
ic
at
ie
s
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
Au
di
to
r: 
“W
he
n 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
is
 d
oi
ng
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
or
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 a
pp
lic
at
io
ns
, t
he
y 
w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 
th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 w
he
n 
th
ey
 a
re
 
in
 p
ha
se
 o
f t
he
 c
ha
ng
e 
an
d 
no
t l
at
er
 a
fte
r t
he
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n”
.
ch
an
ge
 in
 la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
ti
on
s
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 la
w
s 
or
 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
ve
ra
nd
er
in
ge
n 
in
 w
et
-o
f 
re
ge
lg
ev
in
g,
 re
gu
la
to
ry
, w
et
 
ni
et
 a
f, 
M
iF
ID
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 la
w
s 
or
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
, 
re
gu
la
to
ry
, l
aw
 n
ot
 re
ad
y,
 M
iF
ID
Au
di
to
r: 
“D
ur
in
g 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
la
w
s a
nd
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
, 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
ca
n 
be
 h
el
pe
d 
by
 u
s i
f w
e 
co
m
e 
ea
rly
 
en
ou
gh
 w
ith
 o
ur
 re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
so
 th
at
 th
ey
 h
av
e 
su
ffi
ci
en
t t
im
e 
to
 co
rr
ec
t t
hi
ng
s”.
Au
di
te
e:
 “W
he
n 
th
e 
la
w
s a
nd
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 h
av
e 
ch
an
ge
d 
bu
t t
he
y 
ar
e 
no
t r
ea
dy
 y
et
 a
nd
 w
e 
ar
e 
no
t 
re
ad
y 
ye
t w
ith
 o
ur
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 th
is
 is
 n
ot
 a
 g
oo
d 
tim
in
g 
fo
r t
he
 a
ud
ito
r t
o 
co
m
e”
.
ch
an
ge
 in
 p
ro
ce
ss
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
oc
ca
si
on
s 
w
he
n 
th
e 
au
di
te
e 
is
 e
ng
ag
ed
 in
 p
ro
ce
ss
 c
ha
ng
e
pr
oc
es
 a
an
 h
et
 h
er
zi
en
, 
ve
ra
nd
er
in
g,
 d
es
ig
np
ro
ce
s, 
he
ro
nt
w
er
p 
va
n 
pr
oc
es
, 
bo
uw
en
, p
ro
ce
s, 
pr
oc
es
 in
 
ve
ra
nd
er
in
g
re
vi
si
ng
 o
f p
ro
ce
ss
, c
ha
ng
e,
 
pr
oc
es
s 
de
si
gn
, r
ed
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
of
 p
ro
ce
ss
, b
ui
ld
in
g 
up
, p
ro
ce
ss
, 
pr
oc
es
s 
in
 c
ha
ng
e
Au
di
to
r: 
“In
 ca
se
s w
he
n 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
is
 re
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 
a 
ce
rt
ai
n 
pr
oc
es
s, 
it 
is
 m
uc
h 
ch
ea
pe
r a
nd
 e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
if 
w
e 
lo
ok
 a
t t
he
 p
ro
ce
ss
 c
ha
ng
e 
at
 th
e 
m
om
en
t o
f t
he
 
ch
an
ge
 a
nd
 g
iv
e 
ou
r r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
n 
du
rin
g 
th
is
 
ch
an
ge
 in
st
ea
d 
w
ai
tin
g 
to
 d
o 
th
e 
au
di
t a
s p
la
nn
ed
 
by
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
ye
ar
”. 
Au
di
te
e:
 “I
f I
 h
av
e 
to
 st
ar
t w
ith
 d
es
ig
ni
ng
 a
n 
pu
rc
ha
se
 p
ro
ce
ss
 to
m
or
ro
w
, t
he
n 
 I w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 th
e 
au
di
to
rs
 w
ith
 th
ei
r r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
ns
 d
ay
 b
ef
or
e 
ye
st
er
da
y”
.
ch
an
ge
 in
 s
ta
ff
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 s
ta
ff 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
au
di
te
e’
s 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n
af
de
lin
gs
ho
of
d 
ni
eu
w
, m
in
de
r 
m
en
se
n,
 re
or
ga
ni
sa
tie
s, 
m
an
ag
em
en
tw
is
se
lin
g,
 
ve
ra
nd
er
en
 v
an
 m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
ni
eu
w
 m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
m
an
ag
er
 
be
gi
nt
 n
et
ne
w
 h
ea
d 
of
 a
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t, 
le
ss
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s, 
re
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n,
 
ch
an
ge
 o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
m
an
ag
em
en
t c
ha
ng
e,
 n
ew
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
m
an
ag
er
 ju
st
 
st
ar
te
d
Au
di
to
r: 
“W
he
n 
th
e 
de
pa
rt
m
en
t h
ea
d 
is
 n
ew
ly
 
ap
po
in
te
d,
 h
e/
sh
e 
is
 m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
op
en
  t
o 
he
ar
 o
f o
ur
 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
”.
Au
di
te
e:
 “I
f t
he
 m
an
ag
er
 o
f a
 ce
rt
ai
n 
de
pa
rt
m
en
t 
ha
s j
us
t s
ta
rt
ed
, t
he
 a
ud
ito
r i
s m
or
e 
th
an
 w
el
co
m
e 
to
 
gi
ve
 a
 k
in
d 
of
 ‘b
as
el
in
e’
 re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n”
.,
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r C
ha
ra
ct
er
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
ch
ar
ac
te
r A
ud
it
ee
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
 o
f t
he
 
au
di
te
e
st
ug
su
rly
Au
di
to
r: 
“T
he
re
 o
th
er
 ‘s
of
t’ 
fa
ct
or
s t
ha
t p
la
y 
a 
ro
le
 fo
r 
th
e 
au
di
to
r t
o 
ch
oo
se
 h
ow
 to
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
an
d 
w
he
n.
 B
ec
au
se
 if
 y
ou
 k
no
w
 in
 a
dv
an
ce
 th
at
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
is
 a
 su
rly
 p
er
so
n,
 th
en
 y
ou
 h
av
e 
to
 th
in
k 
ca
re
fu
lly
 a
bo
ut
 w
ha
t w
ou
ld
 b
e 
a 
ha
nd
y 
tim
in
g 
to
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 th
is
 p
er
so
n”
.
ch
ar
ac
te
r A
ud
it
or
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
pe
rs
on
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
 o
f t
he
 
au
di
to
r
ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
e 
va
n 
de
 a
ud
ito
r, 
lie
f, 
du
rv
en
 n
ie
t
ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
 o
f t
he
 a
ud
ito
r, 
to
o 
ni
ce
, d
o 
no
t d
ar
e
Au
di
to
r: 
“T
he
re
 is
 so
m
et
hi
ng
 in
 th
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
r o
f 
th
e 
au
di
to
r t
ha
t d
et
er
m
in
es
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
of
 h
is
/h
er
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 I u
se
d 
to
 k
no
w
 a
ud
ito
rs
 th
at
 ca
n 
co
nn
ec
t w
ith
 m
an
ag
em
en
t m
or
e 
ea
sy
 th
an
 o
th
er
s”.
Au
di
te
e:
” I
 th
in
k 
th
at
 so
m
et
im
es
 th
e 
au
di
to
r 
ar
e 
to
o 
ni
ce
. O
r t
he
y 
do
 n
ot
 d
ar
e 
to
 re
po
rt
 th
ei
r 
is
su
es
 im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 b
ut
 w
ai
t l
on
g 
an
d 
he
si
ta
te
 to
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
th
ei
r m
es
sa
ge
”.
ta
bl
e 
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r C
on
te
nt
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
A
ud
it
ee
’s 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 
au
di
to
r’s
 m
es
sa
ge
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
m
om
en
t w
he
n 
th
e 
au
di
te
e 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
s 
th
e 
co
nt
en
t o
f t
he
 
au
di
to
r’s
 m
es
sa
ge
in
ho
ud
, o
p 
m
om
en
t d
at
 
m
en
se
n 
be
gr
ijp
en
co
nt
en
t, 
th
e 
m
om
en
t w
he
n 
pe
op
le
 u
nd
er
st
an
d
Au
di
to
r: 
“A
t t
he
 m
om
en
t w
he
n 
yo
u 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 to
 p
eo
pl
e 
an
d 
th
ey
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
w
ha
t 
yo
u 
w
an
t t
o 
sa
y,
 th
ey
 ca
nn
ot
 d
o 
so
m
et
hi
ng
 
el
se
 th
en
 a
cc
ep
t y
ou
r m
es
sa
ge
. T
hi
s i
s t
he
 ri
gh
t 
m
om
en
t f
or
 th
e 
au
di
to
r t
o 
pu
sh
 a
he
ad
 to
w
ar
ds
 
so
lu
tio
ns
”.
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r D
es
ig
n 
ph
as
e
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
D
es
ig
n 
ph
as
e
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
au
di
to
r l
oo
ki
ng
 a
t t
he
 
de
si
gn
 p
ha
se
 o
f a
 p
ro
ce
ss
, 
co
nt
ro
l, 
sy
st
em
s 
et
c.
 b
ef
or
e 
its
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
de
si
gn
, d
es
ig
n 
fa
se
 v
an
 p
ro
ce
s, 
op
ze
t v
an
 c
on
tr
ol
s
de
si
gn
, d
es
ig
n 
ph
as
e 
of
 a
 
pr
oc
es
s, 
de
si
gn
 o
f c
on
tr
ol
s
Au
di
to
r: 
“Y
ou
 ca
n 
al
re
ad
y 
lo
ok
 a
t t
he
 d
es
ig
n 
of
 
so
m
et
hi
ng
. A
nd
 th
en
 y
ou
 a
re
 in
 ti
m
e 
be
ca
us
e 
th
en
 
th
e 
Au
di
te
es
 w
an
t t
o 
ha
ve
 y
ou
r a
dv
ic
es
 a
nd
 le
ar
n 
fro
m
 y
ou
”.
ta
bl
e 
4-
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r E
xt
er
na
l f
ac
to
rs
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
Ex
te
rn
al
 
fa
ct
or
s-
m
ar
ke
t 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
ou
ts
id
e 
m
ar
ke
t d
ev
el
op
m
en
ts
ex
te
rn
e 
fa
ct
or
en
, 
on
tw
ik
ke
lin
ge
n 
in
 d
e 
m
ar
kt
, 
bu
ite
nw
er
el
d
ex
te
rn
al
 fa
ct
or
s, 
m
ar
ke
t 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
ou
ts
id
e 
w
or
ld
Au
di
to
r: 
“I 
th
in
k 
th
e 
tim
in
g 
of
 th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 m
es
sa
ge
 
sh
ou
ld
 g
o 
al
on
g 
w
ith
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
ou
ts
id
e 
m
ar
ke
t”.
Au
di
te
e:
 “I
f y
ou
 lo
ok
 w
ha
t h
ap
pe
ns
 w
ith
 th
e 
oi
l 
se
ct
or
 a
t t
he
 m
om
en
t, 
th
en
  t
hi
s s
ho
ul
d 
be
 tr
ig
ge
r 
fo
r t
he
 a
ud
ito
r t
o 
lo
ok
 a
t t
he
 im
pa
ct
 o
f t
he
se
 o
ut
si
de
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
ts
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
at
 th
at
 
m
om
en
t a
nd
 n
ot
 w
ai
t u
nt
il 
20
18
 w
he
n 
it 
co
ul
d 
be
 
to
o 
la
te
”.
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r F
oc
us
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
A
ud
it
 fo
cu
s
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
sh
ift
 o
f a
ud
it 
fo
cu
s 
re
la
te
d 
to
 w
ha
t t
op
ic
s 
th
ey
 fi
nd
 
im
po
rt
an
t
ve
ra
nd
er
in
g 
va
n 
fo
cu
s 
bi
nn
en
 
au
di
t
ch
an
ge
 o
f a
ud
it 
fo
cu
s
Au
di
te
e:
 “A
lm
os
t t
en
 y
ea
rs
 a
go
 w
he
n 
w
e 
ha
d 
th
e 
fir
st
 
in
te
rn
et
 b
an
ki
ng
 a
tt
ac
k,
 in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
it 
w
as
 v
er
y 
m
uc
h 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 re
co
m
m
en
di
ng
 so
lu
tio
ns
 to
 m
an
ag
e 
th
e 
is
su
e.
 In
 2
01
2 
th
er
e 
w
as
 a
no
th
er
 in
te
rn
et
 b
an
ki
ng
 
at
ta
ck
 a
nd
 th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 a
ud
ito
r d
id
 n
ot
 p
ay
 m
uc
h 
at
te
nt
io
n 
to
 th
is
 in
ci
de
nt
 b
ut
 ca
m
e 
ha
lf 
an
 y
ea
r l
at
er
 
w
he
n 
w
e 
w
er
e 
re
ad
y 
w
ith
 re
so
lv
in
g 
th
e 
is
su
e.
 D
ue
 
to
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 th
ei
r o
w
n 
au
di
t f
oc
us
,  t
he
 ti
m
in
g 
as
 to
 
w
he
n 
th
e 
au
di
to
r w
ill
 d
o 
th
e 
au
di
t a
nd
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
re
su
lts
 a
ls
o 
ch
an
ge
d”
.
A
ud
it
ee
’s 
fo
cu
s
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
sh
ift
 o
f a
ud
ite
e’
s 
fo
cu
s 
re
la
te
d 
to
 w
ha
t t
op
ic
s 
th
ey
 fi
nd
 
im
po
rt
an
t
be
la
ng
rij
k 
vi
nd
en
, I
PO
, a
ct
ue
el
to
 fi
nd
 im
po
rt
an
t, 
IP
O
, t
op
ic
al
Au
di
to
r: 
“In
 ti
m
es
 w
he
n 
ce
rt
ai
n 
to
pi
cs
 a
re
 v
er
y 
to
pi
ca
l 
to
 m
an
ag
em
en
t y
ou
 d
o 
no
t h
av
e 
to
 d
o 
m
uc
h 
as
 a
n 
au
di
to
r t
o 
ha
ve
 a
n 
im
pa
ct
.
Au
di
te
e:
 “W
he
n 
w
e 
ha
ve
 ce
rt
ai
n 
to
pi
cs
  t
ha
t a
re
 v
er
y 
im
po
rt
an
t, 
w
e 
w
an
t t
he
 a
ud
ito
r t
o 
lo
ok
 a
t t
he
se
 a
t 
a 
ce
rt
ai
n 
m
om
en
t. 
M
y 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
is
 th
at
 th
e 
au
di
to
r 
is
 v
er
y 
se
ns
iti
ve
 in
 su
ch
 m
om
en
ts
 a
nd
 re
sp
on
d 
to
 it
 
ac
co
rd
in
gl
y”
.
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r I
nc
id
en
ts
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
In
ci
de
nt
s
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
in
ci
de
nt
s 
or
 e
ve
nt
s 
th
at
 tr
ig
ge
r 
al
er
tn
es
s 
by
 m
an
ag
em
en
t
cy
be
rc
rim
e,
 a
le
rt
he
id
, a
an
gi
ft
e 
kr
ijg
en
, g
ro
ot
 v
ra
ag
st
uk
, 
sy
st
em
s 
do
w
n,
 fr
au
de
, 
pu
in
ho
op
, o
ve
rt
re
di
ng
 w
et
 
en
 re
ge
lg
ev
in
g,
 in
ci
de
nt
en
, 
m
is
 g
aa
t
cy
be
rc
rim
e,
 b
ei
ng
 a
le
rt
, 
im
po
rt
an
t q
ue
st
io
n,
 fr
au
d,
 
m
es
s, 
br
ea
ch
 la
w
s 
an
d 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
, i
nc
id
en
ts
, g
oi
ng
 
w
ro
ng
Au
di
to
r: 
“T
he
re
 a
re
 se
ve
ra
l t
op
ic
s, 
su
ch
 a
s c
yb
er
cr
im
e 
in
ci
de
nt
s, 
w
he
re
 ti
m
in
g 
do
es
 n
ot
 p
la
y 
an
y 
ro
le
. I
n 
th
is
 
ca
se
 y
ou
 d
o 
no
t n
ee
d 
to
 th
in
k 
ab
ou
t w
he
n 
it 
w
ou
ld
 
be
 a
 g
oo
d 
tim
in
g 
to
 re
po
rt
 o
n 
th
is
 to
pi
c 
bu
t y
ou
 ca
n 
do
 th
at
 a
t a
ny
 ti
m
e 
be
ca
us
e 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
is
 a
le
rt
 fo
r 
th
is
 to
pi
cs
”. 
Au
di
te
e:
 “L
et
 m
e 
te
ll 
yo
u 
an
 e
xa
m
pl
e.
 W
he
n 
w
e 
ha
d 
a 
re
ce
nt
 c
yb
er
cr
im
e,
 th
e 
au
di
to
r c
am
e 
af
te
rw
ar
ds
 
w
he
n 
th
e 
in
ci
de
nt
 h
as
 a
lre
ad
y 
 h
ap
pe
ne
d.
 It
 w
as
 to
o 
la
te
. T
he
 ca
lf 
ha
d 
be
en
 d
ro
ne
d 
al
re
ad
y!
 W
he
re
 w
as
 th
e 
au
di
to
r o
ne
 y
ea
r b
ef
or
e 
th
is
 in
ci
de
nt
 h
ap
pe
ne
d”
?
ta
bl
e 
4-
20
. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r P
re
fe
re
nc
e
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
A
ud
it
ee
’s 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
al
ity
 tr
ai
t 
(u
nr
el
at
ed
 to
 o
th
er
 s
itu
at
io
ns
) 
of
 th
e 
au
di
te
e 
as
 to
 w
he
n 
to
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
s
zo
 s
ne
l m
og
el
ijk
, g
ed
ur
en
de
 
de
 a
ud
it,
 m
et
ee
n 
ra
pp
or
te
re
n
as
 s
oo
n 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e,
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
au
di
t, 
re
po
rt
 im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
Au
di
te
e:
 “I
 w
an
t t
o 
be
 in
fo
rm
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
au
di
to
r a
bo
ut
 
th
e 
is
su
es
 a
s s
oo
n 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e 
an
d 
pr
ef
er
 th
ey
 n
ot
 to
 
w
ai
t t
ill
 th
e 
au
di
t i
s fi
na
lis
ed
. T
im
el
y 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 
th
e 
au
di
to
r i
s f
or
 m
e 
ve
ry
 im
po
rt
an
t s
o 
th
at
 I c
an
 ta
ke
 
tim
el
y 
ac
tio
n.
 F
or
 a
cc
ep
ta
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 is
su
es
 I 
fin
d 
th
is
 v
er
y 
im
po
rt
an
t”.
A
ud
it
or
’s 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 th
e 
pe
rs
on
al
ity
 tr
ai
t 
(u
nr
el
at
ed
 to
 o
th
er
 s
itu
at
io
ns
) 
of
 th
e 
au
di
to
r a
s 
to
 w
he
n 
to
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
s
ra
pp
or
te
er
 m
et
ee
n,
 d
e 
re
ge
l 
ho
e 
ee
rd
er
 h
oe
 b
et
er
, z
o 
sn
el
 
m
og
el
ijk
re
po
rt
 im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
, t
he
 ru
le
 
th
e 
ea
rli
er
 th
e 
be
tt
er
, a
s 
so
on
 a
s 
po
ss
ib
le
Au
di
to
r: 
“M
y 
ow
n 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e,
 a
ct
ua
l m
or
e 
pe
rs
on
al
 
ru
le
, i
s t
ha
t t
he
 e
ar
lie
r y
ou
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
yo
ur
 
m
es
sa
ge
 to
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
th
e 
be
tt
er
. I
n 
a 
la
te
r s
ta
ge
 y
ou
 
ca
n 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
th
es
e 
is
su
es
 a
ga
in
 b
ut
 th
en
 is
 m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
ea
si
er
”.
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21
. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r P
ro
je
ct
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
Pr
oj
ec
t
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 d
on
e 
by
 a
ud
ite
es
pr
oj
ec
t, 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
 fo
rm
, 
ve
ra
nd
er
in
ge
n,
 p
ro
je
ct
en
pr
oj
ec
t, 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
 fo
rm
, 
ch
an
ge
s, 
pr
oj
ec
ts
Au
di
to
r: 
“T
he
 ‘g
o-
no
 g
o’
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
om
en
t o
f a
 p
ro
je
ct
 
is
 a
n 
im
po
rt
an
t m
om
en
t t
o 
re
po
rt
 y
ou
r i
ss
ue
s s
o 
th
at
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
ca
n 
ta
ke
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 a
ct
io
ns
 fo
r i
ss
ue
 
re
so
lu
tio
n.
Au
di
te
e:
” I
f y
ou
 w
an
t t
o 
au
di
t a
 p
ro
je
ct
 th
en
 g
iv
e 
yo
ur
 in
pu
t d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t o
r p
rio
r t
o 
st
ar
t o
f t
he
 
pr
oj
ec
t. 
Bu
t d
o 
no
t c
om
e 
af
te
rw
ar
ds
 to
 g
iv
e 
m
e 
a 
ki
nd
 
of
 a
 ‘r
ep
or
t m
ar
k’
 w
he
n 
I h
av
e 
al
re
ad
y 
 fi
na
lis
ed
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t”.
ta
bl
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r R
eg
ul
at
or
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
re
gu
la
to
r 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 re
gu
la
to
r’s
 re
qu
es
ts
 a
nd
 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
ns
re
gu
la
to
r, 
EC
B
re
gu
la
to
r, 
EC
B
Au
di
to
r: 
“It
 ca
n 
be
 th
at
 ti
m
in
g 
is
 a
ls
o 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
re
gu
la
to
rs
. I
f w
e 
kn
ow
 th
at
 th
e 
re
gu
la
to
r w
ill
 co
m
e 
in
 to
 d
o 
a 
ce
rt
ai
n 
re
se
ar
ch
, t
he
n 
w
e 
ca
n 
re
po
rt
 o
ur
 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
ea
rli
er
 to
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
an
d 
th
ey
 w
ill
 
be
 m
or
e 
re
ad
y 
to
 li
st
en
 to
 u
s”.
Au
di
te
e:
 “T
he
re
 a
re
 re
gu
la
to
ry
 d
riv
en
 a
ud
its
 re
su
lti
ng
 
fro
m
 re
gu
la
to
r i
nv
ol
ve
m
en
t o
r r
eg
ul
at
or
’s 
le
tt
er
s, 
an
d 
 
th
er
e 
is
 li
tt
le
 to
 d
o 
as
 to
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
of
 th
es
e 
au
di
ts
. 
Th
ey
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
do
ne
 a
nd
 w
e 
ha
ve
 li
tt
le
 to
 sa
y 
ab
ou
t 
it”
.
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r R
el
at
io
n 
Au
di
to
r-
Au
di
te
e
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
re
la
ti
on
 A
ud
it
or
-
A
ud
it
ee
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 th
e 
re
la
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
au
di
to
r a
nd
 th
e 
au
di
te
e
kw
al
ite
it 
va
n 
de
 re
la
tie
, 
in
te
ns
ie
ve
r, 
ve
rt
ro
uw
en
sr
el
at
ie
, 
ve
rt
ro
uw
d,
 v
er
ho
ud
in
g
qu
al
ity
 o
f t
he
 re
la
tio
n,
 m
or
e 
in
te
ns
iv
e,
 tr
us
t, 
tr
us
te
d,
 re
la
tio
n
Au
di
to
r: 
“If
 th
e 
au
di
to
r h
as
 a
 g
oo
d 
re
la
tio
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
an
d 
th
e 
au
di
to
r i
s t
ru
st
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e,
 
th
en
 th
e 
au
di
to
r k
no
w
s t
ha
t a
t t
he
 m
om
en
t h
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
es
 h
is
 m
es
sa
ge
 to
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
he
 w
ill
 
lis
te
n 
to
 th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 m
es
sa
ge
. S
o,
 in
 th
is
 ca
se
 y
ou
 
ca
nn
ot
 m
ak
e 
m
uc
h 
m
is
ta
ke
s w
ith
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
of
 y
ou
r 
m
es
sa
ge
”.
Au
di
te
e:
 “I
n 
th
e 
pa
st
,  t
he
 re
la
tio
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
au
di
to
rs
 
w
as
 n
ot
 so
 g
oo
d 
an
d 
in
 th
es
e 
tim
es
 th
e 
au
di
to
r’s
 
m
es
sa
ge
s w
er
e 
no
t e
as
y 
ac
ce
pt
ed
. b
y 
us
 n
o 
m
at
te
r t
he
 
tim
in
g 
of
 th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
”.
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r S
tr
at
eg
ic
 e
ve
nt
s
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
st
ra
te
gi
c 
ev
en
ts
-
cr
it
ic
al
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
de
ci
si
on
s
w
he
n 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 c
rit
ic
al
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
de
ci
si
on
s 
m
ad
e 
by
 th
e 
au
di
te
e 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
lly
 w
he
n 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
In
iti
al
 P
ub
lic
 O
ffe
rin
g 
(IP
O
), 
go
-n
o 
go
 d
ec
is
io
ns
, 
de
ci
si
on
 to
 c
on
tin
ue
 o
r 
di
sc
on
tin
ue
 a
 b
us
in
es
s 
lin
e,
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
al
 is
su
es
IP
O
, g
o-
no
 g
o 
de
ci
si
on
, b
es
lu
it 
w
el
 o
f n
ie
t d
oo
rg
aa
n 
m
et
 e
en
 
bu
si
ne
ss
lij
n,
 s
tr
at
eg
is
ch
e 
is
su
es
, 
be
ur
sg
an
g
IP
O
, g
o-
no
 g
o 
de
ci
si
on
, d
ec
is
io
n 
to
 
co
nt
in
ue
 o
r d
is
co
nt
in
ue
 a
 b
us
in
es
s 
lin
e,
 s
tr
at
eg
ic
al
 is
su
es
Au
di
to
r:”
 In
 th
e 
tim
es
 o
f t
he
 IP
O
, t
he
 A
ud
ite
e 
w
as
 
m
uc
h 
m
or
e 
re
ad
y 
to
 li
st
en
 to
 o
ur
 re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 
an
d 
ca
m
e 
di
re
ct
ly
 in
to
 a
ct
io
n”
.
Au
di
te
e:
 “P
rio
r t
o 
th
e 
IP
O
, w
e 
ha
d 
se
ve
ra
l a
ud
it 
is
su
es
 th
at
 w
e 
pa
id
 in
su
ffi
ci
en
t a
tt
en
tio
n 
to
. A
t t
he
 
m
om
en
t w
he
n 
IP
O
 d
ec
is
io
n 
w
as
 c
lo
se
, s
ud
de
nl
y 
th
es
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
s b
ec
am
e 
ve
ry
 im
po
rt
an
t a
nd
 w
e 
ha
d 
to
 re
so
lv
e 
th
em
 a
s s
oo
n 
as
 p
os
si
bl
e”
.
st
ra
te
gi
c 
ev
en
ts
-
se
pa
ra
ti
on
 &
 
in
te
gr
at
io
n
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 
m
ad
e 
to
 s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
or
 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
m
es
 
of
 th
e 
au
di
te
e
se
pa
ra
tie
-o
f 
in
te
gr
at
ie
pr
og
ra
m
m
a
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
or
 in
te
gr
at
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
m
e
Au
di
to
r: 
“I 
w
as
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 a
 v
er
y 
im
po
rt
an
t 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
an
d 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
w
he
re
 e
ve
ry
 
ho
ur
 w
as
 o
f a
  c
ru
ci
al
 im
po
rt
an
ce
 fo
r t
he
 A
ud
ite
e.
 
In
 th
is
 si
tu
at
io
n,
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
w
an
te
d 
to
 k
no
w
 o
f m
y 
au
di
t c
on
ce
rn
s w
ith
in
 5
 m
in
ut
es
”.
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r T
yp
e 
of
 a
ud
its
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
ty
pe
 a
ud
it
s-
au
di
ts
 
ab
ro
ad
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f t
im
in
g 
fa
ct
or
s 
in
 
au
di
ts
 e
xe
cu
te
d 
ab
ro
ad
au
di
t i
n 
he
t b
ui
te
nl
an
d,
 
bu
ite
nl
an
d 
au
di
ts
au
di
ts
 a
br
oa
d
Au
di
to
r: 
“In
 a
ud
its
 a
br
oa
d 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
w
an
ts
 to
 
kn
ow
 o
f t
he
 a
ud
it 
is
su
es
 a
t t
he
 m
om
en
t b
ef
or
e 
yo
u 
le
av
e.
 T
hu
s, 
th
e 
cl
os
in
g 
m
ee
tin
g 
at
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 y
ou
r 
st
ay
 is
 v
er
y 
im
po
rt
an
t b
ec
au
se
 in
 th
is
 m
ee
tin
g 
yo
u 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
yo
ur
 m
es
sa
ge
 to
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e”
. 
Au
di
te
e:
 “I
n 
au
di
ts
 a
br
oa
d 
ev
er
yt
hi
ng
 m
us
t h
ap
pe
n 
w
ith
in
 tw
o 
or
 th
re
e 
w
ee
ks
. E
ve
ry
bo
dy
 is
 fo
cu
se
d 
an
d 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
is
 sm
oo
th
”.
ty
pe
 a
ud
it
s-
co
nt
in
uo
us
 a
ud
it
in
g
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
co
nt
in
uo
us
 a
ud
iti
ng
co
nt
in
uo
us
 a
ud
iti
ng
, 
co
nt
in
uo
us
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
co
nt
in
uo
us
 a
ud
iti
ng
, 
co
nt
in
uo
us
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
Au
di
to
r: 
“In
 co
nt
in
uo
us
 a
ud
iti
ng
 w
e 
al
so
 h
av
e 
to
 
ha
ve
 co
nt
in
uo
us
 co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n”
.
ty
pe
 a
ud
it
s-
ex
is
ti
ng
 
pr
oc
es
s
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
au
di
ts
 o
n 
ex
is
tin
g 
pr
oc
es
se
s
re
gu
lie
r p
ro
ce
s, 
be
st
aa
nd
e 
pr
oc
es
se
n
re
gu
la
r p
ro
ce
ss
, e
xi
st
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s
Au
di
to
r: 
“In
 th
e 
au
di
ts
 o
f e
xi
st
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s w
e 
ha
ve
 a
 
w
in
do
w
 o
f o
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
 w
he
n 
w
e 
id
en
tif
y 
a 
se
rio
us
 
is
su
e 
fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e 
re
la
te
d 
to
 c
lie
nt
 fi
le
s. 
Bu
t i
n 
ex
is
tin
g 
pr
oc
es
se
s i
t i
s m
or
e 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
to
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
to
 
im
pl
em
en
t c
ha
ng
es
”.
ty
pe
 a
ud
it
s-
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 a
ud
it
s
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 a
ud
its
on
de
rh
ou
d 
au
di
t
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 a
ud
it
Au
di
to
r: 
“T
he
 ti
m
in
g 
is
 v
er
y 
im
po
rt
an
t a
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
st
ar
t o
f e
ac
h 
au
di
t i
n 
or
de
r t
o 
co
m
e 
to
 g
oo
d 
re
su
lts
. 
Fi
rs
t y
ou
 h
av
e 
to
 se
e 
if 
it 
is
 a
 g
oo
d 
m
om
en
t t
o 
do
 th
e 
au
di
t, 
w
ill
 it
 h
av
e 
ad
de
d 
va
lu
e 
to
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
or
 it
 is
 a
 
ki
nd
 o
f m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 a
ud
it 
no
 o
ne
 is
 w
ai
tin
g 
fo
r”.
ty
pe
 a
ud
it
s-
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
re
qu
es
ts
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 a
ud
its
 o
n 
re
qu
es
t o
f 
m
an
ag
em
en
t
op
 a
an
vr
aa
g,
 k
la
nt
 v
ra
ag
t, 
 n
ie
t 
pl
an
ba
ar
on
 re
qu
es
t, 
as
ke
d 
by
 th
e 
cl
ie
nt
, 
no
t p
la
nn
ab
le
Au
di
to
r: 
“T
he
 ti
m
in
g 
de
pe
nd
s o
n 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
au
di
ts
 
ar
e 
au
di
ts
 o
n 
m
an
ag
em
en
t r
eq
ue
st
 o
r r
ou
tin
e 
au
di
ts
”.
Au
di
te
e:
 T
he
 b
es
t t
im
in
g 
fo
r t
he
 a
ud
ito
r i
s w
he
n 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
re
qu
es
ts
 th
e 
au
di
t. 
If 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
ha
s i
ss
ue
s 
an
d 
w
an
t t
he
 a
ud
ito
r t
o 
in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
th
es
e,
 th
is
 is
 a
 
pe
rf
ec
t t
im
in
g 
fo
r t
he
 a
ud
ito
r t
o 
do
 w
el
l i
n 
th
e 
au
di
t”.
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. C
od
in
g 
sc
he
m
e 
fo
r T
yp
e 
of
 a
ud
its
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
co
de
co
de
 d
efi
ni
ti
on
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
or
ds
 / 
Ph
ra
se
s 
(D
ut
ch
)
tr
an
sl
at
io
n
In
te
rv
ie
w
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
(t
ra
ns
la
te
d)
ty
pe
 a
ud
it
s-
m
an
da
to
ry
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
m
an
da
to
ry
 a
ud
its
au
di
t a
an
be
ve
lin
g 
ve
rp
lic
ht
, 
au
di
ts
 d
oo
r w
et
 e
n 
re
ge
lg
ev
in
g,
 a
ud
its
 d
ie
 m
oe
te
n 
ge
be
ur
en
, v
er
pl
ic
ht
e 
au
di
ts
m
an
da
to
ry
 a
ud
it 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n,
 a
ud
its
 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 b
y 
la
w
 a
nd
 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
, a
ud
its
 th
at
 m
us
t 
ha
pp
en
, m
an
da
to
ry
 a
ud
its
Au
di
to
r: 
“If
 w
e 
sa
y 
to
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
th
at
 a
 ce
rt
ai
n 
au
di
t 
m
us
t b
e 
do
ne
 to
m
or
ro
w
, t
ha
n 
th
is
 a
ud
it 
is
 m
an
da
to
ry
 
au
di
t a
nd
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
is
 d
iff
er
en
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
re
gu
la
r 
pl
an
ne
d 
au
di
ts
. F
or
 it
 b
rin
gs
 se
ns
e 
of
 u
rg
en
cy
 o
n 
al
l 
si
de
s a
nd
 th
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
au
di
t i
ss
ue
s g
oe
s 
m
or
e 
sm
oo
th
”.
Au
di
te
e:
 “T
he
 m
an
da
to
ry
 a
ud
its
 h
as
 to
 b
e 
si
m
pl
y 
do
ne
 n
o 
m
at
te
r o
f w
e 
fin
d 
it 
ni
ce
 o
r n
ot
 n
ic
e.
 T
he
 
tim
in
g 
in
 th
es
e 
au
di
ts
 h
as
 n
o 
ro
le
 a
s t
he
 a
ud
it 
m
us
t 
be
 d
on
e.
 B
ut
 fo
r m
an
y 
ot
he
r t
yp
es
 o
f a
ud
its
  I 
th
in
k 
th
at
 th
e 
au
di
to
rs
 h
as
 to
 m
ak
e 
be
tt
er
 li
nk
 w
ith
 m
y 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
ge
nd
a,
 a
nd
 in
 th
is
 ca
se
 th
e 
tim
in
g 
is
 
ve
ry
 im
po
rt
an
t t
o 
m
e”
.
ty
pe
 a
ud
it
s-
po
st
-
m
or
te
m
 a
ud
it
s
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
po
st
-m
or
te
m
 a
ud
its
po
st
-m
or
te
m
po
st
-m
or
te
m
Au
di
to
r: 
“If
 y
ou
 d
o 
a 
ki
nd
 o
f p
os
t-
m
or
te
m
 a
ud
it 
ju
st
 
af
te
r t
he
 p
la
ci
ng
 o
f t
he
 ‘m
on
um
en
t’, 
th
is
 is
 a
 ri
gh
t 
tim
in
g,
  b
ut
 si
x 
m
on
th
s l
at
er
 y
ou
 a
re
 to
o 
la
te
”.
ty
pe
 a
ud
it
s-
so
ft
 
co
nt
ro
ls
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
au
di
ts
 o
n 
so
ft
 c
on
tr
ol
s 
re
la
te
d 
as
pe
ct
s 
su
ch
 a
s 
cu
ltu
re
 a
nd
 
be
ha
vi
ou
r, 
to
n 
at
 th
e 
to
p,
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
cu
ltu
ur
, g
ed
ra
g,
 to
ne
 a
t t
he
 
to
p,
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e,
 c
ul
tu
ur
be
ha
vi
ou
r, 
to
ne
 a
t t
he
 to
p,
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
, c
ul
tu
re
Au
di
to
r: 
“W
he
n 
yo
u 
w
an
t t
o 
in
cl
ud
e 
be
ha
vi
ou
r i
ss
ue
s 
in
 y
ou
r m
es
sa
ge
 th
en
 th
e 
rig
ht
 ti
m
in
g 
to
 d
o 
th
at
 is
 
th
e 
fin
al
 c
lo
si
ng
 m
ee
tin
g 
an
d 
no
t b
ef
or
e 
th
at
. I
n 
th
is
 
m
ee
tin
g 
th
e 
Au
di
te
e 
w
ill
 sh
ow
 th
ei
r c
ul
tu
re
 a
nd
 y
ou
 
ca
n 
in
cl
ud
e 
th
at
 in
 y
ou
r a
ud
it 
op
in
io
n”
. 
Au
di
te
e:
 “I
f t
he
 a
ud
ito
r h
as
 fo
un
d 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 o
r s
of
t 
co
nt
ro
ls
 re
la
te
d 
is
su
es
, I
 th
in
k 
he
/s
he
 sh
ou
ld
 p
ut
 th
es
e 
is
su
es
 o
n 
th
e 
ta
bl
e 
as
 so
on
 a
s p
os
si
bl
e”
.
ty
pe
 a
ud
it
s-
th
em
e 
au
di
ts
w
he
n 
a 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
is
 m
ad
e 
to
 
th
em
e 
au
di
ts
th
em
a 
au
di
ts
th
em
e 
au
di
ts
Au
di
to
r: 
“A
t t
he
 m
om
en
t y
ou
 d
o 
a 
th
em
e 
au
di
t w
hi
ch
  
ge
ts
 a
 g
re
at
 a
tt
en
tio
n 
by
 th
e 
Au
di
te
e,
 I t
hi
nk
 y
ou
 d
o 
no
t n
ee
d 
to
 d
o 
m
uc
h 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 h
av
e 
an
 im
pa
ct
”.

5
Views on the Influence of ‘Timing’ 
on the Effectiveness of the Internal 
Audit Function: A Q-methodological 
Study
chAPtEr oVErVIEw
The focus of this study is on the understanding of the timing factors that might be of influ-
ence on the Internal Audit (IA) effectiveness and the importance thereof for the internal 
auditors and management (the auditees). Various factors influencing IA effectiveness have 
been already studied; however, our knowledge of the relevance of timing factors on the IA 
effectiveness is limited. The aim of this study is to explore views of internal auditors and audi-
tees concerning ‘which timing related factors play a role and determine that the time is right 
(not too early and not too late) for the internal auditor to communicate the risk warnings 
to the auditee so that the Internal Audit function will be most effective?’. For the purpose of 
our study we defined IA effectiveness as the extent to which the internal auditor’s message 
recipients (auditees) are willing to listen or not to listen to the internal auditors’ risk warning 
message. 
A Q-method approach was adopted that allow us to perform a wide pattern analysis com-
bining qualitative and quantitative exploration of the timing factors. Auditors (N=26) and 
auditees (N=26) each performed a sorting task in face-to-face interview setting. The respon-
dents were asked to rank 43 statements describing timing factors from ‘most important ’to 
‘least important’. The responses were analyzed using by-person factor analysis. The results 
revealed five different viewpoints in relation to the importance of the timing factors for the IA 
effectiveness. These viewpoints are: ‘‘Communicate important issues immediately, no matter 
what’’, ‘Establish good relation first, then communicate issues’, ‘Communicate when changes 
are still possible, not afterwards’, ‘Communicate risk warnings when you have evidence first’, 
‘Communicate immediately, and remain independent’. The early communication of risk 
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warnings, immediately when issues are observed, is central to all identified viewpoints in 
our study. 
With this study we address an important knowledge gap concerning the IA effectiveness 
as well as in our understanding of timing i.e. when is the right moment to act.
keywords: timing factors, internal audit effectiveness, internal audit function, internal 
auditor, auditee, risk warning messages, Q methodology
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5.1 IntroDuctIon
“Timing is everything. Act too early or too late, and the results can be disappointing – or 
even disastrous.” (Albert, 2013, p.1).
If timing is everything in every aspect of business to make a difference between success 
and disaster, it may also be a relevant factor for the effectiveness of the Internal Audit 
function (IAF). The internal auditor operates in a dynamic organizational environment 
that has its own tempo and dynamic. At the same time, audits have their own planning 
and rhythm that are based on prescribed audit methodology and auditing standards. 
In certain situations, the internal auditor needs to report his findings and recommenda-
tions even though the audit investigation is not yet finalised, simply because the time 
is right to act and make a difference. In other situations, the time may not yet be right 
and the auditor may then consider to wait and hold reporting of findings and recom-
mendations.
The IAF can be considered effective when organizations follow their internal auditors’ 
(independent) advice for improvement (Lenz, 2013). Lenz and Sarens (2012) consider 
the internal audit report as an output that cannot be effective per se. However, it may 
trigger an intended change, a specific outcome and possibly lasting impact, and this is 
what matters. If the timing of ‘when to act’ indeed is everything (Albert and Bell, 2002), 
we may assume that the timing of the internal auditor’s trigger for the intended change 
matters for the IA effectiveness.
As discussed earlier in Chapter 1 and 2 of this thesis, prior research on factors influenc-
ing IA effectiveness has tended to focus predominantly on factors such as the acceptance 
and implementation of the audit recommendations, the size of the audit department, 
compliance with the auditing standards, the positioning of the Internal Audit depart-
ment in the organization and relation with the Audit Committee, and interaction with 
line managers (Arena and Azzone, 2009), top management support (Cohen and Sayag, 
2010; Van Peursem, 2005; Mihret and Yismaw 2007), staff expertise, executing the audit 
plan, audit communication (Mihret and Yismaw, 2007), organizational support’ (Sarens 
and De Beelde, 2006a; 2006b). In their study Nuijten et al, (2016) tested some causes of 
deaf effect (the reluctance to hear bad news) on strategic topics such as continuation of 
an escalating Information Systems project and suggested that deaf effect can be consid-
ered as a deficiency in the effectiveness of the IA function. Despite the many studies on 
the IA effectiveness, our knowledge of the relevance of timing factors remains limited. 
Albert and Bell (2002) did an extensive review of the organizational literature on timing 
and noted that timing questions (point-moment problems) appear mostly focused on 
sequencing problems (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988), rate problems (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; Gersick, 1989), synchrony problems (Perlow, 1999), 
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deadlines (Waller et al, 2001), and duration and coordination (Ancona et al, 2001a). 
In other words, although the importance of timing is acknowledged in the literature 
(Blount and Janick, 2001, Ancona, et al, 2001b, Lawrence, 1988, Albert and Bell, 2002), 
we still know little about when is the right point of moment to act. Albert and Bell (2002) 
posit that when a well-developed and valid theory about when to act is lacking, there 
is no guidance for the decision makers about when is the right moment to act but they 
must rely on heuristics like ‘the sooner the better’(Albert and Bell, 2002). 
Therefore, in this study we aim to obtain a better understanding about the influence of 
timing factors on the effectiveness of the IA. The research question we address is: What 
are the views of the auditors and auditees (management) about the influence of timing 
related factors that determine the time is right (not too early and not too late) for the 
internal auditor to communicate the risk warnings to the auditee so that the auditee will 
listen to the internal auditor’s message? The IA function is our unit of analysis we study 
(Blumberg et al, 2014; Sekaran and Bougie, 2013) and we define the IA effectiveness as 
auditee’s willingness to listen or not to listen to the auditor’s risk warning message. We 
consider risk warning messages as part of both planned audit engagements as well as 
other occasions outside planned engagements, when the auditor has contact with the 
auditee. 
Understanding the views of auditors and auditees about the timing may be relevant 
from a theoretical as well as practical perspective. By lack of theory in this area, the 
empirical results of this study can be used for theory development. From a practical 
perspective it is interesting by itself to gain insight in how internal auditors and the 
auditees (as important stakeholders of the IAF) perceive the importance of timing for 
the effectiveness of the IA. 
The paper is organised as follows: we start describing our research methodology, 
thereafter we elaborate on our results. We then follow by a discussion on the implica-
tions of our study for research as well as practice.
5.2 rEsEArch mEthoD
Q methodology
In this study we applied Q methodology (Watts and Stenner, 2012) to explore the views 
of auditors and auditees about the influence of timing factors on the effectiveness of 
the IAF. Q methodology is a form of pattern analysis for the study of subjectivity that 
combines aspects of qualitative and quantitative methods (Stenner et al, 2000). It was 
introduced by William Stephenson in the 1930s but it can still be considered as a in-
novative method in the field of auditing and accounting. In a Q methodological study, 
respondents are asked to rank a set of statements about a certain topic according to 
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their opinion, and explain this ranking in a follow-up interview. By-person factor analysis 
identifies the main patterns in the rankings of statements across respondents, and the 
statements that illustrate the consensus and difference of opinion between patterns 
(Watts and Stenner, 2012).
Below we describe the consecutive steps in conducting this study. Because Q method-
ology may be novel to part of the readership, we describe each step elaborately.
Development of the statement set
The Q methodological study starts with the development of the research instrument. 
The research instrument is a collection of statements representing the broadest pos-
sible variety of perspectives on the topic under investigation. In a Q methodological 
study the statement set represents the study sample. In line with the Q methodological 
approach of Watts and Stenner (2012; 2014), we developed the statement set in such a 
way to fit the demands of the research question we seek to answer in this study and is 
broadly representative of the population of people from which it is drawn (Watts and 
Stenner, 2012; 2014).
The statement set for this study was based on previous qualitative research on timing 
factors (see Chapter 4 of this thesis). Five focus group interviews were conducted with 
in total 15 auditors and 15 auditees, which resulted in 48 timing factors. For the purpose 
of this study, we first translated these identified timing factors into 48 statements, 
based on quotes extracted from the focus group interviews. In an iterative process, we 
evaluated the usefulness and formulation of the statements in relation to the research 
question of this study. Next, we conducted a pilot test with these statements with two 
internal auditors and one auditee to check the intelligibility of individual statements 
and the comprehensiveness of the statement set. Following this pilot test, a number 
of statements were removed because participants identified them as ambiguous, 
double-barrelled and/or overlapping, and several changes were made to the wording of 
statements. This fine-tuning resulted in a set of 43 statements related to timing factors. 
This statement set was again pilot tested with three auditors and two auditees to ensure 
the statements were complete, similarly worded and easy to understand. The pilot test 
showed no further changes were required. 
The full list of the statements in relation to the timing factors identified in the previous 
study is presented in table 5-4 in Appendix 1.
selection of participants
For this study, we selected a sample of 26 auditors and 26 auditees for face-to-face 
interviews. This is well within the common range of 40 to 80 participants in such studies 
(Watts and Stenner, 2012). 
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In a Q methodological study, where the aim is to explore the variety of views, partici-
pants are sampled purposively (Watts and Stenner, 2012). In line with this approach of 
Watts and Stenner (2012; 2014) we selected each participant carefully and with con-
sideration because each participant becomes a variable in a Q methodological study 
(Watts and Stenner, 2012). 
The main selection criteria for selecting the participants for this study was that the au-
ditors had to have experience with conducting audit investigations and reporting audit 
issues to auditees. While the auditees had to have experience with audit engagements 
and have received audit issues and reports from auditors. The auditors and the auditees 
were selected from a large Bank in The Netherlands that was willing to cooperate in 
this study because the organization was in phase of taking strategic decisions (like the 
initial public offering, change of top management) in which the timing of the auditor’s 
message was a matter of interest. The auditees were recruited from the network of the 
banking organization. 
For the purpose of the study we approached individuals who were likely to hold 
pertinent viewpoints on the topic under investigation. The inclusion criteria included 
job function (auditor, auditee), department, age, gender, years of work experience, 
and education level. Exclusion criteria were not being involved in any kind of internal 
auditing (as an auditor or as an auditee), not being able to understand English (as our 
statements and instructions were presented in English), and not having the capacity 
to understand the sorting task. See table 5-1 for the characteristics of the final sample.
table 5-1. Participants (n=52)
characteristic Value
Age (mean, range) 43.0; 28-60
Gender (%) - female 21.2
- male 78.8
Years of work experience (mean, range) 18.3; 3-36
Education (%) - below university degree 7.7
- university degree 57.7
- post-university degree 34.6
Department (%) - audit 50.0
- Auditees from 1st line of defence 23.1
- Auditees from 2nd line of defence (operational risk, compliance) 26.9
Data collection
All participants were interviewed individually, face-to-face. At the start of the interview, 
we explained the aim of the study, the task they were asked to perform, and the use 
and anonymity of the data they would provide. Then, we asked participants to rank the 
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statement set using a sorting grid that was placed on a table in front of them (see figure 
5-1) and the following instruction: 
‘The willingness of the Auditee to listen to the risk-warning message of the Internal 
Auditor is an indicator of Internal Audit effectiveness. According to you, WHICH timing 
factors determine WHEN is the right moment (thus, not too early and not too late) for 
the Internal Auditor to communicate the risk-warning message that makes the Auditee 
listen to the Internal Auditor?’
Participants were given 43 shuffled cards containing the statements and were asked 
to read them and divide them into three piles: ‘important’, ‘not important’ and ‘neutral’. 
Next, they were asked to read through the statements they had placed on the ‘important’ 
pile and to rank the two most important statements onto the far right of the grid, (col-
umn 9), the next most important three statements into the column 8 etc. Subsequently, 
they were asked to read the statements they placed in the pile ‘not important’ and to 
rank the two least important statements onto the far left of the grid, (column 1), then 
the next three into column 2 etc. Finally, they were asked to rank the statements from 
their neutral pile onto the remaining open spots on the grid. Once the sorting task was 
finished, they had the opportunity to move statements around until they were happy 
with their ranking of the 43 statements. 
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In the second part of the interview, participants were asked a number of follow-up 
questions. First, they were asked for the reasoning behind the ranking of the two ‘least 
important’ and ‘most important’ statements (columns 1 and 9). Then they were asked for 
any other comments about statements or their ranking. This part of the interview was 
tape recorded by the researcher after consent by the participant. 
Analysis
The 52 rankings of 43 statements were subject to by-person factor analysis (centroid 
extraction, varimax rotation) using the dedicated software package PQ method (version 
2.35; Schmolck, 2014). The assumption behind this analysis is that participants’ rankings 
of the statements reflect their viewpoint about the timing factors we study, and when 
the rankings of two participants are highly correlated, they have the same view. Factor 
analysis helps to identify the main groups of participants with correlated rankings of 
statements, and thereby identify the main views about the influence of the timing fac-
tors on the IA effectiveness. 
For each resulting factor from our factor analysis (i.e. identified ‘viewpoint’), an ide-
alized ranking of the statements was calculated. This idealized ranking is a weighted 
average ranking of the statements based on the rankings of the respondents associated 
with that factor (hereafter, ‘viewpoint’), with their correlation coefficient with the view-
point as weight. In fact, this idealized ranking represents how a respondent with a 100% 
correlation with that viewpoint would have ranked the 43 statements, and provides the 
statistical basis for interpretation and description of the viewpoint. 
We drafted a first interpretation of the viewpoints about the timing factors using the 
idealized ranking of statements of each viewpoint. Then, the communalities and differ-
ences between viewpoints were highlighted using the consensus statements, whose 
rankings did not differ significantly between any pair of viewpoints, and the distinguish-
ing statements, whose rankings in a viewpoint differed statistically significantly from 
the ranking in all other. The interpretation was finalized using the qualitative materials 
from the follow-up interviews. In addition, citations from participants associated with 
the viewpoints were extracted for purpose of illustration of the views. By following these 
steps, we aimed for the viewpoints to reflect, as closely as possible, how participants 
perceived the importance of the timing factors for the IA effectiveness.
5.3 rEsults
Analysis of the 52 rankings of the 43 statements revealed five distinct viewpoints among 
auditors and auditees. All five viewpoints had an eigenvalue > 1 and at least two defining 
variables, i.e. statistically significant and uniquely associated participant rankings (Watts 
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and Stenner, 2012). Extraction of more than 5 viewpoints would results into statistically 
insignificant viewpoints (eigenvalue < 1 or less than two defining variables). Each view-
point offered a clear, distinct, and coherent explanation of the auditors and the auditees all 
together about the importance of timing factors for IA effectiveness, i.e. ‘when is the right 
moment’ (thus, not too early and not too late) for the internal auditor to communicate the 
risk-warning message so that the auditee will listen to the internal auditor. The five view-
points had between five and nine defining variables each and together explained 52% 
of the variance in the data (see table 5-2). The correlations between the factors ranged 
between .33 and .57, indicating that there is quite some consensus between each pair of 
views and that there are no very distinct or opposing views. Correlations with Viewpoint 
2 seem generally lower. Table 5-5 in Appendix 2 shows the viewpoints loadings table. 
table 5-2. Viewpoint characteristics
characteristic Viewpoint
1 2 3 4 5
Number of defining variables (n) 9 5 8 6 5
Explained variance (%) 14 6 12 11 9
Cumulative explained variance (%) 20 32 43 52
Correlations between viewpoints 2 .47
3 .53 .33
4 .54 .40 .51
5 .57 .33 .51 .55
Table 5-3 presents the idealised sorts of the five viewpoints and thus shows the ranking 
of statements that is characteristic for each viewpoint. A ‘‘+4’’ indicates that the statement 
is positioned at the far right of the distribution in that viewpoint (“most important”; col-
umn 9 in Figure 5-1); a ‘‘-4’’ that it is positioned at the far left (“least important”; column 
1 in Figure 5-1). An * next to the score of the statement indicates that the statement 
is distinguishing for that viewpoint, i.e. has a statistically significantly different score 
(p<.01) relative to the other viewpoints.
We present the five viewpoints. The numbers in brackets represent the rankings of 
statements in the idealized ranking underlying that viewpoint. For example (2: -4) indi-
cates that statement 2 was ranked in the -4 (‘least important’) position in viewpoint 1. 
Verbatim comments from participants associated with the viewpoint are shown in italics 
and are followed by the identification number of the participant in parentheses (with 
AUD=auditor and AEE=auditee). Although the identification codes of the participant 
distinguish auditors from auditees, in our analysis of the viewpoints we chose not to 
make this difference as assumed the right timing should be determined in dialogue 
between the auditors and the auditees. Hence, each viewpoint identified in our study is 
a viewpoint of the auditors and auditees all together. 
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table 5-3. Complete list of statements and composite factor analysis scores for the five viewpoints
statement Viewpoint
1 2 3 4 5
1 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message when the organization 
makes a change of external auditor.
-3 -2 -2 -1 0*
2 Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor is aligned with 
the timing of activities of the external auditor.
-4* -2 -2 -1 0*
3 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message when the first and 
second line have finished their investigation.
-1 -3 -2 -3 -3
4 Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor is aligned with 
the priorities and objectives of the auditee.
-2 +3 0* +2 -1
5 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message before the auditee 
makes decisions about budgets.
-1 0 +1 -1 +1
6 Critical or high-risk findings are communicated directly at the moment the 
auditor has identified the risk. 
+4* +2 +2 +4 +4
7 Serious issues with high sense of urgency are communicated by the auditor 
directly, irrespective of the stage of the audit investigation.
+4 +4 +3 +4 +4
8 When the audit opinion is ‘weak’, the communication of the risk-warning 
message by the auditor starts in the early stage of the audit.
+3 -1* +1 +2 +3
9 The risk-warning message is communicated by the auditor before the 
deadline for realisation of the Year Audit Plan at year end.
-3 -4* -3 -2 -2
10 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message only after executing all 
the necessary audit activities with due care.
0 0 -2* +1 0
11 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message only when there is 
sufficient evidence supporting the message.
0 +2 -1* +3 +2
12 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message only when the factual 
accuracy checks have been performed.
+1 +1 -1* +3* 0
13 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message at the end of the 
fieldwork, in the closing meeting.
-1 -1 0 0 -2
14 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message in early stage, during 
the orientation phase of the audit.
+1 -3* 0 -1 -1
15 Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor is on a quarterly 
basis as part of the quarterly audit opinion reporting.
-2 -4* 0 -1 +1*
16 The auditor communicates with the auditee in frequent update meetings 
throughout the audit to discuss potential issues arising.
+2 +3 +1* +3 +3
17 The auditor takes into consideration holiday periods and absence of key staff 
of the auditee in the communication of risk-warning messages.
-1 0* -4* -2 -1
18 The auditor takes the appraisal cycle of the auditee by year-end into 
consideration in the communication of risk-warning messages.
-4 -3 -4 -2 -4
19 The auditor takes into consideration that the auditee sometimes is already 
working on improvements.
+1 +3 +2 +2 -1*
20 The auditor takes into consideration that the auditee sometimes is too busy to 
listen to a risk-warning message.
-2 +1* -3 -3 -3
21 Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor comes during the 
phase of change of applications or processes, not after implementation of the 
change.
0 +1 +3* 0 +1
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statement Viewpoint
1 2 3 4 5
22 When laws and regulations change, the auditor communicates the risk-
warning message early enough for the auditee to have sufficient time to 
correct things.
+2 +1 +3 +1 +1
23 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message when the auditee has 
appointed new management within the department.
-1 0 0 0 -2
24 The auditor takes soft factors like the character of the auditee into 
consideration to decide on when to communicate of the risk-warning 
message.
0 +1 0 -3* +1
25 The auditor is straight and bold enough to communicate the risk-warning 
message directly.
+3* 0 -1* +2 +1
26 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message when the auditee 
understands the content of the issue.
+2 +2 -2* 0 0
27 Communication of the risk-warning message starts during the design phase, 
not after implementation of the project.
+1 0 +4* 0 +2
28 Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor is aligned with 
market developments.
0 0 +2* 0 -4*
29 Communication of the risk-warning message is aligned with topics the auditor 
finds important at that particular moment.
0 +2* -1 -1 -3*
30 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message directly when an 
incident is observed. 
+3* -2* +1 +1 0
31 The auditor takes the personal preferences of the auditee about 
communication of risk-warning messages into consideration. 
+1 +1 0 -4 -2
32 The moment of communicating the risk-warning message to the auditee is a 
personal choice by the auditor.
0 -2 -3 -4 -1
33 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message before the ‘go-no go’ 
decision of a project.
+2 -1 +2 0 +3
34 Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor is aligned with 
the timing of requests for investigation by the bank’s regulator/supervisor.
-3* -1 -1 +1 0
35 The auditor takes into consideration the quality of the relation with the 
auditee (trust).
-1 +4 -1 -2 +1*
36 The auditor communicates the risk-warning message in strategic events when 
management makes critical decisions.
0* +1 +4* +2 +2
37 In audits abroad the auditee wants to know of the audit issues before the 
auditors leave.
+2 0 -1* 0 +2
38 In continuous auditing the auditor communicates the risk-warning messages 
continuously.
+1 0 +1 +1 -2*
39 The auditor communicates the risk-warning messages in audit that has an 
added value for the auditee.
+1 +2 +1 0 -1
40 The auditor communicates the risk-warning messages when the audit is 
requested by management.
-2 -1 0 +1 -1
41 Communication of the risk-warning message comes right after the post-
mortem (of projects, products), not long after it.
-2 -2 0 -1 0
42 The risk-warning message concerns governance or soft controls related issues. 0 -1 +2 -2 +2
43 The risk-warning messages are communicated by the auditor in theme audits 
that receive great attention from management.
-1 -1 +1 +1 0
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Viewpoint 1. 
In viewpoint 1, communicating critical, high-risk or urgent findings immediately, irre-
spective of the stage of the audit investigation, is considered most important (6: +4*; 
7: +4; 30: +3*; 16: +2). An auditor explained: “Important issues should be communicated 
smoothly and fast, the internal auditor should not wait till all audit activities are finalised 
but communicate the issue as soon as it is observed. If you identify important issue you 
need to communicate it directly and not wait to finalise the audit” (6: +4; AUD08). Another 
auditor: “These two statements (6 and 7) indicate that these issues should be communicated 
directly. You can do extra investigation later on but you need to communicate these issues 
immediately and then you are in time to see what additional work you need to do” (7: +4; 
AUD11). And an auditee stated: “At the moment the auditor identifies serious issue he 
should not wait but directly communicate the risk to me. It is about the moment the audi-
tor has identified an issue and at that moment the auditor should report the issue and not 
wait” (6: +4; AEE26). For this purpose, it is important that the auditor is straight and bold 
enough to communicate the risk-warning message directly (25: +3*). In this respect one 
of the auditors noted: “The auditor has to communicate his message at all times no matter 
of the timing. You should not be afraid of various formalities” (25; AUD13). While one of the 
auditees said: “The auditor should be bold and direct. The auditor should communicate the 
risk directly, to initiate discussion and dialog with the auditee so that the auditee is able to 
take action. If the auditor is too late with his risk message, this is not a preferred situation for 
the auditee” (25; AEE14). Overall, early communication of issues arising throughout the 
audit is central to this viewpoint because it gives the auditee more time to intervene, for 
example when the audit opinion is ‘weak’(8: +3), when laws and regulations change (22: 
+2) or before the ‘go-no go’ decision of a project (33: +2). For example, one of the audi-
tees said: “It is important to me to know of the issue very early so that I can do something 
about it” (33; AEE08). Thus the auditor should not hesitate to address important issues 
‘when the iron is hot’.
In line with this strong focus on early and straight communication, which is distin-
guishing for this view, statements that mentioned fixed timings like the year-end (18: 
-4; 9: -3), alignment with the timing of activities of the external auditor (2: -4*) or the 
timing of requests for investigation by the bank’s regulator/supervisor (34: -3*), or just 
when requested by management (40: -2) were considered least important. One of the 
auditees associated with this viewpoint stated: “The appraisal cycle of management is not 
important for the moment of the communication of the risk message by the auditor. The 
auditor can communicate the message anyway and not take into consideration this factor” 
(18: -4; AEE09). And one of the auditors explained: “The internal auditor’s activities are 
independent of the various events such as e.g. the involvement of the external auditor or 
budget decisions. These are no reasons not to communicate the message” (2: -4; AUD07). 
Another auditor confirmed this view by saying: “The internal auditor should not wait for 
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the external auditor’s or supervisor’s alignment; the internal auditor should be able to report 
risks independently. Otherwise the internal auditor is too late with the communication of the 
risks. I expect that in these situations the internal auditor is even more early that the external 
auditor or supervisor in reporting the issues” (34: -3: AUD08).
Considering the above, we call this viewpoint ‘Communicate important issues im-
mediately, no matter what’. This viewpoint can be expected among both auditors and 
auditees as it was defined by five auditors (AUD07, AUD08, AUD11, AUD13 and AUD18) 
and four auditees (AEE08, AEE09, AEE14, AEE26) (see Appendix 2).
Viewpoint 2. 
The auditors and auditees in viewpoint 2 believe more than their peers in the other 
viewpoints that the most important factor for the timing of the communication of the 
risk warning message by the auditor is the quality of the relation with the auditee (trust) 
(35: +4*). With respect to the quality of the relation, one of the auditors said: “We have 
to investigate the issues, but we need to have a good communication with the auditee. We 
need to address issues in our regular meetings with management. This is important for the 
relation with the auditee.” (35: +4; AUD12). Therefore this group found aspects such as 
communicating risk warning messages in frequent update meetings throughout the 
audit (16: +3), aligning the timing with the priorities and objectives of the auditee’ (4: 
+3), taking the improvements of auditees into consideration (19: +3) also important 
as it contributes positively to the relation with the auditee and facilitates the effective 
communication of the risk warning messages by the auditor. One of the auditee stated: 
“This statement relates to the moment when the auditor can place himself in the shoes of the 
auditees and this is for me most important timing factor” (19: +3; AEE21). 
That the relation with the auditee is important in this viewpoint, can be also seen in 
aspects this group found more important than other groups, like ‘alignment with topics 
the auditor finds important at that particular moment’ (29: +2*), ‘taking into consider-
ation busy periods of the auditee’ (20: +1*) and ‘the personal preferences of the auditee 
about the moment of communication of risk-warning messages’ (31: +1*). Although 
the relation with the auditee takes the central place in this viewpoint, still having suf-
ficient evidence supporting the message (11: +2) and understanding the content of the 
message by the auditee (26: +2) are seen by this group as important prerequisites to 
‘communicate serious issues with high sense of urgency immediately, irrespective of the 
stage of the audit investigation’ (7: +4) and ‘communicate critical or high-risk findings 
directly at the moment the auditor has identified the risk’ (6: +2). For example one of 
the auditor said: “It starts when the Auditee understands what the issue is about otherwise 
we cannot convince him that there is a risk” (26; AUD10). This may be the reason why this 
group found aspects such as ‘when the audit opinion is ‘weak’, the communication of the 
risk-warning message by the auditor starts in the early stage of the audit’ (8: -1*), ‘the 
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auditor communicates the risk-warning message directly when an incident is observed’ 
(30: -2*) more unimportant compared to their peers in the other viewpoints. 
For the auditors and auditees in this viewpoint more unimportant timing factors 
compared to their peers in the other four viewpoints are fixed timings related to the 
communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor is on a quarterly basis (15: 
-4*), the deadline for realisation of the Year Audit Plan at year end (9: -4*). They found 
that other fixed moments like the orientation phase of the audit (14: -3*), when the 
first and second line have finished their investigation’ (3: -3), the appraisal cycle of the 
auditee by year-end (18: -3), or post-mortem (of projects, products) moments, also as 
not important. For this group the timing is not a personal choice by the auditor (32: -2) 
and it should not depend on the moment when the organization makes a change of 
external auditor (1: -2). The following statement of one of the auditees is informative in 
this respect: “The statement about realisation of the Year Audit Plan is related to internal 
processes of the auditors and for me this is not important timing factor” (9; AEE21). One 
of the auditors confirmed this by stating: “The auditee is not interested in our deadlines 
related to audit plan” (9; AUD10). 
In this viewpoint establishing a good relation and trust between the auditors and 
auditees before communicating the risk warning message takes central place in deter-
mining the right timing for the auditor to act. We call this viewpoint ‘Establish good 
relation first, then communicate issues’. Viewpoint 2 can be found among auditors and 
auditees as it was defined by four auditors (AUD01, AUD05, AUD10, AUD12) and one 
auditee (AEE21) (see Appendix 2).
Viewpoint 3.
In viewpoint 3 communicating risk-warning messages by the auditors in moments when 
the auditee listens the most, like in strategic events when management makes critical 
decisions (36: +4*), and during change, not after implementation of the change (27: 
+4*; 21: +3*) are much more emphasised compared to the other four viewpoints. In this 
respect, one of the auditees stated: “The auditor should communicate the risk message 
at the moment when everyone listens. Strategic events are for me most important because 
at the moment of such events the auditee listens much more to the auditor’s message” 
(36; AEE06). One of the auditors explained: “The auditor should perform audits more on 
changes/design. During change the auditor should communicate risks more often” (27; 
AUD26). For this purpose, it is important to this group that the auditor communicates 
serious and high risk issues with high sense of urgency directly, at the moment the audi-
tor has identified the risk irrespective of the stage of the audit investigation (7: +3; 6: +2), 
before the ‘go-no go decisions but aligned with market developments and early enough 
for the auditee to have sufficient time to correct things (22: +3; 33: +2; 28: +2*), by com-
municating these issues in frequent update meetings throughout the audit to discuss 
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potential issues arising (16: +1*). One of the auditors illustrated this by saying: “For senior 
management the internal auditor is effective when he/she is sensitive for risks entailed 
by market developments and in a phase of design/change“ (28; AUD26). And one of the 
auditees noted: “The auditor should communicate the issues early, continuously, regularly 
and think together with the auditee about the issues and resolutions” (16; AEE04). Another 
auditee said: “Urgent issues should be communicated directly” (7; AEE05) and confirmed 
by another auditee who said: “Important issues should be directly communicated by the 
auditor. The auditor should not wait with it till he/she has finalised certain phases of the 
audit” (7; AEE17). 
In this viewpoint it is therefore more unimportant than in the other viewpoints that 
the auditor communicates the risk-warning message only after executing all the neces-
sary audit activities with due care, when the there is sufficient evidence and all factual 
checks supporting the message are done. (10: -2*; 11: -1*; 12: -1*). And for this group 
the auditor should communicate the risk warnings early, not at the end of the audit 
(37:-1), independently of being straight or bold enough (25: -1) or whether the auditee 
understands the content of the issue (26; -2*). In this respect one of the auditors said: 
“Bold and straight are not relevant for the timing, you need to be more politic sensitive to be 
able to convince the auditee of the audit issues” (25; AUD22). One of the auditees said: “The 
auditor should not align the moment of communication of the risks with the external audi-
tor. The work of the auditor is independent of the work of the external auditor” (26; AEE18).
The focus on early communication of risk warning, before making strategic decisions 
and change implementations by management is emphasised in this viewpoint by 
considering subjective timing moments related to the appraisal cycle of the auditee by 
year-end (18: -4), holiday periods and absence of key staff or too busy periods of the 
auditee (17: -4*; 20: -3) in the communication of risk-warning messages, deadlines for 
realisation of the Year Audit Plan at year end (9: -3), personal choices by the auditor’ (32: 
-3), and the moment of changing the external auditor’ (1: -2) as unimportant. One of the 
auditors stated: “The appraisal cycle has no role in the timing of the communication of the 
risks by the auditor” (18; AUD26). While one of the auditees said: “Holidays are nonsense. 
The auditor should not wait till the auditee is back from holidays or absence to communicate 
his risk message” (17; AEE17). 
Given the strong focus on early communication during strategic decisions and change 
and not after their implementation, we call this viewpoint ‘Communicate when changes 
are still possible, not afterwards’. Viewpoint 3 was defined by two auditors (AUD22, 
AUD26) and six auditee (AEE04, AEE05, AEE06, AEE17, AEE18, AEE23) (see Appendix 2). 
Viewpoint 4. 
In viewpoint 4 having collected sufficient evidence (11: +3) and especially having facts 
checked first (12: +3*) before immediately communicating serious issues to manage-
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ment (6: +4; 7: +4; 36: +2; 16: +3), takes central place in determining the right timing 
for the auditor to act. This view is illustrated by one of the auditees who indicated: 
“High and critical issues should be directly communicated by the auditor (6; AEE07) who 
also noted: “The auditor should not wait with the communication of issues that have a high 
sense of urgency. These issues should be communicated directly no matter in which phase 
is the audit investigation. With such issues the auditor should not wait till he finalises the 
audit but communicate these issues in an early stage” (7; AEE07). However, one of the 
auditors stated: “You need to make sure there is sufficient audit evidence that will support 
the communication of the findings. We need to check and double check and confirm before 
we communicate the issues.” (11; AUD04). One of the auditees illustrated this by saying: 
“Factual accuracy of the issues that the auditor communicates to the auditee is very impor-
tant. Only correct issues, confirmed for factual accuracy can be effectively communicated by 
the auditor as he/she can convince the auditee this way much better” (12; AEE12). This was 
confirmed by another auditee who said in his concluding remarks: “Issues should be early 
communicated but always be backed with good evidence” (AEE20).
In this viewpoint aspects related to considering the character of the auditee to decide 
on when to communicate of the risk-warning message is seen as more unimportant 
compared to the peers in the other four viewpoints (24: -3*). For this group, the moment 
of communicating the risk-warning message to the auditee is not a personal choice by 
the auditor or the auditee (32: -4; 31: -4). To illustrate this, one of the auditors noted: “The 
communication of the issues should not be a personal choice of the auditor. There should be 
some kind of guidance but personal choice is not important” (32; AUD04). This was noted 
by one of the auditees saying: “If the timing is personal choice by the auditor, he/she is not 
client focussed” (32; AEE26) and another auditee: “The personal preferences of the auditee 
are also not important for the timing. I cannot imagine this to be important timing factor” 
(31; AEE07). Also in this viewpoint, the timing should not depend on aspects like holiday 
periods and absence of key staff, too busy periods, or the moment when others have 
finished their investigation (17: -2; 20 -3; 3: -3). 
Communicating serious and high risk issues based on evidence and facts is central 
to this viewpoint and therefore we call this viewpoint ‘Communicate risk warnings when 
you have evidence first’. Viewpoint 4 was defined by only one auditor (AUD04) and five 
auditees (AEE03, AEE07, AEE12, AEE20, AEE25) (see Appendix 2). 
Viewpoint 5.
Early and frequent communication of serious, high risk, critical risk warnings is central 
to viewpoint 5 (6: +4; 7: +4; 16: +3; 15: +1*) because this way the auditee will have the 
chance to intervene directly and timely, for example when the audit opinion is ‘weak’(8: 
+3), before ‘go-no go’ decision of a project’(33: +3), in strategic events when manage-
ment makes critical decisions’ (36: +2) or when there are issues related to governance 
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and soft controls (42: +2). To illustrate this, one of the auditors stated: “In case of high 
sense of urgency you need to communicate directly and if we do not report these directly it 
will be too late and we have no added value and the relevance is gone” (7; AUD03). One of 
the auditees said: “Serious issues should be directly communicated to the auditee so that 
auditee can implement solutions directly” (7; AEE02). 
Although the early communication is central in this viewpoint, the group considers 
that the right timing for communication of the risk warning messages by the internal 
auditor is not determined by personal choices of auditors and auditees. This is reflected 
by statements that relate to what the auditors find important at that particular moment 
(29: -3*), preferences like the year-end appraisals (18: -4), personal preferences of the 
auditee (31: -2), too busy to listen to a risk-warning message (20: -3), when the first and 
second line have finished their investigation’ (3: -3), which we found by this group as 
unimportant for the timing. That this group considers the auditor should remain inde-
pendent of what others prefer when deciding about the timing, is illustrated by one of 
the auditees noting: “The auditor should not wait the first or the second line of defence to 
finish their investigations but report the risks independently”. (3; AEE13). This is confirmed 
by one of the auditors who noted: “We are independent and objective and this is outside of 
the appraisal cycles of auditees. This is the least relevant of all statements here” (18; AUD03). 
One of the auditees stated the following: “The appraisal cycle is not important for the 
timing. It is my opinion that if the auditee does not want to listen to the auditor’s message 
due to the appraisal cycle, he does not take the auditor seriously” (18; AEE22). With respect 
to auditee being too busy to listen to the auditor’s risk warning message, one of the 
auditors noted: “This is not a reason not to communicate the risk and we cannot wait until 
for the auditee it is a good moment” (20; AUD03). In addition, this group found aspects like 
continue communication (38: -2*), market developments, inside ongoing improvements 
(28: -4*; 19: -1*) much more unimportant compared to their peers. For example one of 
the auditees said: “Timing should not depend on developments in outside market but the 
auditor should take into consideration what is important for the organzsation” (28; AEE03). 
Communicating serious risk warnings immediately in early stage, no matter of 
preferences of others is central to this viewpoint. We call this viewpoint ‘Communicate 
immediately, and remain independent’. Viewpoint 5 was defined by two auditors (AUD03, 
AUD17) and three auditees (AEE02, AEE13, AEE22) (see Appendix 2). 
5.4 DIscussIon
In this section we will be discussing the main findings and conclusions, the implications 
of our study for research and practice, as well as the limitations.
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main findings
Our study aimed at obtaining the views of the internal auditors and the auditees (man-
agement) on the influence of timing factors on the IA effectiveness. The research ques-
tion we addressed in this study was: “What are the views of the auditors and auditees 
(management) about the influence of timing related factors that determine the time is 
right (not too early and not too late) for the internal auditor to communicate the risk 
warnings to the auditee so that the auditee will listen to the internal auditor’s message?” 
This Q-methodological study gives insights into the heterogeneity and the subjectivi-
ties in views about the timing factors relevant to the effectiveness of the IAF. Our study 
revealed five distinct views of auditors and auditees about the factors that determine 
the right moment (i.e. not too early, not too late) for the auditor to communicate the risk 
warning message to the auditee. We summarize these viewpoints below:
•	 Viewpoint	1	‘Communicate	 important	 issues	 immediately,	no	matter	what’	 can	be	
found among both the auditors and the auditees. In this Viewpoint it was empha-
sised that important issues should be communicated immediately to auditees, no 
matter of other conditions such as e.g. the stage of the audit investigation and hav-
ing collected sufficient fact evidence. 
•	 In	Viewpoint	2	‘Establish	good	relation	first,	then	communicate	issues’,	both	the	audi-
tors and the auditees shared the view that the quality of the relation the auditor 
has with the auditee is prevailing factor for the timing. This view is less expected 
to be found among the auditors given the independent role of the auditor and we 
feel there is in a way some tension between the independent role of the internal 
auditor in the organization and their emphasize on having a good relation with man-
agement.  This could be presumably clarified by studies showing that the internal 
auditor is more effective as a Partner to management than as a Policeman (Nuijten et 
al, 2016); however it needs further investigation.
•	 Viewpoint	3	‘Communicate	when	changes	are	still	possible,	not	afterwards’	can	be	
also found among auditees and has a strong focus on hearing about the risks during 
decision making processes (e.g. strategic events, projects) when taking corrective 
actions are still possible and changes are made on time. 
•	 Viewpoint	4	‘Communicate	risk	warnings	when	you	have	evidence’	is	also	a	view	that	
can be found among the auditors and the auditees. It emphasizes having sufficient 
fact evidence as a precondition for the timing of the communication of the risk 
warning message by the auditor. We would expect having sufficient evidence and 
checked facts would be more auditor’s view given these aspects are part of their 
standard audit procedures. Apparently the auditees demand hearing about issues 
immediately but still these issues need to be correct and supported with sufficient 
evidence. 
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•	 Similarly	to	Viewpoint	1,	Viewpoint	5	‘‘Communicate	immediately,	and	remain	inde-
pendent’’ is shared view among auditors and auditees. In this Viewpoint the timing 
is not determined by what others prefer as timings related to subjective aspects like 
for instance personal choices of auditors and auditees, year-end appraisals, end of 
year deadlines, absence of staff, holidays, having too busy periods, were considered 
more unimportant compared to the other four Viewpoints identified in this study. In 
this viewpoint the immediate communication of serious issues is important but the 
emphasize is on the independence of the auditor when choosing the right timing for 
the communication of the risk warning message.  
The early communication of risk warnings, immediately when the issue is observed, is 
central to all identified viewpoints in our study.  However, our study does not intend to 
give recommendation to the internal auditors to always communicate the risk warning 
messages to the auditees immediately. Each viewpoint in our study outlines different 
conditions which determine the right timing. All five viewpoints are shared among the 
auditors and auditees and we cannot link any of the viewpoints specifically to group of 
auditors or group of auditees.  
Implications for theory and practice
The knowledge about the views of auditors and auditees of the timing factors in relation 
to the effectiveness of IAF is important for several reasons. 
•	 There	is	no	only	one	view	that	can	be	distinguished	about	the	important	of	the	tim-
ing for the IAF effectiveness but more views exist and these are to be found among 
auditors and auditees. 
•	 The	 identified	 views	 in	 this	 study	 are	 not	 very	 different	 or	 opposing	 among	 the	
auditors and the auditees. There is a quite some consensus between each pair of 
viewpoints as they were moderately correlated with each other.  
•	 Based	on	the	identified	viewpoints	in	our	study,	we	cannot	build	only	one	‘objective’	
view about which timing factors are the most important and which are the least im-
portant for the IA effectiveness. Although, in our opinion, identifying five viewpoints 
on timing is quite extensive, our results do not provide one common policy guidance 
with regard to ‘when is the right moment for the auditor to communicate the risk 
warning message’. There are more views, the views are subjective as one timing factor 
is most important in one viewpoint but less important in another viewpoint.  Being 
aware of these views, the auditors and auditees can start discussion with each other 
to align views and expectations with respect to the right moment of communication 
of the risk warnings.
•	 The	results	of	our	study	show	that	both	subjective	and	objective	timing	factors	play	
role in all five identified Viewpoints and choosing the right timing is an interchange 
between subjective and objectives timing factors. While the auditors and the au-
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ditees worry about having facts first, there is a tension between having sufficient 
evidence and early communicating the risk. The auditors and auditees want to 
establish a good relation with each other before the auditor communicates the bad 
news but when choosing ‘the right moment’ for communication of the risk message, 
the auditor needs to remain independent of the personal preferences of others.
•	 Finally,	the	knowledge	about	the	existence	of	different	views	regarding	the	impor-
tance of timing for the IA effectiveness can be used further within the audit organiza-
tion to decide whether a formal policy for timing is necessary or is it perhaps to leave 
the choice to each auditor individually to decide on the right timing to communicate 
the risk warning message. The former could potentially have implications for  the 
continuity of the audits in case one auditor would be replaced with another who has 
a different timing approach in a particular audit.
Our study has also important theoretical implications. One of the important implica-
tions of our study for the theory is that it addresses an important knowledge gap in the 
research area of IA effectiveness as well as broader, in the organizational literature with 
respect to timing. Academic studies that have (qualitatively as well as quantitatively) 
examined the role of the timing factors in the effectiveness of IA are, to our knowledge, 
not available. This study is perhaps a first attempt in examining the timing factors that 
may be of influence to the effectiveness of IA function.
Lenz and Hahn (2015) performed a comprehensive review of the literature on effec-
tiveness of IAF and distinguished two different streams in the literature, the ‘supply-side’ 
perspective, i.e. empirical studies based on self-assessments of the Auditors, and the 
‘demand-side’ perspective, i.e. empirical studies based on other stakeholders’ perspec-
tives. Prior research on effectiveness of the IAF was mainly focussed on the ‘supply-side’ 
perspective of the Auditors (e.g. the role of the CAE and the skills and competencies of 
auditors, organizational specifics, its politics and culture, support from senior manage-
ment and the impact of the board, directly or through the audit committee (AC)) and 
the ‘demand-side’ perspective of other stakeholders (e.g. whether management will or 
will not implement recommendations made by the Auditor). In their comprehensive 
literature review of the empirical literature in the area of effectiveness of the IA, Lenz and 
Hahn (2015) stated that the ‘demand- side’ of the effectiveness of the IA is still under-
examined area. With our study we contributed by adding the timing as a new dimension 
to the ‘demand-side’ perspective of the IA effectiveness. 
While other studies explore the IA effectiveness only from a ‘supply-side’ perspective 
or only from a ‘demand-side’ perspective, our study is presumably the first study that 
addresses both perspectives simultaneously. Each identified viewpoint in this study 
is a viewpoint of both the auditors (‘supply-side’) and auditees (‘demand-side’), which 
may be an indication that the determination of the right timing for communicating 
risk warnings by the auditors ideally should be done in an interaction between both 
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groups, the auditors and the auditees in the same time as this in fact happens in the 
audit investigations in practice.  
In addition to the above, it is worth mentioning that during the study, the participants 
shared with the researcher they found the Q-sort procedure very useful and an eye-
opener helping them to understand the impact timing may have on effectiveness of the 
IA. Some of the auditors shared with the researcher they do not think of the ‘right timing’ 
when they communicate the risk warning to the auditees and this study increased their 
awareness of the importance of the timing for the effectiveness of the IA.
limitations and suggestions for further research
As with other studies, our study also has some limitations.  This form of generalization 
in our study is driven by semantics rather than statistics (Watts and Stenner, 2012). The 
viewpoints presented in this study are representative only of those that can be observed 
among auditors in the selected Dutch banking organization and related auditees. Our 
Q-methodological study can say little about the prevalence of these five views among 
auditors and auditees, in this or other similar banking institutions in The Netherlands. 
However, we do not expect to identify different views in comparable larger banks in 
The Netherlands as these, similarly to our selected financial institution, at the time of 
our study, were subject to important strategic developments resulting in increased at-
tention to the timing issues. Still, we recommend further study with respondents from 
other large banks in the Netherlands but also abroad to confirm this expectation.
During our study some of the respondents made some general comments about the 
timing that could be interesting for interpretation of the study results. When giving the 
rationale for their ranking choices they made on the Q sorting grid, the auditors and the 
auditees shared interesting views about how the timing factors may be categorised in 
order these to be more easy identified and managed:
•	 One	of	 the	auditees	 (AEE16)	 suggested	dividing	 the	 timing	 factors	 in	 two	groups,	
subjective and objective saying: “On the right side I put the factors that have to do with 
concrete hard requirements on when I (as an auditee) wish the auditor to communicate 
the risk messages. On the left side I put statements that have to do with early warnings. 
I do not like early warnings, the auditor should come to me with hard evidence. Soft fac-
tors are not important to me but hard evidence. Thus divided the timing factors in two 
groups: objective and subjective”. 
•	 One	of	the	auditors	(AUD05)	looked	at	the	timing	from	a	perspective	of	serious	ur-
gent issues and less important issues and said: “The logic how I divided the statements 
was on basis of two groups: events that are damageable for the business and events that 
are not damageable for the business. If something will damage the business that the 
auditor should communicate the risk warnings as soon as possible”. In a similar direc-
tion, one of the auditees said (AEE11): “On the right side I put timing factors that have 
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to do with risks that have an immediate impact for management. On the left side I put 
timing factors that have to do more with regulations, internal matters of the auditor and 
auditees which are not so important for the timing”.
•	 AUD24	identified	three	categories	of	timing	factors	and	said:	“Overall I identified three 
theme’s: first, timing factors related to factual accuracy and having evidence in order to 
be sure of the audit issues, second, fast communication of issues with no conditions and 
third, soft aspect”.
•	 Finally	one	auditee	(AEE22)	referred	to	three	categories	of	timing	factors	and	said:	“In 
general, the selected statements on the right side of the scheme have to do with direct 
communication of the risks by the auditor thereby remaining independent of other fac-
tors. In the middle I put the statements for which the auditor has to take care of (various 
factors related to audit procedures) and on the left side are the statements where the 
auditor takes into account circumstances of the auditee”.
From the additional feedback we obtained during the face-to-face interviews we see 
the potential of deriving various categories of timing factors which we recommend to 
be studied in further research as we believe investigating this more in depth could give 
an important contribution for further understanding of timing and its relation to the IA 
effectiveness. From a practical perspective, if there is a more clear categorisation of the 
various types timing factors, the auditors and auditees can define approaches how to 
deploy these more effectively in the communication and acceptance of the risk warn-
ings.
In our study we focus on communication of ‘bad news’ messages i.e. unwelcome mes-
sages about risks that threaten the organization. We assume there are different timing 
factors for communicating of ‘good news’ i.e. messages about positive observations 
identified by the auditors. These kind of messages were not part of our study as we 
considered the positive messages do not impair the IA effectiveness. Which timing fac-
tors play a role for communicating good news and their influence on the IA effectiveness 
could potentially be an interesting future research.
Our final remark about the limitations of our study is that in our study we focused on 
the timing at inter-personal level: with the auditor as communicator of the risk warn-
ing message and the auditee (a representative of management) as a recipient of the 
risk warning message. Studying the views of the timing factors between auditors and 
auditees in the context of a specific audit investigation, could be an interesting future 
research to obtain more understanding on the role of specific timing aspects and views 
thereof. For example we suggest to focus on a specific Viewpoint during a specific audit 
and investigate further how the timing factors in this specific Viewpoint are viewed by 
these groups, what is the dynamic and interaction of these groups with regard to the 
timing in general and analyse differences among specific groups.
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In conclusion of this paper our study resulted in five viewpoints about the timing, 
each of which outlines different circumstances which determine the right moment for 
the auditor to act. Our study revealed that the early communication of risk warnings, 
immediately when the issue is observed, is central to all identified viewpoints in our 
study.  However, based on this study, a general recommendation to the internal auditors 
to always communicate the risk warning messages to the auditees immediately can-
not be given. All five viewpoints are shared among the auditors and auditees and each 
identified viewpoint emphasises different aspects of the timing.  
We encourage others to use our study as an input to auditors and auditees during 
a mutual discussion about their expectation with regard to the right timing for com-
munication of the risk warning messages by the auditor. 
We believe our study opens up promising avenues for future research and we encour-
age also others to advance our understanding of the timing factors in the context of the 
IA effectiveness.
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APPEnDIx 1.
table 5-4. Theoretical structure for selection of statements 
category* timing factors* statements
Alignment Alignment external 
auditor
1. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message when 
the organization makes a change of external auditor.
2. Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor 
is aligned with the timing of activities of the external auditor.
Alignment three lines of 
defence
3. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message when 
the first and second line have finished their investigation.
Alignment audit plan 
with auditee’s needs
4. Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor 
is aligned with the  priorities and objectives of the auditee.
Alignment with 
auditee’s budget needs
5. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message before 
the auditee makes decisions about budgets.
Audit issue 
classification
risk indication 6. Critical or high-risk findings are communicated directly at 
the moment the auditor has identified the risk.  
severity of audit issues 7. Serious issues with high sense of urgency are 
communicated by the auditor directly, irrespective of the stage 
of the audit investigation.
Audit opinion Audit opinion 8. When the audit opinion is ‘weak’, the communication of the 
risk-warning message by the auditor starts in the early stage of 
the audit.
Audit 
procedures
Audit procedures-audit 
time schedule
9. The risk-warning message is communicated by the auditor 
before the deadline for realisation of the Year Audit Plan at year 
end.
Audit procedures-due 
care
10. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message only 
after executing all the necessary audit activities with due care.
Audit procedures-
evidence
11. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message only 
when there is sufficient evidence supporting the message.
Audit procedures-
factual accuracy
12. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message only 
when the factual accuracy checks have been performed.
Audit procedures-
fieldwork
13. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message at the 
end of the fieldwork, in the closing meeting.
Audit procedures-
orientation phase
14. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message in 
early stage, during the orientation phase of the audit.
Audit procedures-
quarterly reporting
15. Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor 
is on a quarterly basis as part of the quarterly audit opinion 
reporting.
Audit procedures-
update meetings
16. The auditor communicates with the auditee in frequent 
update meetings throughout the audit to discuss potential 
issues arising.
Auditee’s 
agenda
Auditee’s agenda-
absence staff
17. The auditor takes into consideration holiday periods and 
absence of key staff of the auditee in the communication of risk-
warning messages.
Auditee’s agenda-end 
of year appraisal
18. The auditor takes the appraisal cycle of the auditee by year-
end into consideration in the communication of risk-warning 
messages.
Auditee’s agenda-
themselves busy with 
solutions
19. The auditor takes into consideration that the auditee 
sometimes is already working on improvements.
Auditee’s agenda-too 
busy periods
20. The auditor takes into consideration that the auditee 
sometimes is too busy to listen to a risk-warning message.
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category* timing factors* statements
change change in applications 21. Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor 
comes during the phase of change of applications or processes, 
not after implementation of the change.
change in laws and 
regulations
22. When laws and regulations change, the auditor 
communicates the risk-warning message early enough for the 
auditee to have sufficient time to correct things.
change in process Covered with statement 21
change in staff 23. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message 
when the auditee has appointed new management within the 
department.
character character auditee 24. The auditor takes soft factors like the character of the 
auditee into consideration to decide on when to communicate 
of the risk-warning message.
character auditor 25. The auditor is straight and bold enough to communicate the 
risk-warning message directly.
content Auditee’s 
understanding of 
auditor’s message
26. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message when 
the auditee understands the content of the issue.
Design phase Design phase 27. Communication of the risk-warning message starts during 
the design phase, not after implementation of the project.
External 
factors
External factors-market 
development
28. Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor 
is aligned with  market developments.
focus Audit focus 29. Communication of the risk-warning message is aligned with 
topics the auditor finds important at that particular moment.
Auditee’s focus Covered with statement 4
Incidents Incidents 30. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message 
directly when an incident is observed. 
Preference Auditee’s preference 31. The auditor takes the personal preferences of the 
auditee about communication of risk-warning messages into 
consideration. 
Auditor’s preference 32. The moment of communicating the risk-warning message 
to the auditee is a personal choice by the auditor.
Project Project 33. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message before 
the ‘go-no go’ decision of a project.
regulator regulator involvement 34. Communication of the risk-warning message by the auditor 
is aligned with the timing of requests for investigation by the 
bank’s regulator/supervisor.
relation 
auditor-
auditee
relation auditor-
auditee
35. The auditor takes into consideration the quality of the 
relation with the auditee (trust).  
strategic 
events
strategic events-critical 
management decisions
36. The auditor communicates the risk-warning message in 
strategic events when management makes critical decisions.
strategic events-
separation & 
integration
Covered with statement 36
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category* timing factors* statements
type of audits type audits-audits 
abroad
37. In audits abroad the auditee wants to know of the audit 
issues before the auditors leave.
type audits-continuous 
auditing
38. In continuous auditing the auditor communicates the risk-
warning messages continuously.
type audits-existing 
process
Covered with statement 21
type audits-
maintenance audits
39. The auditor communicates the risk-warning messages in 
audit that has an added value for the auditee.
type audits-
management requests
40. The auditor communicates the risk-warning messages when 
the audit is requested by management.
type audits-mandatory Covered with statement 34
type audits-post-
mortem audits
41. Communication of the risk-warning message comes right 
after the post-mortem (of projects, products), not long after it.
type audits-soft 
controls
42. The risk-warning message concerns governance or soft 
controls related issues.
type audits-theme 
audits
43. The risk-warning messages are communicated by the 
auditor in theme audits that receive great attention from 
management.
*Category and Timing factors as per Focus Groups study (Chapter 4: table 4-1 and table 4-8 throughout 
4-25 in Appendix 3)
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APPEnDIx 2.
table 5-5. Factor loadings table, with * indicating statistically significant and unique loadings 
respondent Viewpoint
1 2 3 4 5
1 AUD01 0.2993 0.4526* -0.0142 0.2377 0.1275
2 AUD02 0.5470 0.3038 0.3348 0.3235 0.2809
3 AUD03 0.2152 -0.0344 0.2664 0.2079 0.6125*
4 AUD04 0.2544 0.1912 -0.0398 0.5559* 0.1027
5 AUD05 0.2043 0.4412* 0.1894 0.1221 -0.0978
6 AUD06 0.3591 0.0862 0.3894 0.0012 0.4416
7 AUD07 0.5405* 0.2410 0.0999 0.0832 0.0739
8 AUD08 0.6216* 0.1294 0.2903 -0.1042 0.2268
9 AUD09 0.4421 0.0099 0.3471 0.1184 0.5535
10 AUD10 -0.1125 0.5903* 0.2972 0.0960 0.2252
11 AUD11 0.5628* 0.2700 0.2991 0.3324 0.1353
12 AUD12 0.1962 0.5826* 0.0464 0.2276 0.3070
13 AUD13 0.4736* 0.2029 0.2568 0.1335 0.1856
14 AUD14 0.2388 0.1742 0.3367 0.5581 0.4420
15 AUD15 0.4887 0.1167 0.3275 0.5606 0.1375
16 AUD16 0.4973 0.2995 0.3756 0.3594 0.1697
17 AUD17 0.1981 -0.0847 0.1009 0.1736 0.5610*
18 AUD18 0.6107* -0.0103 0.0392 0.4133 0.1108
19 AUD19 0.5837 0.0426 0.1333 0.3767 0.4479
20 AUD20 0.2064 0.2845 -0.3177 0.4194 0.3781
21 AUD21 0.1185 0.2971 0.0825 0.3890 0.2115
22 AUD22 0.1246 0.0294 0.4959* 0.2131 -0.1587
23 AUD23 0.4330 -0.1620 0.2456 0.5298 0.2759
24 AUD24 0.5432 0.3415 0.0812 0.3815 0.4756
25 AUD25 0.2987 0.3665 0.4480 0.1061 0.2518
26 AUD26 0.2001 0.1045 0.7916* 0.2288 0.1593
27 AEE01 0.4521 0.0612 0.4232 0.4427 0.1995
28 AEE02 0.1142 0.2088 0.1132 0.3032 0.5451*
29 AEE03 -0.0150 0.1678 0.0930 0.4708* 0.3747
30 AEE04 0.1729 0.0388 0.4536* 0.0714 0.3575
31 AEE05 0.1045 0.1453 0.6129* 0.3538 0.2256
32 AEE06 0.1417 0.0480 0.5325* 0.2948 0.1807
33 AEE07 0.3477 -0.0029 0.1830 0.5804* 0.2741
34 AEE08 0.4990* 0.0993 0.2519 0.1215 0.1954
35 AEE09 0.7021* 0.2966 0.0315 0.1207 0.1669
36 AEE10 0.1819 0.3036 0.3706 0.4034 -0.0426
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respondent Viewpoint
1 2 3 4 5
37 AEE11 0.5193 0.0007 0.3001 0.5256 0.1759
38 AEE12 0.2930 0.2972 0.2063 0.5069* 0.0042
39 AEE13 0.1553 0.3303 0.0482 0.1395 0.6091*
40 AEE14 0.4394* -0.1970 -0.2451 0.1053 0.1998
41 AEE15 0.4615 0.2806 0.3227 0.0842 0.2732
42 AEE16 -0.0343 0.2863 0.2728 0.2863 -0.2156
43 AEE17 0.4047 -0.0181 0.5493* 0.1625 0.3189
44 AEE18 0.2839 0.2064 0.6533* 0.0152 0.1230
45 AEE19 0.4134 0.0790 0.3488 0.4448 0.4771
46 AEE20 0.1692 -0.0211 0.3189 0.5681* 0.3320
47 AEE21 0.1537 0.7135* -0.0012 0.0083 -0.0498
48 AEE22 0.4122 0.0408 0.1910 0.1716 0.5868*
49 AEE23 0.0614 0.0562 0.7261* 0.0897 0.2726
50 AEE24 0.4829 0.1913 0.4712 0.0504 0.0694
51 AEE25 -0.0746 0.1500 0.1897 0.4876* 0.1211
52 AEE26 0.6953* 0.0403 0.3420 0.3006 0.1530
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Conclusions
In this final chapter of this thesis we conclude with a discussion on our main findings, the 
theoretical implications of our study as well as the implications for internal auditors and 
management. We furthermore discuss the limitations of our study and give recommenda-
tions for further research. This chapter ends with a brief reflection by the author of this thesis 
about the research as a whole.
6.1 DIscussIon of thE mAIn fInDIngs
In chapter 2 throughout 5 of this thesis we studied different factors influencing deaf 
effect for risk warning as indicator for IA effectiveness. We answered the research ques-
tions of each individual study thereby providing important findings. In this Chapter we 
discuss these findings in relation to the objective of this study being as follows.
1. Identifying and recommending additional approaches and factors from the ‘demand-
side’ perspective of IA effectiveness for reducing deaf effect and hence improving IA 
effectiveness; 
2. Examining the main causal effects including additional contingency factors such as 
organization power of the internal auditor operationalized through top manage-
ment support, nudging concepts including descriptive social norms and their inter-
action effects from the collaborative partner vs. opponent perspective. Additionally, 
we examined what constitutes the right ‘timing’ for communicating the risk warning 
message by the internal auditor and its main causal effects on IA effectiveness;
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3. Combining both the ‘supply’ and the ‘demand’ side perspective of the IA effective-
ness for finding better ways for meeting customer expectations.
In Chapter 2 and 3 a manager acts in the role of project owner who is not willing to listen 
to the risk warning message that continuation of an information systems project is not 
reasonable and the project should be redirected or discontinued. In Chapter 4 and 5 a 
manager acts in the role of an auditee (management) who is not willing to listen to the 
risk warning message related to risks involved in management’s decision making in the 
organization in general. The messenger providing the risk warnings in our study is the 
internal auditor who is a credible source that makes true assertions based on thorough 
investigation in conformity with the internal auditing standards and requirements.
In Chapter 2 we demonstrated our 2x2 laboratory study on how organization power 
through top management support of internal audit influences deaf effect on escalating 
information systems project as an indicator of IA effectiveness. In the following 2x2 labo-
ratory study described in Chapter 3 we included nudging concepts through descriptive 
social norm and investigated how this could be of influence on the IA effectiveness. In 
both studies we included the collaborative partner vs opponent relationship between 
the internal auditor (the messenger of risk warnings (bad news)) and the project owner 
(management – decision maker). In Chapter 4 we described our exploratory study that 
examined what determines the right timing for communicating of the risk warning 
message by the internal auditor. Chapter 5 describes the follow up of the previous 
study by applying a Q methodology (a mix of qualitative and quantitative approach) 
investigating what are the views of internal auditor and the auditees about the impor-
tance of timing to the IA effectiveness. Most prior academic research on IA effectiveness 
investigated factors influencing IA effectiveness from the ‘supply-side’ perspective. The 
‘demand-side’ perspective is less examined. The contribution of our studies to existing 
academic research is that we centred our studies around the ‘demand-side’ perspective 
of IA effectiveness. Furthermore, by using (to our knowledge) different approaches to 
address IA effectiveness, we contributed to existing research by identifying additional 
factors of IA effectiveness, linking the ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side with each other.
Combining the findings of our studies we draw the following conclusions:
conclusion 1: being a collaborative partner and highly supported by top 
management is not always an advantage for the internal auditor
Chapter 2 studied the effect of organization power through top management support on 
the deaf effect for risk warnings (as an indicator for IA effectiveness) by the internal audi-
tor in escalating information systems-projects. In an experiment setting we examined 
the main effects of the partnership relation of the auditor with management and the 
organization power variables on the deaf effect for risk warnings. We also manipulated 
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organization power of the internal auditor through top management support as a mod-
erator variable to examine whether this influence of the partnership relation on the deaf 
effect is made stronger of weaker by either a high or a low organization power through 
top management support. Although one may think the hypotheses in our experiment 
were not difficult to predict, yet our results were surprising and brought originality in 
this area of academic research. More specifically, our results showed that top manage-
ment support does not necessarily have a positive influence on the deaf effect (and 
hence IA effectiveness) as there were no significant main effects of organization power 
on the deaf effect. While it may seem to be logical that in the high organization power 
conditions decision makers are more likely to follow any advice, regardless whether the 
message comes from a collaborative partner or an opponent, our findings suggested 
this can even be contra-productive when the internal auditor is seen as a collaborative 
partner. However, our study provides evidence that high organization power through 
top management support is helpful and even necessary for reducing the deaf effect on 
risk warnings when the internal auditor is seen as an opponent.
conclusion 2: nudging can be a new way to increase IA effectiveness especially 
when the internal auditor is a collaborative partner to management
The internal auditors focus more on enforced adherence by management to pre-defined 
rules and regulations rather than using non-forced compliance ways to influence de-
cision makers. Previous studies have shown that that small changes in the way how 
information about choices is presented (commonly referred to as “choice architecture”) 
can alter people’s behaviour in a predictable way while preserving freedom of choice. 
Drawing on research from behavioural economics, in Chapter 3 we examine the concept 
of nudging with descriptive social norms as a technique that internal auditors could 
use to help overcome deaf effect on risk warnings. As such, this study extends exist-
ing research on deaf effect and IA effectiveness by being presumably a first attempt to 
apply nudging concepts in relation to IA effectiveness. We conducted an experiment 
to investigate the main effects of descriptive social norms on deaf effect and the in-
teraction of messenger-recipient relationship (collaborative partner vs opponent) and 
descriptive social norms. We furthermore provided more evidence for the main effect 
of the messenger-recipient relationship on the deaf effect. The findings of this empirical 
study indicate that nudging through descriptive social norm can be used by the internal 
auditor to increase IA effectiveness by overcoming the deaf effect response to their 
risk warnings to management. Including a descriptive social norm as part of the risk 
warning message of the internal auditor in our experiment appeared to be useful as 
it significantly reduced the deaf effect response by the message recipient. Descriptive 
social norm can be even more useful when the messenger is seen as a collaborative 
partner. When the internal auditor is seen as an opponent, nudging with a descriptive 
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social norm is ineffective, so there is no guarantee that providing a descriptive social 
norm will work as intended. To conclude on this section, nudging with social descriptive 
norms can be used by the internal auditors to improve effectiveness.
conclusion 3: the timing of the communication of the risk warning message by the 
internal auditor influences IA effectiveness
Chapter 4 extends existing research on timing. To our knowledge timing has not been 
addressed as a factor influencing IA effectiveness in academic research. In our study we 
hypothesized that the right timing of the communication of the risk warning message 
by the internal auditor (not too early, not too late) could be of influence on the willing-
ness of the auditees to listen or not to listen to the auditors message (deaf effect) and 
hence on the IA effectiveness. Our study was exploratory in its nature, which involved 
focus groups interviews aiming at firstly identifying the factors that determine the right 
timing. Based on analysis of the focus groups interviews, our results revealed multiple 
and diverse factors that determine the right timing for communicating the risk warning 
message by the internal auditor, dependable whether these were indicated by the audi-
tees or the internal auditors. Based on the results, in our study we proposed grouping of 
the identified timing factors in three groups: 
1. Standard timing factors emerging from regular ‘business as usual’ situations. Ex-
amples are timing factors related to alignment, audit procedures, auditee’s agenda;
2. Mandatory timing factors emerging from regulator’s requests that are unavoidable 
and cannot be postponed; 
3. Special timing factors emerging from exceptional (more complex) situations that 
require special attention by the auditees and auditors. Examples are timing factors 
related to incidents, audit issue risk classification, change, strategic events, projects, 
audits abroad, soft controls audits.
Although it will require further research, we assume these various timing factors could 
have an important impact on the future internal auditor’s skills required for most ef-
fectively execution of the audit assignments. We suggest that higher professional skills 
would be required from an internal auditor performing special, more complex assign-
ments related to unanticipated events, compared to standard, more predictable assign-
ments whereby ‘ticking the box’ may be done by less skilled internal auditors.
Interestingly, that the timing can be an important factor for IA effectiveness was 
unknown issue till we addressed it in our interviews (the participants experienced our 
interviews as an ‘eye opener’ as they acknowledged to have not thought of the timing 
factors in relation with IA effectiveness before). The information we identified in our 
study could be of use to the internal auditors and the auditees to enter into a discus-
sion with each other and align their understanding as to when is the right timing for 
communicating risk warning message by the internal auditor so that the auditees will 
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be willing to listen more to this risk warning message. Hence, this will have a favourable 
effect on IA effectiveness. 
conclusion 4: there is no recipe for the right timing for communication of the risk 
warning by the internal auditor 
Chapter 5 extends on the results of Chapter 4 by ranking the identified timing factors 
in the previous study from important to unimportant. In this sturdy we applied a Q-
methodology as we aimed at providing insights into the heterogeneity and the sub-
jectivities in views of internal auditors and auditees about the timing factors relevant 
to the IA effectiveness. Our study identified five distinct views of auditors and auditees 
about the importance of the factors that determine the right moment (i.e. not too early, 
not too late) for the internal auditor to communicate the risk warning message to the 
auditee. While in the first viewpoint the auditors and auditees consider that important 
issues should be communicated immediately to auditees, no matter of other conditions 
such as e.g. the stage of the audit investigation and having collected sufficient factual 
evidence, in the second viewpoint the most important precondition for the right timing 
is to establish good relation with the auditees first.  The former was less expected to be 
found among the internal auditors given the independent role of the internal auditor. In 
this respect, we feel there is in a way some tension between the independent role of the 
internal auditor in the organization and their emphasize on having a good relation with 
management. The third viewpoint clearly states that the right timing for communication 
of the risk warning messages in project/change situations is during the project/change 
and not afterwards when taking corrective actions are not possible or will cost more 
money. The fourth viewpoint was about having sufficient evidence by the internal audi-
tor before the risk warning message is communicated to the auditees, which is in line 
with the internal auditor’s standards and audit procedures. Finally, the fifth viewpoint 
emphasizes the importance of communicating the risk warnings immediately, but still 
independently of preferences of others. This viewpoint emphasized that the internal 
auditor should be and remain independent when choosing the right timing for the 
communication of the risk warning message.  
We cannot link any of these five viewpoints specifically to the group of internal audi-
tors or the group of auditees as they were all shared among the internal auditors and 
the auditees. Based on the results of this study, we can point out that the early com-
munication of risk warnings, immediately when the issue is observed stands central to 
all identified viewpoints shared between the internal auditors and the auditees. As each 
viewpoint in our study outlines different conditions which determine the right timing, 
our study cannot neither give recommendation to the internal auditors to always com-
municate the risk warning messages to the auditees immediately nor recipe for deter-
mining when is the time right to communicate the risk warning to the auditee. However, 
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the five viewpoints resulting from our study are now available and can be used by both 
the internal auditors and auditees to determine the right timing of the risk warnings 
messages communication and hence contribute to increase of IA effectiveness.
6.2 ImPlIcAtIons for IntErnAl AuDIt
Our studies have implications for the effectiveness of internal audit from the perspective 
of communication of the risk warnings. It is not our aim to issue a recipe to the internal 
auditor on how to maximize IA effectiveness, but we give some recommendations to 
internal audit that could positively contribute to the IA effectiveness.
recommendation 1: build a collaborative partnership relation with 
management
Our empirical studies described in Chapter 2 and 3 provided supporting evidence to 
previous research that an internal auditor who has a history of being a collaborative 
partner to management can increase IA effectiveness by reducing the deaf effect of the 
risk warnings communicated by the internal auditor. The results of our studies show that 
organization power through top management support and nudging have greater effect 
on reducing deafness to risk warnings and hence increasing IA effectiveness when the 
internal auditor has a collaborative partnership relation with management. Besides, our 
studies described in Chapter 4 and 5 showed that the right timing for communication 
of the internal auditor’s risk warning message can be best determined in dialogue with 
management, which enhances the collaborative partnership relation between the inter-
nal auditors and their auditees. Next to the results of our studies, the importance of this 
collaborative partnership relation with management can also be illustrated with one 
example from practice. One senior audit manager from a large bank in The Netherlands 
had an interesting idea for an audit approach that fosters the collaborative partner-
ship principles on the basis of nudging. Namely, senior management of the audited 
department was invited in a closing meeting session that was set up as a ‘story walk’ 
fashion. In this session, the internal auditors presented their risk warning messages i.e., 
the audit findings and identified risks. Looking for new ways to show the collaborative 
partnership, the senior audit manager decided to organize the closing meeting in an un-
conventional way i.e., not in an office at a table where management sits at one side and 
internal auditors at the opposite side, but a session in which audit findings (risk warning 
messages) were illustrated on posters hanging on the wall. In this session, management 
was taken through each poster by the audit team members discussing the audit issues. 
Thereafter, management was asked to define actions and put these on a post it, while 
the audit team was walking around to take up any additional questions or concerns of 
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participating management. Actions were defined and agreed with management at the 
spot and management showed strong commitment to resolve the issues. At the end of 
this session we received a very positive feedback from the auditee about the way how 
this closing meeting was set up and how the internal auditors guided them throughout 
the process. Our example illustrates how the deaf effect for the risk warnings can be 
reduced or eliminated in a creative way. We therefore encourage the internal auditors 
to invest in advancement of the collaborative partnership relation with management as 
this relation is important for the IA effectiveness.   
recommendation 2: make use of top management support
While our study did not provide strong empirical evidence that the organization power 
of Internal Audit through top management support has a significant positive influence 
on the deaf effect (and hence IA effectiveness), still there are important practical implica-
tions for the internal auditors, especially in conditions when the internal auditor is seen 
as an opponent by management.  In this condition, top management support is helpful 
and even necessary for reducing the deaf effect on risk warnings. Our findings suggest 
that top management support can even be contra-productive when the internal auditor 
is seen as a collaborative partner resulting in increase of the deaf effect for risk warnings. 
With this study we aim to increase awareness of the internal auditors that when their or-
ganization power through top management support is strong, it does not always mean 
that management is more likely to follow any advice, regardless whether the message 
comes from a collaborative partner or an opponent. By increasing awareness of internal 
auditors about the effects on top management support on deaf effect and hence IA 
effectiveness, we aim to help internal auditors to identify and avoid situations where 
well intended actions could have adverse effects on IA effectiveness.
recommendation 3: you can use contingency approach on collaborative 
partnership vs opponent roles
Another suggestion for increasing IA effectiveness provided by our study relates to 
the contingency approach with regard to the collaborative partner vs opponent roles, 
that the internal auditor can use in different circumstances. As elaborated earlier in this 
thesis, great top management support is most helpful when the internal auditor is seen 
as an opponent. When the internal auditor is seen as a collaborative partner by manage-
ment, the deafness for the internal auditor’s risk warning will be reduced; however this 
is not always a guarantee that management will listen to the risk warning of the internal 
auditor. As our study showed, the combination of a great top management support and 
being a collaborative partner to management does not make management to listen 
more to the risk warnings by the internal auditor, but this combination can even backfire 
and bring opposite effect than desired. Although we have not investigated how much 
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top management support is enough for a collaborative partner to be most effective, we 
assume that these undesired effects will occur when top management support appears 
to be too much in combination with the collaborative partnership of the internal audi-
tor. We assume this could also potentially have implications for the internal auditor who 
is seen as a collaborative partner and as such uses nudging by including descriptive 
social norm in the communication of the risk warnings. Although we need to further in-
vestigate, this could imply that in circumstances of combination of having too much top 
management support and use of nudging with social descriptive norm by the internal 
auditor who is seen as a collaborative partner, the great top management support may 
also have adverse effects on the nudging as it will presumably not work as intended.  
With our study we aim to increase awareness of internal auditors that being a collab-
orative partner in combination with other factors will not always increase IA effectiveness 
and that there is a contingency approach regarding their roles in the organization (col-
laborative partner vs opponent). That the contingency approach is needed for effective 
corporate governance in organizations is also recognized and recommended by Davis et 
al, (1997) who suggest the Agency and Stewardship approaches to be complementary and 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) claim that these two theories need each other. Knowing 
this and based on the results of our studies, we recommend internal auditors to look for 
possibilities to use these two roles effectively (e.g. switch from one to another role or com-
bine both roles) in different circumstances (e.g. high versus low top management support 
with or without nudging) to decrease deafness for the risk warnings of the internal auditor. 
recommendation 4: make use of nudging
One recommendation for increasing management’s willingness to listen more to the risk 
warning message of the internal auditor is related to the nudging concepts. Our study 
showed the internal auditors can nudge auditees through inclusion of a descriptive 
social norm as part of their risk warning message. Nudging in a positive way by includ-
ing a descriptive social norm in the risk warning message is useful as it could prevent 
management continuing course of action in spite of risks. It is important internal audi-
tors to be aware that nudging can be used in the communication of their risk warnings 
to management and that nudging in combination with collaborative partnership by the 
internal auditor reduces deaf effect and thus has positive effects on IA effectiveness. We 
encourage internal auditors to start experimenting with nudging not only by including 
descriptive social norms in their communication but also try out other nudging ways 
to influence management to listen more to their risk warnings in risky situations. We 
suggest nudging is something  that needs more attention in the professional practices 
of internal auditors as it could have a lot of untapped potential for increasing impact. 
Conclusions 147
recommendation 5: Discuss ‘the right timing’ with Auditees with help of the 
identified five viewpoints 
Our study introduced ‘timing’ as a factor that influences IA effectiveness. We first 
identified what factors determine the ‘right timing’(thus, not too early, not too late) for 
the internal auditor to communicate the risk warning message so that management 
(auditees) will be most willing to listen to this risk warning message. Based on ranking 
of these timing factors from important to unimportant we identified five different sub-
jective viewpoints supported by both the internal auditors and the auditees as to what 
timing factors they find important and unimportant with respect to the right timing for 
the communication of the risk warning message by the internal auditor. In all viewpoints 
the early communication of risk warnings, no matter of other conditions (e.g. sufficient 
audit evidence, finalised phases in the audit, personal preferences of others etc.) takes 
central place in all identified viewpoints by both parties. The results of our study indicate 
that different conditions determine the right timing for communicating the risk warn-
ing by the internal auditor. Additionally, we noticed a certain tension between what 
auditees consider to be important with regard to timing and the auditing standards and 
procedures (objectivity, quality) that the internal auditor is required to comply to. Our 
study cannot provide a straightforward recipe to the internal auditors for finding the 
right timing of communication of the risk warning, but we recommend internal auditors 
to use our five viewpoints in their dialogue with the auditees in determining this right 
timing and by doing so making a bridge and better alignment between the ‘supply’-
side and ‘demand’-side of the IA effectiveness. Our study did not investigate this, but 
perhaps developing an audit approach for conducting a timing analysis comparable to 
the risk analysis the internal auditors must do as part of their audit procedures could be 
of benefit to determine the right timing and hence increase IA effectiveness. 
recommendation 6: Adapt the IA organization to fit the ‘demand-side’ of IA 
effectiveness
The results of our study may have an impact on the current IA organizations and can be 
used as a stepping stone for the IA organizations of the future. Our studies described 
in Chapter 2 and 3 indicated that combining the collaborative partnership vs opponent 
roles of the internal auditor could have the most positive effect on the IA effectiveness. 
This will potentially have consequences for the auditor’s communication skills in such a 
way that the internal auditor should be capable of switching these roles when necessary 
to be most effective. Furthermore, applying of nudging concepts as described in Chapter 
3 of this thesis may imply different skills from the internal auditor (in terms of communica-
tion and behavioural skills) than the standard auditing skills, which will potentially lead to 
different audit approach. The timing factors identified in our studies described in Chapter 
4 and 5 may also impact the internal auditor’s skills as well as the type of engagements 
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that will be executed. More precisely, our study suggests that there are standard timing 
factors related to standard, procedural, or repetitive events in the organization for which 
auditors could be employed that have less demanding skills compared to other timing 
factors arising from more complex strategic decisions and changes in the organization 
for which other, more demanding internal auditor’s skills would be more appropriate. Our 
findings related to the favourable effect of top management support on the IA effective-
ness as well as the views of the internal auditors and the auditees about what constitutes 
the right timing for communicating the risk warnings by the internal auditor, indicate 
that the relation between the internal auditor and the auditee is important for the IA ef-
fectiveness. As the IA organizations are becoming smaller in terms of resources, but larger 
in terms of demand by management and other parties, we recommend internal auditors 
to consider the findings of our studies and start looking outside the box (i.e. outside the 
existing internal auditing standards) to find other (more) effective ways of auditing. This 
way, the IA organization of the future will be capable of meeting the increasing demand 
from management and other stakeholders (‘demand’-side perspective of IA effectiveness).
6.3 ImPlIcAtIons for mAnAgEmEnt
We summarize below the most important recommendations to management about how 
they could use the results of our study to positively contribute to the IA effectiveness. 
recommendation 1: give support to internal audit - but do not overdo
Our results showed that top management support helps management to listen more to 
the internal auditor’s risk warnings leading to improvements in the organization. So, top 
management support is not only useful for the IA effectiveness but top management 
in organizations benefits as well as risks are being eliminated or mitigated as a result of 
the greater impact of the internal auditor. Therefore, we stimulate top management in 
organizations to give support to IA, but would like to draw the attention that too much 
top management support combined with the collaborative partnership of the internal 
auditor will presumably not make management to listen more to the risk warnings of the 
internal auditor. Although we do not know yet what constitutes too much top manage-
ment support, our study indicates there may be a turning point when top management 
support will even increase deafness.
recommendation 2: Address the expectations with regard to timing to the 
internal auditor to manage expectations 
As discussed earlier in this study, the timing of the risk warning message of the internal 
auditor was recognized by both the internal auditors and the auditees as an important 
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factor for IA effectiveness. From our interviews we learned that timing of the risk warn-
ing message is not something that is determined by the internal auditor alone, but it is 
also influenced by the organization dynamics and its management. Also we noted that 
till we did not address timing in our interviews, it was recognized by both the internal 
auditors and auditees they have not thought of it before as an important matter for IA 
effectiveness. We think that addressing timing in discussion between internal auditors 
and auditees to share views about the importance of timing, can help manage expecta-
tions with regard to when the is right moment to hear about the risks identified by the 
internal auditors. By doing so, management will be able to take corrective measures 
timely and consequently IA will be more effective.
recommendation 3: Embrace the new ways of communication of the risk 
warnings by the internal auditors   
The results of our studies revealed additional factors that may be of positive influence to 
the extent the auditees listen to the risk warning messages of the internal auditor. When 
deployed adequately top management support, nudging and timing can be of a great 
help to the internal auditors to decrease deafness to their risk warning messages by the 
auditees and hence increase IA effectiveness. While we recommend internal auditors to 
start experimenting with new audit approaches ‘outside the box’ that include these ad-
ditional factors investigated in our study, we also like to raise awareness of the auditees 
about the application of these new approaches by the internal auditors in near future. 
We invite auditees to embrace these new ways of communication of the risk warnings by 
the internal auditors for the benefit of both parties. With these new approaches manage-
ment may be able to better listen to the internal auditors’ risk warnings and take timely 
the necessary corrective measures. Hence this will help to increase IA effectiveness. 
recommendation 4: use descriptive social norms to your own benefit 
As our study showed, descriptive social norms in organizations, used as nudges by the 
internal auditors in their risk warning messages, can be useful as these increase the 
willingness of management to listen more to these risk warnings and thus influence 
their decision making towards the desired behaviour. We want to raise awareness of 
management that there are various descriptive social norms in the organization that 
can be positively deployed to influence their management decision making. When they 
are already present, management can use them to make right management decisions, 
and presumably by doing so, management can take corrective measures ahead of the 
internal auditor’s risk warnings.
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6.4 ImPlIcAtIons for thEory
Our studies described in this thesis not only further validated some existing but also 
developed some additional measurement instruments that can be of use for future 
experiments in the area of IA effectiveness and broader. We demonstrated that even a 
previously known and studied factors of IA effectiveness (such as top management sup-
port) can have different way of influencing deafness to the risk warnings by the internal 
auditor. 
In our experiments we examined the main causal effects of additional contingency 
factors such as organization power of the internal auditor operationalized in top man-
agement support and nudging concepts including descriptive social norms and their 
interaction effects from the collaborative partner vs. opponent perspective. Additionally, 
we examined what constitutes the right ‘timing’ for communicating the risk warnings by 
the internal auditor as a new contingency factor for IA effectiveness.
Below we elaborate on the theoretical implications of our study.
the ‘demand-side’ perspective of IA effectiveness and its link with the ‘supply-
side’ need attention in IA effectiveness research
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, earlier research on factors influencing IA effectiveness 
has tended to focus predominantly on factors such as the acceptance and implementa-
tion of the audit recommendations, the size of the audit department, compliance with the 
auditing standards, the positioning of the Internal Audit department in the organization 
and relation with the Audit Committee, and interaction with line managers (Arena and 
Azzone, 2009), top management support (Cohen and Sayag, 2010; Van Peursem, 2005; 
Mihret and Yismaw, 2007), staff expertise, executing the audit plan, audit communica-
tion (Mihret and Yismaw, 2007), organizational support’ (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; 
2006b).  When providing a review of the existing empirical literature on IA effectiveness, 
Lenz and Hahn (2015) distinguished two different streams, the ‘supply-side’ perspective, 
i.e. empirical studies based on self-assessments of internal auditors, and the ‘demand-side’ 
perspective, i.e., empirical studies based on other stakeholders’ perspectives. In this thesis, 
we identified causal factors of IA effectiveness (such as nudging and timing), which, to our 
knowledge have received no attention in the field of deaf effect and IA effectiveness litera-
ture. In academic research, in the area of IA effectiveness, most academic studies focused 
on the ‘supply-side’ perspective of the IA effectiveness. The stakeholders (‘demand-side’) 
perspective is under examined area, which was already reported by Lens and Hahn (2015). 
By focusing on the ‘demand-side’ factors of IA effectiveness our study contributes to the 
literature of IA effectiveness by providing more knowledge to better understand these 
factors and their influence on IA effectiveness. On the top of that, our study identified 
some additional factors that may influence IA effectiveness (such as nudging and timing). 
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To our knowledge, our study is the first that connects the ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side’ 
perspective of IA effectiveness with each other by identifying the shared views of the 
internal auditors and management about the importance of timing for IA effectiveness. 
our examined causal factors of IA effectiveness enrich the interpersonal 
relations dimension of IA effectiveness 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis we referred to Lenz et al, (2014) who based on a literature review, 
derived four key dimensions or categorical blocks of effectiveness of the IA function: or-
ganizational factors, IA personality factors, IA processes and IA interpersonal relationships. 
Lenz et al, (2014) regarded the interpersonal factors (such as the relationship between IA 
and senior management and the board/Audit Committee and other third parties) as being 
critical in determining IA effectiveness and consider these to represent a new important 
research field. Based on the results of our study we assume that top management support, 
nudging and timing as causal factors of IA effectiveness reside within the IA interpersonal 
relations dimension, reflecting the ‘demand-side’ perspective (expectations from stake-
holders) as well as the linkage between the ‘supply- side’ (Internal Audit) and ‘demand-side’ 
perspective of the IA effectiveness. Our contribution to the interpersonal relations dimen-
sion of the existing model of building blocks of IA is shown in Figure 6-1 below.
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Figure 6-1. Contribution to existing model of building blocks of IA characteristics 
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Agency theory and stewardship theory principles strengthen each other in 
favour of  IA effectiveness 
Our study further examined the choice between Agency and Stewardship relationships 
by including interaction effects between the relationship and other organizational or 
psychological factors such as top management support, nudging and timing. By inves-
tigating how other factors influence IA effectiveness in combination with the collabora-
tive partnership vs opponent roles of the internal auditor, our study indicates that the 
collaborative partnership and opponent roles could be combined by IA organizations to 
become more effective.  This is supported by our two experiments described in Chapter 2 
and 3 of this thesis that use the principles of Agency and the Stewardship Theory, focus-
sing on the deaf effect as a measurable exhibition of IA effectiveness. Previous research 
empirical research provided evidence that managers (project owners) are more likely to 
listen to the risk warnings from an internal auditor who is seen as a collaborative partner 
but they are less motivated intrinsically to listen to the risk warning, when the messen-
ger is seen as an opponent. Our study described in Chapter 2 demonstrated that when 
the internal auditor is seen as a collaborative partner by management in combination 
with (too)high organization power through top management support, this is not always 
a guarantee that deafness to the risk warnings of the internal auditor will be reduced, 
but in contrary, it can have adverse effect on deafness and hence on the IA effective-
ness. In this case, our study showed the it would be most useful the internal auditor to 
have the opponent role. Although it needs further investigation, the results of our study 
described in Chapter 2 in combination with the results of the study described in Chapter 
3, presumably indicate that in circumstances when the internal auditor obtains great 
top management support, the nudging through descriptive social norm by the internal 
auditor who is seen as a collaborative partner will also be ineffective because of this 
great top management support. So, our studies indicated that the collaborative partner-
ship and opponent roles should be considered as complementary to each other and be 
combined by the internal auditor in favour of the IA effectiveness. From a theoretical 
perspective, this confirms that the Agency and Stewardship Theory are complementary 
and need each other for building effective organizations, which supports the theory 
assumptions of Davis et al, (1997) and Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003). 
Next, the results of our the study on timing factors described in Chapter 4 and 5 sup-
port the concepts of the Stewardship Theory. As discussed earlier in this thesis, instead 
of rules and control mechanisms applied in the Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory 
is based upon collaboration and trust among actors in organizations, clarity of the 
organizational strategy and intrinsic motivation, which in turn, results in actors acting in 
service to the organization (Hernandez, 2008). Resulting in several viewpoints about the 
importance of timing for IA effectiveness that were supported by both internal auditors 
and the auditees, our study indicates that the internal auditor should look for collabora-
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tion and congruencies with the auditees with respect to the timing when a risk warning 
should be communicated (risks must be shared with and not thrown to the auditees 
over the fence). This foresters the interpersonal relations of the internal auditor with 
management, which ultimately will lead to increased IA effectiveness. 
behavioural aspects can influence IA effectiveness
Further, our study delivers important contribution to the literature of IA effectiveness 
from the perspective of the communication of the risk warning messages by internal 
auditors. Prior research on factors influencing IA effectiveness has tended to focus 
predominantly on factors such as ‘organizational support’ (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006a; 
2006b); the acceptance and implementation of the audit recommendations, the size 
of the audit department the positioning of the IA department in the organization and 
relation with the Audit Committee (Arena and Azzone, 2009), top management support 
(Cohen and Sayag, 2010; Van Peursem, 2005; Mihret and Yismaw, 2007). Research on 
other additional factors from a human behaviour perspective influencing effectiveness 
of IA is limited. In our experiment described in Chapter 3 we included nudging with 
descriptive social norm in the risk warning message of the internal auditor to influence 
the project owner in taking the decision to continue or redirect an IT-project. With this, 
we contributed to the literature of IA effectiveness by providing some evidence that 
human behavioural aspects could be of benefit to Internal Audit and its effectiveness.
timing is a causal factor of IA effectiveness and should be further explored
Finally, our studies described in Chapter 4 and 5 are to our knowledge, the first that 
explored what factors constitute the right timing for the internal auditor to decrease 
deafness by management on the risk warnings and hence increase IA effectiveness and 
how is the importance of these factors viewed by both the internal auditors and auditees. 
If timing is not properly managed this could result in deaf effect for the risk warning mes-
sages of the internal auditor. We assume our study on timing provided important material 
that could be potentially used in further research of timing issues based on the concepts 
of Music Theory, similar to the study of Albert and Bell (2002). Next, our study on timing 
could open up interesting research questions for further empirical studies on the skills 
and competencies of the internal auditor related to specific types of timing factors that 
are required within the IA function to manage expectations with management and meet 
the required level of IA effectiveness. Also the question ‘what constitutes right timing for 
communicating risk warnings by the internal auditor’ could be explored in different set-
tings, such as other financial or non-financial organizations, other countries and cultures. 
summary of our theoretical contribution
Figure 6-2 depicts an overview the theoretical contribution of our study.
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In table 6-1 below we show a refined description the contribution of our study to exist-
ing literature. 
table 6-1. Contribution of this study
contribution replication Extension Innovation
theory Stewardship Theory (C2, C3) - -
methodology Deaf effect (C2, C3) Nudging (C3) Timing (C4)
Application Collab Partner/ Opponent relation (C2, 
C3)
Deaf effect (C2, C3)
Top management 
support (C2)
Nudging (C3)
Timing (C4)
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6.5 lImItAtIons & furthEr rEsEArch
Our study has several limitations and therefore any generalization of the findings of this 
study to other settings should be treated with caution. In the separate Chapters of this 
thesis we described the limitations comprehensively. In this paragraph we elaborate the 
most important limitations applying to our study and give several recommendations for 
further research. 
One limitation refers to the choice for a laboratory experiment in the studies described 
in Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis. Conducting a laboratory experiment allowed us to test 
causal relationships and achieve high internal validity, but at some cost for the external 
validity. To achieve a high level of internal validity and high degree of control, our stud-
ies took a necessarily narrow focus and involved a small number of variables. Hence, in 
our experimental approach we were unable to include all the complexities of real work 
situations and the effects observed in the laboratory settings may not occur in real live 
situations. This trade-off of higher internal validity for lower external validity is common 
in laboratory experiments and should not be considered to be a flaw. At the same time, 
any generalization of the findings of this study to other settings should be done with 
caution. 
We compensated for the above limitation by using a multi-method approach in 
our study, consisting of a combination of quantitative and qualitative research. We 
studied the IA effectiveness phenomenon from various perspectives and hence used a 
convergent research methodology, called triangulation (Webb et al, 1966). Jick (1979) 
promotes the idea that quantitative and qualitative research could be complementary. 
He also suggested that triangulation, in addition to bringing validation and reliability, 
also enables researchers to capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal 
of the units under study. To achieve triangulation in research methods we combined two 
laboratory experiments, exploratory study by Focus Groups and a Q methodological 
study (combination of qualitative and quantitative method) in order to obtain insight 
into how the deaf effect for risk warnings could be influenced. The two laboratory 
experiments provided us with methodological strength with regard to the precision of 
measurement and deduction by testing a set of theoretically determined hypotheses 
(Nuijten, 2012). The qualitative study with Focus Groups provided more insight into the 
factors influencing deafness. The Q methodological study provided further insight from 
the interviews, delivering interesting viewpoints about the importance of timing for the 
IA effectiveness that could be interesting for further research.
Another limitation relates to the use of student participants in these two studies that 
could also limit the external validity of our results. Although students often serve as 
valid surrogates for managers in this type of research, we conducted further research 
to determine if these findings can be replicated with more experienced participants. 
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To replicate our nudging experiment with practitioners described in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, we first conducted a pilot with managers from real organizations through Qual-
trics. In our pilot we tested with 44 managers. We defined selection criteria and filtered 
the results on these criteria (native English speaker, country of origin United States, role 
manager, limitation of time for completing the questions, attention filter, control ques-
tions). Prior to launching the pilot with the requested 44 participants, we tested with 15 
participants in order to check the set-up of the experiment and take out any mistakes. 
As we concluded that 15 participants did not provide for sufficient information to be 
able to decide to conduct the real experiment or not, we proceeded with the execution 
of the pilot with 44 participants. Despite the filters and several testing attempts with 
Qualtrics, the quality of data was poor leading us to the decision not to proceed with the 
experiment. This decision was also supported by the results of the moderation analy-
sis we performed in SPSS showing that the interaction effect between SocNorm and 
Continue was not only inconsistent with our expectations but also not logical (e.g. the 
deaf effect was significantly increased when the message including descriptive social 
norm was communicated by an internal auditor who is seen as a collaborative partner 
but when the message including descriptive social norm was communicated by internal 
auditor who is seen as an opponent, the deaf effect was significantly reduced).  
Based on our experience with this pilot, we think online providers could not be appro-
priate for laboratory experiments with practitioners due to the risk of poor data quality, 
the required level of control and the required internal and external validity.  Therefore 
we recommend in further research to replicate our experiments on the organization 
power and nudging part in different experimental conditions with more experienced 
participants, although it may be difficult to have large number of practitioners in a lab 
at one time and one place.
The next limitation refers to our measures of the OrgPower and SocNorm constructs 
in the studies described in respectively Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis in the context 
of internal auditor – project owner relationship. These constructs were self-developed 
given our particular level (inter personal) and context. Although they were derived from 
literature, tested and improved in the preparations of this study and shared with experts, 
refinement and testing is recommended in further research.   
As elaborated earlier in this thesis, our study on organization power of the internal 
auditor through top management support suggested that there is turning point when 
top management support can have undesired effects and even increase deafness to 
the risk warnings of the internal auditor. In future research it would be interesting to 
confirm these findings by replicating the experiment with practitioners from the field. 
Also in future research it would be interesting to investigate what constitutes high top 
management support and at what turning point top management support will be 
contra effective. Further, in future research it could be interesting to investigate the long 
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run effects of top management support on the relation between the internal auditor 
and management and hence on the effectiveness of IA.  As discussed earlier in Chapter 
2 of this thesis, our study investigated how the opponent and collaborative partner role 
interact with organization power of the internal auditor. Knowing the effects thereof on 
deaf effect, the internal auditor could consider the possibilities for switching between 
these two roles to achieve less deaf effect on the risk warnings and hence increase inter-
nal audit effectiveness. We assume, the results of our study could help internal auditors 
to upgrade the internal audit profession by improving their skills and expertise to be 
able  to deploy the collaborative partnership versus opponent roles in communication 
of the risk warnings more effectively. We encourage other researches to further explore 
this challenging area of internal audit effectiveness. 
Further, in our study we used top management support to internal auditors in the 
organization as an operational measure of organization power of the internal auditor. 
Next to the support from superiors, Near and Miceli (1995) measure the whistle-blower’s 
power variable by other several operational measures such as position in hierarchy, pay 
grade, value congruence power, professional status, education level, tenure, minority 
influence, lack of retaliation, and individual power membership in majority group. In 
future research it could be investigated how these operational measures of organization 
power can influence deaf effect on risk warnings as an indicator of IA effectiveness.  
As to the study described in Chapter 3, we limited our experiment to using a social 
descriptive norm as a nudge included in the risk warning message of the internal audi-
tor. From literature we know that other forms of nudging could be deployed to change 
human behavior (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). In future research, in an experimental 
design, it could be investigated for example, how nudging with implementation plans 
or how sequence of the auditor’s recommendations or timing factors influence deaf-
ness of management to risk warnings of the internal auditor. In addition, based on the 
EAST (Easy, Attractive, Social and Timely) assumptions for influencing human behaviour, 
we assume timing may also be effectively deployed to nudge auditees into the right 
direction (i.e. to better listen to the internal auditor’s risk warnings) and we encourage 
future research of this topic as well. Similarly to our study in Chapter 2, in future research 
it could be interesting to investigate whether the effects of nudging management by 
the internal auditor on long run would be still effective and favourable for the relation 
between the internal auditor and management and hence for the effectiveness of IA.
There are also limitations related to our exploratory studies described in Chapter 4 
and 5 of this thesis. The interviews conducted as part of these studies were held with 
participants with Dutch nationality working within one large bank in The Netherlands. 
This choice is defendable given the focus of these two studies. We did not expect to 
identify different results in comparable larger banks in The Netherlands as these, simi-
larly to our selected bank, at the time of our study, were subject to important strategic 
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developments resulting in increased attention to the timing issues. Still, we recommend 
further study with respondents from other large banks in The Netherlands, but also 
abroad to confirm this expectation. The results could be different in other settings and 
generalization of our findings to other companies and countries should be done with 
care. Other factors may also affect the effectiveness of the internal auditor’s communica-
tion of the risk warning message, like for instance cultural aspects, type of audits, type 
of company etc. and we recommend further research taking into account these aspects. 
Our studies on the timing factors described in Chapter 4 and 5 revealed that the tim-
ing factors determining the right moment for communicating the risk warning message 
by the internal auditor may also impact the internal auditor’s skills and competencies. 
Identifying the right timing for communicating the risk warning message to manage-
ment in complex and unanticipated events (e.g. strategic changes) would presumably 
require other skills and competencies from the internal auditor compared to other less 
complex situations (e.g. mandatory or repetitive events). Therefore, an interesting future 
research in this respect could be to investigate what specific skills and competencies are 
required from the internal auditor so that he will be able to identify the right timing for 
communicating the risk warning message. 
Our studies will potentially have consequences for the auditor’s communication skills 
in such a way that the internal auditor should be capable of switching the collaborative 
parner vs opponent roles when necessary to be most effective. Furthermore, applying 
of nudging concepts as described in Chapter 3 of this thesis may imply different skills 
from the internal auditor (in terms of communication and behavioural skills) than the 
standard auditing skills, which will potentially lead to different audit approach. In this 
respect, it could be interesting for others to investigate further what will be the required 
skills set of the internal auditor to achieve greater IA effectiveness.
In our study we focus on communication of ‘bad news’ messages i.e. messages about 
risks that threaten the organization. Communication of positive messages by the in-
ternal auditor were not part of our study as we considered these kind of messages do 
not impair the effectiveness of the IA. We assume there are different timing factors for 
communicating of ‘good news’ that could potentially be an interesting future research.
As mentioned before in this thesis, our study focussed on the ‘demand-side’ perspec-
tive of IA effectiveness. Our study is perhaps a first study in the area of IA effectiveness 
that connected the ‘supply-side’ with the ‘demand-side’ perspective of the IA effective-
ness by asking auditors and auditees to discuss timing in order to arrive together at 
shared views on the importance of timing for IA effectiveness. We believe this topic has 
a lot of potential for future research and we support researches in investigating more 
factors of IA effectiveness from both the ‘supply-side’ and demand-side’ perspective and 
all together.  
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As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, we situated our studies within the interper-
sonal relations dimension of the IA effectiveness (Lenz et al, 2014). The findings of our 
studies enrich this dimension with additional factors influencing the IA effectiveness, 
which could potentially have important influence on the other three dimensions of the 
IA effectiveness (IA organization, IA personality factors (resources), and the IA processes). 
In this thesis we made several assumptions about what these influences could be and 
we consider this as an important research field for future researchers. 
In our study we focused on the decision making processes at inter-personal (indi-
vidual) level: with the internal auditor as provider of the risk warning message and with 
the decision taker’s view on the messenger (as a collaborative partner or an opponent). 
We did not study the possible effects of decision making at a department-level or at an 
organizational level. To obtain more insight into the dynamic processes of group deci-
sion making and consequences thereof, we would recommend further research based 
not only on behavioural theories but also making use of Sociological theories. 
One final remark we want to make here with respect to research implications of our 
study, is that from our literature review we noticed that Agency Theory is a dominant 
paradigm used in academic research of IA effectiveness and therefore we encourage 
further academic research of IA effectiveness from a Stewardship Theory perspective. 
Additionally, the findings of our study showed that Agency and the Stewardship prin-
ciples cannot be always used isolated of each other and a combination of both could be 
necessary to achieve greater IA effectiveness. We encourage others to further investigate 
whether this combination is possible, what are the consequences of this combination 
for the IA effectiveness and the IA organization in general and the way of auditing in 
particular.
6.5 EPIlog
By studying IA effectiveness through deaf effect our study aimed at not only identifying 
additional causal factors influencing IA effectiveness, but also finding out whether deaf 
effect for risk warning messages of the internal auditor can be studied by applying dif-
ferent approaches. Studies on IA effectiveness have focused mostly on the ‘supply-side’ 
perspective (the internal auditors) of IA effectiveness and the ‘demand-side’ perspective 
(stakeholders expectations) is not very much examined area. While most of the studies 
in the area of IA effectiveness have focussed on factors influencing IA effectiveness such 
as e.g.  realization of the audit plan, number of issued reports, implemented recom-
mendations and the like, our study made a first step towards investigating how other, 
more behavioural related factors may be of benefit to the IA effectiveness. Our study 
found evidence that such factors like organization power of the internal auditor through 
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top management support, nudging and timing can be important for IA effectiveness 
and that internal auditors should look outside the box (i.e. outside the ‘dominant logic’ 
based on the auditing standards) to find other ways to increase effectiveness. While top 
management support has been addressed by few researches in the field of IA effective-
ness, we think our study provided interesting and surprising results from the interaction 
effects, indicating that top management support is not always a guarantee for reducing 
deafness on risk warnings of the internal auditor. From our studies it appeared that there 
is a contingency approach with regard to the collaborative partner vs opponent role of 
the internal auditor and the internal auditor should be smart in combining these roles 
in achieving greater effectiveness. Further, based on literature review we think our study 
is the first attempt to link nudging to deaf effect and hence IA effectiveness. Our study 
provided evidence that internal auditors can include nudging with descriptive social 
norms in their risk warning message communication to management and this can be 
helpful to reduce deaf effect. We encourage academic researchers as well as internal 
auditors to investigate how other ways of nudging affects the willingness of manage-
ment to listen or not to listen to the risk warnings of the internal auditor. Furthermore, 
to our knowledge, our study is a first study within the IA effectiveness research that 
investigated timing in relation to IA effectiveness, thereby linking the ‘supply-side’ and 
the ‘demand-side’ perspective of the IA effectiveness with each other. We are happy to 
see timing is recognized by both internal auditors and management as an important 
factor for IA effectiveness. Although the effects of timing needs further research, we 
encourage internal auditors to use the five viewpoints we made available through this 
study, to find out the right timing to communicate the risk warning messages. A lot 
of work has been invested in our studies aiming at providing reliable and hopefully, 
interesting results that can be used by academics and practitioners. We believe that the 
studies in this thesis open up challenging venues for further research and provide a 
valuable input to both internal auditors and management to help achieve the best of IA.
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169Summary
summAry
The effectiveness of Internal Audit obtains growing importance in both practice and 
academic research. The tension between the value that IA believes to provide and the 
value perceived by some of its customers is increasing. In many occasions audit issues 
addressed by the internal auditor are not always accepted by management and even 
though audit issues are accepted by management and corrective actions have been 
agreed, management turns a deaf ear to the internal auditor’s risk warning and is 
continuing the ‘wrongdoing’. As an illustration, we often hear about organizations expe-
riencing large projects that are not successful but not stopped by management despite 
the risk warnings reported by the internal auditor. While the question arises whether IA 
acts effectively in deaf effect situations, in circumstances of disastrous business failures, 
this could go even worse, followed by the inevitable question ‘where was the auditor 
again?’. This could raise the question if the IA is effective and its services are beneficial 
to management. 
In this thesis, several factors influencing deaf effect as indicator for IA effectiveness 
are studied which were (mostly) unexplored in the academic literature. In an experiment 
(Chapter 2) it was tested what are the main causal effects of additional contingency 
factors - the organization power of the internal auditor translated in top management 
support and the interaction effects from the collaborative partner vs. opponent per-
spective. In another experiment (Chapter 3) we included nudging with descriptive 
social norm to test the main causal effects and interaction effects from the collaborative 
partner vs opponent perspective. The results of these experiments were surprising and 
brought originality in this area of academic research. Our study provided interesting and 
surprising results from the interaction effects, indicating that top management support 
is not always a guarantee for reducing deafness on risk warnings of the internal auditor. 
While it may seem to be logical that in the high organization power conditions, decision 
makers are more likely to follow any advice, regardless whether the message comes 
from a collaborative partner or an opponent, our findings suggested that great top man-
agement support can even be contra-productive when the internal auditor is seen as a 
collaborative partner. Based on our study results, top management support appeared 
to be most useful for IA effectiveness when the internal auditor is seen as an opponent. 
The findings of the second experiment indicate that nudging through descriptive social 
norm can be used by the internal auditor to increase IA effectiveness by overcoming 
the deaf effect response to their risk warnings to management. Including a descriptive 
social norm as part of the risk warning message of the internal auditor in our experiment 
appeared to be useful as it significantly reduced the deaf effect response by the message 
recipient. Descriptive social norm can be even more useful when the messenger is seen 
as a collaborative partner. When the internal auditor is seen as an opponent, nudging 
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with a descriptive social norm is ineffective, so there is no guarantee that providing a 
descriptive social norm will work as intended.  To our knowledge, our study is a first 
study within the IA effectiveness research that investigated timing in relation to IA ef-
fectiveness, thereby linking the ‘supply-side’ and the ‘demand-side’ perspective of the 
IA effectiveness with each other (Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). By applying Focus Groups 
interviews (Chapter 4) and Q methodological approach (Chapter 5), we identified what 
determines the right moment for the internal auditor to communicate the risk warning 
messages to management. The results of these studies showed that timing is recognized 
by both internal auditors and management as an important factor for IA effectiveness. 
From these studies five ‘viewpoints’ were derived that may help internal auditors to find 
out the right timing to communicate the risk warning messages and hence increase IA 
effectiveness.
By studying IA effectiveness through deaf effect our study aimed at not only identify-
ing additional causal factors influencing IA effectiveness, but also finding out whether 
deaf effect for risk warning messages of the internal auditor can be studied by applying 
different approaches. While most of the studies in the area of IA effectiveness have fo-
cussed on factors influencing IA effectiveness such as e.g.  realisation of the audit plan, 
number of issued reports, implemented recommendations and the like, our study made 
a first step towards investigating how other, more behavioural related factors may be of 
benefit to the IA effectiveness. The studies in this thesis demonstrate that such factors 
like top management support, nudging and timing can be important for IA effective-
ness and that internal auditors should look ‘out of the box’ to look for other, innovative 
ways to increase effectiveness.
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nEDErlAnDsE sAmEnVAttIng (summAry In Dutch)
Effectiviteit van Internal Audit (IA) wordt steeds belangrijker voor organisaties. De waarde 
van de Internal Audit functies binnen  organisaties wordt steeds meer uitgedaagd door 
het management. In de praktijk komt het vaak voor  dat de audit issues, gerapporteerd 
door de internal auditor,  niet worden geaccepteerd door het  management. Het komt 
ook voor dat  het management de audit issues weliswaar accepteert, maar niet luistert 
naar de risico waarschuwing van de internal auditor en doorgaat met ‘wrongdoing’. 
Dit soort gedrag komt bijvoorbeeld vaak voor bij grote projecten binnen organisaties 
die niet succesvol zijn en de projecten gaan door ondanks de risico waarschuwingen 
van de internal auditor. De vraag ontstaat of de internal auditors effectief zijn in deze 
omstandigheden. Vooral in situaties waarbij grote projecten zijn mislukt kan er nog een 
vervolgvraag gesteld worden: ‘waar was de auditor weer?’ Dit soort situaties zorgt er-
voor dat de effectiviteit van Internal Audit in twijfel wordt getrokken en de toegevoegde 
waarde van  Internal Audit functie voor het management ter discuss wordt gesteld.  
Dit proefschrift richt zich op een aantal factoren die van invloed kunnen zijn op het 
‘deaf effect’ als een indicator voor de IA effectiviteit die tot dusver niet of nauwelijks on-
derzocht is in de academische literatuur. In het eerste experiment (Hoofdstuk 2) worden 
de main causal effecten van factoren zoals organization power van de internal auditor 
vertaald in top management support van de internal auditor en de interactie effecten 
collaborative partner vs. opponent perspectief onderzocht. In het tweede experiment 
(Hoofdstuk 3) wordt nudging met descriptive social norm getest voor de main causal 
effects and interaction effects vanuit de collaborative partner vs opponent perspectief. 
Deze twee experimenten hebben verrassende en originele resultaten voortgebracht. De 
uitkomsten geven aan dat organization power van de internal auditor via top manage-
ment support niet per se een garantie is voor vermindering van het deaf effect op de 
risico waarschuwingen van de internal auditor, en dat top management support niet 
altijd een positief effect op het deaf effect (en daardoor op IA effectiviteit) kan hebben. 
Het zou  logisch zijn dat in ‘high organization power ’condities, management  meer de 
neiging zou hebben om elk advies van de internal auditor op te volgen ongeacht of 
de risico boodschap vanuit een collaborative partner of een opponent komt. Echter, 
de bevindingen van onze studie geven aan dat dit tegenovergestelde effecten kan 
hebben wanner de risico boodschap vanuit een internal auditor als een collaborative 
partner komt. De resultaten van het tweede experiment geven aan dat nudging met 
descriptive social norms kan gebruikt worden door de internal auditor als onderdeel 
van de risico boodschap om het deaf effect te verminderen en zo de IA effectiviteit te 
vergroten. In ons experiment bleek het toevoegen van een descriptive social norm in 
de risico boodschap van de internal auditor te helpen om het deaf effect van de bood-
schap ontvanger te verminderen. De studie duidt aan dat descriptive social norm kan 
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nog meer bijdragen om het deaf effect te verminderen als de risico boodschap van een 
internal auditor die gezien wordt als collaborative partner komt. De resultaten geven 
aan dat wanneer de internal auditor gezien wordt als een opponent, de nudging met 
descriptive social norm niet effectief is. Verder, is voor zover wij weten,  deze studie de 
eerste binnen het academisch onderzoek van IA effectiviteit die timing in relatie tot het 
deaf effect en IA effectiviteit onderzoekt. Daarbij worden de ‘supply kant’ en de ‘demand 
kant’ perspectieven van IA effectiviteit met elkaar verbonden (Hoofdstuk 4 en Hoofdstuk 
5). De resultaten van de derde en de vierde studie laten zien dat timing belangrijk wordt 
gevonden door de internal auditors en management als een belangrijke factor voor 
de IA effectiviteit. Deze studies resulteerden in vijf ‘viewpoints’ die de internal auditors 
samen met management kunnen gebruiken om de juiste timing te vinden voor het 
communiceren van de risico boodschap zodat management meer luistert naar deze 
boodschap. Hierdoor wordt   de IA effectiviteit vergroot.  
De studies in dit proefschrift laten zien dat ook andere, meer gedragsgerelateerde 
factoren wel degelijk de IA effectiviteit kunnen vergroten. Zelfs factoren die niets met 
internal auditing te maken hebben, lijken in staat om het deaf effect op risico waar-
schuwingen van de internal auditor te beïnvloeden. Dit onderstreept het belang voor 
de internal auditors om buiten de box te gaan denken om te zoeken naar andere, in-
novatieve manieren voor het vergoten van de IA effectiviteit. 
173About the Author
About thE Author
Violeta Verbraak-Kolevska was born on February 13, 1967 in 
Skopje, Macedonia. She moved to The Netherlands in Feb-
ruary 1997 to continue with her private and professional 
life. She graduated cum laude at the University of Skopje 
‘Kiril and Methodij’ for her university degree in Economics 
& Banking & Accounting in 1991. In 2005 she continued 
her education and became a Certified Internal Auditor at 
the Institute of Internal Auditors. In 2012 she graduated 
at the Erasmus School of Accounting & Auditing for her 
degree Executive Master of IT Auditing. Thereafter in 2013 
she obtained her degree Executive Master of Internal Auditing. Her interest in (research 
on) effectiveness of internal audit was formed during the finalization of her post master 
education at the ESAA. After defending her thesis related to monitoring of IT projects 
for the purpose of finalization of her Executive Master of IT Auditing, mentored by Dr. 
Arno Nuijten, she got the opportunity to proceed with further research as part of her 
PhD. This PhD research was under supervision of Dr. Arno Nuijten who became the co-
promotor for this thesis. 
In 2014, after presenting her research idea at the 11the European Academic Confer-
ence on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance in Oslo, Violeta started her PhD 
research at the Erasmus University Rotterdam as a part-time PhD student being full 
time employed as an internal auditor at ABN AMRO Bank in Amsterdam. During her PhD 
research, she attended and presented her work at several conferences such as the Euro-
pean Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance in 2013  throughout 2017 
and the SABE/IAREP conference in 2016. In 2014 she obtained the ‘best paper award’ for 
her first paper at the European Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance 
in Italy. Violeta is currently part of the E-Bridges research team at the Erasmus School of 
Accounting & Assurance (ESAA).  
Violeta is married to Guido and together they have a son Victor who is 15 years old. 
In her free time she likes shopping and as soon as she can, she visits her family in Mace-
donia. 
11 
 
bout the Author
174 Portfolio
PortfolIo
Publications
Articles under review:
Verbraak, V, Nuijten, A.L.P., Keil M.  Nudging with Descriptive Social Norms to Overcome 
the Deaf Effect for IT Project Risk Warnings, under review at EJIS.
Articles in progress:
Verbraak, V, Nuijten, A.L.P  Does the Organization Power through Top Management Sup-
port help Internal Auditors to Reduce the Deaf Effect for Risk Warnings?, in preparation 
to be resubmitted in AJTP. 
Verbraak, V, Nuijten, A.L.P., van Exel J. Q Method study: The influence of timing on IA 
effectiveness, in preparation to be submitted in AJTP.
Ph.D. Studies, Workshops and Courses:
Self-studies and Training on the Job
Self-study on Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Design (September 2013 through-
out March 2014 and September 2014 throughout March 2015).
Self-study on Focus Groups methodology (October 2015 throughout March 2016).
Self-study over Q Methodological research (June – September 2016) for the purpose for 
the purpose of the Q Method study on Timing factors conducted starting September 
2016 throughout April 2017.
Training on the job: academic writing by prof Mark Keil (Georgia State University), May 
2016.
Training on the job: Q-method by prof Job van Exel (ESE), October-December 2016. 
Workshops
Workshop Moderation Analysis by Professor Mark Keil from Gorgia State University (May 
20, 2015).
Workshop PhD research approach by Professor Mark Keil from Gorgia State University 
(May 18, 2016).
175Portfolio
Workshop writing a paper for a journal by Professor Mark Keil from Gorgia State Univer-
sity (May 19, 2016).
Courses
Limperg course on Experimental Research in Accounting in Tilburg by Professor Kristy 
Towry from Goizueta Business School, Emory University (April 22, 2014 – April 23, 2014 
and May 19 – May 23, 2014).
SPSS course by dr. Arno Nuijten (December 19, 2014 and December 23, 2014).
PLS course by dr. Arno Nuijten (March 6, 2015).
Altas.ti course by dr. Nick Benschop (March 4, 2016 and March 21, 2016).
Specific Integrity training: 
Scientific Professionalism and Integrity session by prof. dr. Marius van Dijke (RSM) and 
prof. dr. Patrick Groenen (ESE): Registered for February 23, 2017.   
Conference paper presented at:
11th European Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance in Oslo 
(by Norwegian Business School), April 24, 2013 – April 26, 2013.
12th European Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance in Millan 
(by Politechnico di Milano University), April 9, 2014 – April 11, 2014.
13th European Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance in Lon-
don (CASS Business School), April 9, 2015 – April 11, 2015.
14th European Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance in Rot-
terdam (by the ESAA), April 6, 2016 – April 8, 2016.
15th European Academic Conference on Internal Audit and Corporate Governance in Athens, 
April 19, 2016 – April 21, 2017.
 “Behavioural Insights in research and Policy Making” SABE/IAREB Conference in Wagenin-
gen, July 8, 2016 – July 10, 2016.
IIA Congress ‘Where on Earth Are We?, IJmuiden, June 23, 2014 – June 24, 2014.
